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ABSTRACT
As cooperative multiagent systems (MASs) increase in interconnectivity, complex-
ity, size, and longevity, coordinating the agents’ reasoning and behaviors becomes
increasingly difficult. One approach to address these issues is to use insights from
human organizations to design structures within which the agents can more efficiently
reason and interact. Generally speaking, an organization influences each agent such
that, by following its respective influences, an agent can make globally-useful local
decisions without having to explicitly reason about the complete joint coordination
problem. For example, an organizational influence might constrain and/or inform
which actions an agent performs. If these influences are well-constructed to be cohesive
and correlated across the agents, then each agent is influenced into reasoning about and
performing only the actions that are appropriate for its (organizationally-designated)
portion of the joint coordination problem.
In this dissertation, I develop an agent-driven approach to organizations, wherein
the foundation for representing and reasoning about an organization stems from the
needs of the agents in the MAS. I create an organizational specification language to
express the possible ways in which an organization could influence the agents’ decision
making processes, and leverage details from those decision processes to establish
quantitative, principled metrics for organizational performance based on the expected
impact that an organization will have on the agents’ reasoning and behaviors.
Building upon my agent-driven organizational representations, I identify a strategy
for automating the organizational design process (ODP), wherein my ODP computes
a quantitative description of organizational patterns and then searches through those
possible patterns to identify an (approximately) optimal set of organizational influences
for the MAS. Evaluating my ODP reveals that it can create organizations that both
influence the MAS into effective patterns of joint policies and also streamline the agents’
decision making in a coordinate manner. Finally, I use my agent-driven approach to
identify characteristics of effective abstractions over organizational influences and a
heuristic strategy for converging on a good abstraction.
xiv
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Multiagent systems (MASs) are a promising approach for addressing many com-
plex real world problems such as: disaster response, health care management, energy
distribution, transportation management, and distributed sensing, among many oth-
ers. However, as such systems become increasingly large, interconnected, resource
constrained, and long lived, coordinating the agents’ individual actions to collectively
achieve desirable global outcomes becomes increasingly difficult. Larger MASs expand
the space of possible joint actions, increasing the number of collective decisions the
agents can consider making. More interconnected MASs limit the effectiveness of
decoupling techniques (Witwicki, 2010; Zhang et al., 2010) that exploit structure in
the ways that agents can interact to make joint decision making more efficient. Tighter
resource constraints magnify the importance of enacting coordinated joint policies.
Long lasting systems further compound these issues by making the agents account for
the long-term effects of their joint actions’ trajectory.
One approach for combating these issues in real-world, human systems (e.g.,
corporations, governments, etc.) is the use of organizations, which, broadly speaking,
attempt to instill long term coordination patterns so as to decompose the system’s
joint decision problem into more manageable components. The hope is that, if these
patterns are chosen well, people can make local decisions that contribute to effective
joint actions without having to explicitly consider the entire joint decision problem. As
a result, a well-designed organization allows humans to efficiently operate even when
scaled to many people collectively working towards a long-term objective with limited
resources. Complementarily and unsurprisingly, a poorly-designed organization can
be disastrous for the system, and result in mis-coordination (e.g., poor utilization of
shared resources or failure to realize collectively achievable objectives) and/or excessive
or insufficient coordination to make collective decisions.
1
In an effort to realize organizational benefits for computational agents, MAS
research has investigated how organizational concepts and strategies can be modeled
and utilized, and shown that organizations can increase the expected performance of
large-scale, cooperative MASs (So & Durfee, 1998; Fox et al., 1998). However, as I
describe more fully in Section 2.2, existing organizational research fails to provide
computational representations and algorithms that can explicitly identify appropriate
organizational patterns from first principles without external expert information. I
argue that such computational techniques for organizational design, which are the
focus of this dissertation, are vital if organizations are to be reliably deployed as a
beneficial technique for multiagent coordination, since a poorly-designed organization
can have adverse consequences and designing an organization by hand can be complex,
time-consuming, and error-prone.
1.1 Problem Statement
While organizations for MASs have been extensively studied, there is no consensus
as to what constitutes a well-defined organizational design problem. However, there
are several common properties in the MAS organizational design research literature
that when taken together constitute an intuitive, informal conception of what an
organization is. I begin here by characterizing these core properties, and outline how
they relate to an intuitive understanding of organizations. Then, I describe how these
properties can be more formally grounded to provide the well-defined organizational
design problem for MASs that I solve in this dissertation.
Property 1.1: Cooperative Multiagent System. Fundamentally, an organi-
zation consists of multiple agents collectively working to achieve a known, shared
objective, and carries a notion of at least some cooperation among the agents. If we
further assume the agents are constructed for the purpose of operating in the organiza-
tion, then the agents are also fully-cooperative.1 That is, there are not self-interested
notions such as personal gain (e.g., preferring actions that result in more individual
glory) or fairness (e.g., preferring actions that require less individual effort). I make
no assumptions about agent heterogeneity, and the agents may or may not have varied
capabilities.
1It is noteworthy that organizations have also been studied in semi-cooperative settings where
agents make decisions based on a balance between organizational and personal objectives (Brooks &
Durfee, 2003; Stone et al., 2010). However, in this dissertation I limit my discussion to fully-cooperative
settings.
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Property 1.2: Interdependent Agents. Intuitively, a primary objective of any
MAS coordination mechanism, including organizations, is to facilitate good inter-
actions among the agents. This implicitly assumes a problem domain containing
inter-agent dependencies (e.g., synchronized/sequential actions and/or contention for
shared resources) that the agents must collectively resolve. In MAS research, such in-
terdependencies have been characterized as agent coupling (Witwicki & Durfee, 2011),
and several methods have been developed for efficient reasoning in loosely-coupled
MASs (Varakantham et al., 2009; Witwicki, 2010; Velagapudi et al., 2011; Oliehoek
et al., 2013). The relationship between organizational techniques and agent coupling
is complex. For loosely-coupled systems, an organization can more safely facilitate
agent interactions by imposing coordination patterns since agents can already operate
without extensive coordination, intuitively allowing for high performing organizations
in such systems. On the other hand, tightly-coupled systems present more prevalent
and/or significant opportunities for facilitating agent interactions, and thus are in-
tuitively more interesting systems for employing organizational techniques. In this
dissertation, I will not make any strong assumptions about loose versus tight coupling,
but will tend to evaluate my work in relatively tightly-coupled systems since they
present a more challenging domain for organizational design.
Property 1.3: Knowledge Limitations. Agents in an organization are often
assumed to have some degree of individual expertise about the problem domain, but
may lack knowledge of how their individual actions should (best) contribute to the
rest of the system. Complementarily, a centralized perspective of the global problem
domain exists (for the organizational design process) that models how the agents
can interact with each other; however, this perspective may be imprecise and/or
incomplete with respect to the detailed problem specifics contained in the agents’
expertise. A basic motivation for an organizational approach is to provide the agents
with a more globally aware, organizational context within which to exercise their local
expertise.
Property 1.4: Coordination Overhead. Agents are typically assumed to have
some capacity for coordinating their decisions with other agents; however, doing so
incurs overhead and thus must be performed judiciously. For example, agents might
be capable of communicating to share information about the domain, create joint
plans, or commit to agreed-upon responsibilities, however such message exchanges
consume valuable resources (e.g., power, time, or bandwidth) that could be spent on
other actions. An intuitive advantage of an organization is to decrease such overhead
by reducing the amount of explicit coordination that the agents require.
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Property 1.5: Temporally Extended. Organizations are typically assumed to
be long-lived (i.e., persist for several similar or related problem instances that the
agents face in sequence), and moreover to change slowly (i.e., the same, or nearly
the same, organization is used for each of the instances). This serves to provide
stability and continuity for the MAS (e.g., agents can be replaced without having to
completely redesign how the other agents in the MAS should reason and behave), as
well as to reduce the effective costs for designing an organization since the costs can
be amortized. In this dissertation, I manifest this property as an episodic problem
domain (i.e., the environment is either naturally episodic or can be punctuated to
artificially create episodes), where actions executed in one episode do not impact
choice of actions or their effects in any other episode. While distinct, I assume episodes
are similar enough to each other that sufficient long-term coordination patterns exist
to warrant an organizational approach.
MASs exhibiting Properties 1.1– 1.5 can be encoded in a variety of modeling
paradigms. To ground my discussions in this dissertation, I focus on the decentralized
Markov decision process (Dec-MDP) (Bernstein et al., 2002), which I describe in more
detail in Section 2.1.4. Briefly, the Dec-MDP is a formal mathematical framework for
describing distributed, sequential decision problems in partially observable, stochastic
domains.
Collectively, Properties 1.1– 1.5 provide a high-level motivation for employing an
organization in a MAS. Namely, an organization for a MAS provides information
to each agent about the long-term patterns of organizationally-designated policies it
should typically be responsible for reasoning about and/or executing (i.e., incorporates
non-local considerations into the agents’ local decision problems), which enables agents
to make globally-useful local decisions without having to explicitly consider the entire
joint coordination problem.
This characterization leaves many questions unanswered. For example, how does
an organizational designer decide which responsibilities each agent should have? To
what extent should the organization impose policies on the agents versus leveraging
their individual expertise? To what extent should an organization specify broad
patterns that provide organizational context for agents’ local decision making versus
provide a collection of specific, narrow patterns for ensuring nuanced, coordinated
interactions at critical junctures? These questions, among others to be addressed later,
can be categorized as aspects of the organizational design problem, and fall under the
overarching question of how are (good) organizations created?
Prior organizational design approaches, which I discuss more in Section 2.2, have
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centered either on employing a human to encode an organization using his/her expert
knowledge to identify an organization for the problem domain, or on allowing implicitly-
organized policies to emerge via experience gained by the agents repeatedly interacting
with the environment and each other. Each of these approaches has limitations, for
example human driven organizational design may be overly complex, error prone,
and/or time consuming. Emergence of implicit organizations may require extensive
interactions, have poor transient performance until the MAS’s policy converges (if ever),
and/or the resulting policy may be difficult for system administrators to comprehend
or justify. In this dissertation, I bridge these alternative approaches, and develop an
agent-driven approach for automated design of explicit organizations.
The main problem that I address in this dissertation is how to represent and design
effective organizations for MASs via an automated computational process. A solution
to this problem is an organizational design process (ODP) that satisfies the following
criteria:
Principled, mathematical foundation. Reliance on external expert information
to design organizations is ultimately unsustainable as MASs become increasingly large,
long-lived, interconnected, distant from human experience, and populated by agents
that are far from human-like, resulting in nuanced agent policies and interaction
patterns that are difficult for humans to predict and organizationally encode. As
such, a user of an ODP should not be expected to provide expert knowledge of
appropriate organizational patterns for a MAS, but rather to provide knowledge about
the MAS’s characteristics that an ODP can analyze as part of creating an organization.
In my dissertation, this means that an ODP should create organizations from the
patterns it can identify from its Dec-MDP model of the domain, and not rely on
(human-provided) domain-specific knowledge external to this model. In circumstances
where a parameterized ODP could produce alternative organizations with different,
non-Pareto dominating performance measures (e.g., imparted metareasoning regime,
organizational abstraction level, etc.), a theoretical understanding of how parameter
choices affect the resulting organization should also be provided to guide usage of the
algorithm.
Flexibility to varied domain characteristics. While an ODP undoubtedly needs
to recognize and exploit domain-specific information contained in the Dec-MDP model
of the MAS, an ODP should not be reliant on the existence of specific, specialized
domain characteristics (e.g., transition or reward independence, particular inter-agent
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influence topologies like loose-coupling or a directed acyclic influence graph, etc.). If a
MAS is expressible as a Dec-MDP, then an ODP should be capable of designing an
organization for that system.
Yield high-quality organizations. An ODP should create organizations that do
not harm the performance of the MAS in expectation, and should typically improve
the expected performance of the system.
Scalability. As implied by Properties 1.1– 1.5, organizations are assumed to be
scalable in a multitude of dimensions including number of agents, agent coupling,
knowledge availability/accuracy, overhead, and lifetime. Moreover, the benefits of
organizations are believed to become increasingly important as these dimensions
scale up (Corkill & Lander, 1998). As such, an ODP should be able to scale up to
create organizations for MASs with interconnected agents that must interact for long
lifetimes, where coordination incurs substantial overhead, and organizations must be
created from imperfect knowledge of the domain and MAS.
1.2 Illustrating Example
To provide a more concrete example of the problems I am addressing, in this
section I describe a simplified firefighting domain that I use for illustration and
evaluation throughout this dissertation. Consider a grid world containing fires of
various intensities/importances, and fire-fighting agents that move throughout the
grid to extinguish those fires. The objective of the agents is to extinguish the fires as
quickly as possible, and let us assume that only a single agent is necessary to fight a
fire (e.g., an agent represents a fire brigade), implying the optimal joint policy is for
agents to spread out and fight fires in parallel. Additionally, suppose that grid-cell
delays cause movement throughout the grid to be non-deterministic, for example due
to traffic or debris that stochastically impedes an agent’s attempts to move into a
grid cell. Finally, the world is episodic, where the agents begin each episode at a
fixed location (e.g., their respective firehouses), then move throughout the grid and
extinguish a set of fires before returning to their initial locations. In each episode,
the agents are facing the same high-level problem (i.e., fight a set of fires), but the
specifics of each episode may differ, for example fires may be in different locations
with different intensities and the cell delays may be different. Figure 1.1 illustrates
several example problem episodes.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 1.1: Example initial states for three different problem episodes. Darker cell
shading indicates higher cell delays.
If each agent had full awareness of the global state and the other agents’ capabilities,
then the agents could each determine the optimal joint policy (though this could
be prohibitively expensive to compute in some cases), and consequently also know
the respective local actions that they should perform as part of that joint policy.
However, a more practical assumption is that the agents are not inherently fully
aware of the global state or each others’ capabilities, but rather can only obtain
such non-local information if they exchange messages. Intuitively, communicating
the agents’ capabilities for the full range of possible global states and/or maintaining
global state awareness as the state stochastically changes over time could require an
extensive amount of information being exchanged between the agents, which consumes
valuable resources that could otherwise be spent fighting fires.
To see the advantages that an organization can provide for such a MAS, consider the
simple organization in Figure 1.2a that designates partitioned regions of responsibility
for each agent to fight fires within. If each agent focuses on fighting the fires in its
organizationally-designated region, then the agents no longer need to know any non-
local information or to (further) coordinate their local policies with other agents. It is
non-trivial, however, to decide if this region-partitioning organization is appropriate
for the problem domain. For example, notice that this region-partitioning organization
will tend to work well if the fires are uniformly distributed among the partitions, but
since the organization will persist across all episodes,2 could be overly restrictive in
other episodes, for example the episode in Figure 1.1b where by chance the fires are
skewed to one partition.
Stepping back, how did an ODP come up with the region-partitioning organization
2 Alternatively, a MAS could have different organizations for different episodes, alongside rules
for multiplexing these alternative organizations, and indeed this strategy makes sense in many
cases. (I revisit this notion in Section 6.2.1). Conceptually, however, such a multiplexing strategy
is semantically identical to an overarching organization with several sub-components, each with
interaction patterns tailored for sub-classes of environmental conditions. For simplicity and clarity in
my discussions, I will treat multiplexed organizations as a single, overarching organization unless
otherwise noted.
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Figure 1.2: Example organizations that designate regions of responsibility for each
agent to focus on fighting fires within.
in the first place? Why not partition the grid differently (e.g., Figure 1.2b), or have
overlapping regions of responsibility to decrease the likelihood of mismatched episodes
(e.g., Figure 1.2c), or time varying regions (confusing to represent on a spatial graphic,
but see Section 5.4 for examples of these kinds of organizations), or fuzzy boundaries
to designate regions of responsibility (again confusing to represent graphically, but see
Section 3.5.3 for an example)? Indeed, each of these alternative examples could be
the best organization for some (subset of) problem episodes.
The objective of the organizational design problem laid out in Section 1.1, and the
focus of this dissertation, is to identify the (approximately) optimal organization for a
given MAS from the first principles about the expected domain (as captured in the
ODP’s Dec-MDP model).
1.3 Solution Approach
Prior approaches to explicitly solving the organizational design problem have
taken a problem-driven stance (see Section 2.2.2 for more details). That is, these
approaches begin by designing an organization (externally to any specific MAS) to
solve a problem, and then populate the organization with agents to embody that
organization. In contrast, my approach is agent-driven, where I begin by assuming
a specific MAS is already in place and then create an organization to optimize and
streamline that MAS. As we will see throughout this dissertation, the fundamental
advantage of my agent-driven approach over a problem-driven one is that decisions
about the organizational design can be grounded in the expected impact that those
decisions will have on the MAS. This mathematical basis provides opportunities for a
deeper, theoretical comprehension of how organizations relate to MASs, establishes a
basis for evaluating the effectiveness of an organization, and anchors computational
algorithms for autonomous organizational design.
My agent-driven approach has far-reaching consequences, and affects issues ranging
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Figure 1.3: Overview of how my ODP operates and interacts with the MAS.
from the language for specifying an organization to agents in a MAS, to heuristics
for guiding organizational design (e.g., either for a human designer or for setting
parameters of an automated ODP), to how an autonomous ODP can create an
appropriate organization, among others to be discussed later. In this dissertation I
focus on three primary areas as depicted in Figure 1.3 (see Section 6.2 for a discussion
and some preliminary results of how my approach could affect other points of interest
in organizational and MAS research).
Agent Decision Making. Specifying an organization to a MAS such that the
agents can each unambiguously understand what is organizationally expected of them
is a complex problem (see Section 2.2.2 for an overview of prior work in this area).
Moreover, the agents must be capable of integrating the organizational directives
into their native, local reasoning processes. Leveraging my agent-driven approach,
however, solves these issues at a fundamental level. Rather than construct a language
by identifying important and/or useful organizational constructs and then building
up middleware that permits agents to understand and integrate their organization
into their local reasoning (as is typical in prior work), I instead begin by committing
to a particular agent reasoning framework (Dec-MDP agents in this dissertation)
and then derive the organizational constructs that are natively and unambiguously
expressible in that framework. That is, my organizational specification language is
directly derived from the agents’ internal reasoning framework, which allows agents
to naturally understand and integrate the organizational directives into their local
reasoning.
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Organizational Search. As alluded in Section 1.1, an ODP’s objective is to create
an organization by identifying appropriate patterns of agent actions and interactions
and then encoding those patterns within the target organizational specification lan-
guage. My ODP achieves this by searching through a space of organizational influences,
which are the building blocks that comprise an organizational specification. Broadly
speaking (formal definitions follow in Chapter 3), an organizational influence is a
modification to an agent’s local reasoning process For example in Dec-MDP agents,
an organizational influence could prohibit an agent from considering an action in some
state(s), augment an agent’s reward function to incentivize organizationally-desired
policies, etc. Thus, my ODP’s objective is to identify a set of organizational influences
to specify that will guide the agents into appropriate patterns of agent actions and
interactions.
Leveraging my agent-driven approach, an ODP can measure the impact that a
(set of) influences will have on the MAS, and use these measurements to inform a
search over the organizational influence space. Intuitively, the optimal organization is
then defined as the set of organizational influences with the optimal expected impact
to the MAS; unsurprisingly however, it is computationally intractable to exhaustively
search through the combinations of organizational influences. As such, an important
part of my work in this dissertation is the identification of more efficient techniques
for identifying an approximately optimal set of organizational influences.
Compute Organizational Patterns. My organizational search process just de-
scribed relies extensively on statistical estimates of the impact that organizational
influences are expected to have on the MAS. More broadly, for a computational ODP
to make intelligent decisions about the long-term patterns it should encode as an
organization for a MAS, it must have a sense as to how well each of the agents’ various
policies are expected to perform. In principle, an ODP could acquire this information
from any of several sources, such as from a system administrator (e.g., an expert human
that has general ideas of how the MAS should act) or from the agents themselves
(e.g., if the MAS has been acting in the environment for some time already); however,
leveraging my agent-driven approach for organizational design, in this dissertation I
develop techniques by which an ODP can self-determine a quantitative description of
organizational patterns.
Given that the ODP has a Dec-MDP model of the MAS, computing a quantitative
description of organizational patterns can be done by completely solving the Dec-MDP
for the MAS’s optimal joint policy, which is a computationally intensive task, especially
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for MASs exhibiting Properties 1.1– 1.5. To mitigate the computational intractability
of directly computing the MAS’s complete, optimal joint policy, I adopt a Monte Carlo
sampling approach to empirically estimate organizational patterns. Specifically, the
ODP samples problem episodes from its Dec-MDP model, and for each computes the
optimal joint policy for that episode’s reachable state space, before finally aggregating
across the samples to form an estimate of optimal organizational patterns. In this way,
the ODP can compute a statistically-stable, quantitative description of organizational
patterns, which the ODP can then use to inform its search of the organizational
influence space.
1.4 Contributions
Fundamentally, the overarching question of my dissertation is how is an organization
created for a MAS? In answering this question, I develop both novel representational
strategies for describing organizations in MASs and solution techniques for deciding
on an appropriate organization for a MAS. In what follows, I highlight the most
significant contributions of my work, describe how each is evaluated, and discuss the
implications of my results to further extensions by researchers and/or adoption by
practitioners.
Agent-driven Organizational Specification Languages. From my agent-driven
approach, a principled organizational specification language can be derived from the
agents’ native reasoning representations and processes. Fundamentally, the advantage
of constructing a specification language this way is that the agents can unambiguously,
directly integrate their organization into their local decision processes. Additionally,
since the agents (presumably) have a finite vocabulary of native representational
constructs (e.g., states, initial states, actions, rewards, transitions, and time horizon
constructs for MDP-based agents), an agent-driven approach allows for formal analysis
of a specification language’s necessity and completeness, and also establishes a well-
defined organizational design space.
I evaluate this methodology by demonstrating its application to Dec-MDP agents
(Chapter 3). Stepping through my methodology, I first use the Dec-MDP decision
framework to enumerate the constructs of my organizational specification language,
and then use the mathematics of the Dec-MDP framework to formally prove the
necessity and completeness of my language. While the semantics associated with
each construct of my specification language are precisely defined by the underlying
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theory of the Dec-MDP framework, I additionally perform an empirical evaluation for
each language construct to demonstrate the practical applicability of my agent-driven
organizational specification language.
My methodology could be used by other researchers studying organizations to
construct agent-grounded specification languages for other agent reasoning frameworks.
Additionally, by demonstrating my methodology on Dec-MDP agents, I provide a
language for practitioners of Dec-MDPs to incorporate organizations into their systems
as well as a launching point for further study of organizations in Dec-MDPs.
Principled, Quantitative Metrics for Organizational Performance. A sig-
nificant advantage of my agent-driven approach is that it enables quantitative mea-
surements of organizational performance stemming from how the MAS is expected
to actually perform when using the organization. As I describe in Section 2.2.2,
prior, problem-driven approaches to organizational design do not have a systematic
way to measure organizational performance, which makes selecting an appropriate
or optimal organization rather ad hoc. From my agent-driven perspective, however,
organizational performance is directly defined by the MAS’s performance when using
the organization, thus providing a mathematically-sound foundation for reasoning
about alternative organizations. Consequently, I identify that an organization not only
impacts the quality of the MAS’s joint policy, but also the amount of computation
required for the agents to make decisions; that is, an organization can trade off between
the agents’ policy quality and their computational costs, a property often included as
part of metareasoning decisions (see Section 4.3.1 for an overview of prior research
on metareasoning). Leveraging my agent-driven approach, I quantify the effects
of such metareasoning decisions to provide parameterized metrics of organizational
performance (Section 4.3).
I evaluate the advantages of my agent-driven, quantitative performance metrics by
developing an ODP based on them, and evaluating this ODP’s effectiveness over a
space of parameters as previously described in the problem statement (Section 1.1).
My ODP evaluation shows that my organizational performance metrics are predictive
of the actual performance of the MAS using the organization, and that the ODP is
able to leverage these quantitative metrics to design effective organizations for the
MAS.
The performance metrics I identify, and my agent-driven approach for identifying
them more broadly, could be used by other researchers studying organizations to
provide a principled, quantitative foundation for further study of organizational
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design techniques, thereby allowing for informed, rational decision-making about
organizational designs. Possible directions for future research include further study of
the ODP beyond what I describe in the scope of this dissertation (see Section 6.2), such
as organizational adaptations (e.g., in response to shifting or unexpected environmental
conditions), or hierarchical nesting of organizations.
Heuristics for Guiding Organizational Selection. Creating an organization is
a challenging task, regardless of whether the ODP is performed by a computational
algorithm or an expert human. To both broaden my results’ accessibility to problem-
driven organizational approaches, as well as guide usage of automated ODPs, I
formulate heuristic guidelines for selecting an appropriate organization for a MAS.
Specifically, I identify that an organization should focus on patterns of the agents’
joint interactions rather than how an agent should execute its local components of
those joint actions (Section 4.1), and that task-delineated abstractions are a good
mechanism to include in an ODP’s reasoning about which organizational influences to
specify (Section 5.5).
Leveraging my agent-driven approach, I analyze these heuristics to identify their
theoretical foundations. In addition, I demonstrate the heuristics’ effectiveness em-
pirically over a space of environmental parameters, and find that in expectation
they yield organizations do not harm the MAS’s performance, but that they perform
significantly better under certain environmental parameterizations, e.g., when agents
have meaningful local expertise (Property 1.3).
Beyond informing usage of my ODP algorithm, these heuristics could be used to
inform usage of existing, problem-driven organizational approaches, for example, to
delimit and/or focus a human designer’s attention to the aspects of an organization that
are most important to explicitly reason about. Additionally, MAS practitioners can
use these heuristics to identify effective ways for organizing a MAS as a less-demanding
alternative to a complete, computationally-intensive ODP.
Techniques for Automated Organizational Design. Finally, to provide a more
comprehensive solution for the organizational design problem than heuristics, I develop
representations and algorithms for an automated ODP (Chapters 4 and 5). In doing
so, I develop novel strategies for efficiently estimating an organizational influence’s
incremental impact, and embed these statistical estimates in an incremental search
algorithm of the organizational influence space. I also develop a novel framework for
analyzing how the abstraction level of the organizational influence space affects the
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ODP’s search algorithm and the resulting performance of an organization created by
my ODP.
I evaluate my ODP using the solution criteria previously set forth in Section 1.1. I
empirically evaluate both the ODP’s effectiveness as well as the performance of the
organizations the ODP creates, and when meaningful, additionally provide theoretical
analysis of my ODP’s characteristics (e.g., computational complexity). Briefly, I find
that my ODP is able to efficiently identify an approximately optimal organization
for a MAS, where such an organization exploits structure in the domain to achieve
performance significantly better than the baseline MAS as well as better than the best
hand-tailored organizations that I create using my organizational selection heuristics.
As is, my ODP can be used to create organizations for MASs represented as Dec-
MDPs, which Dec-MDP practitioners could use to organize their systems. Moreover,
my results here serve as a springboard for further study of organizational reasoning
techniques, providing not only a starting point for further research (e.g., see Section 6.2)
but also a performance benchmark against which to compare alternative organizational
design approaches.
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CHAPTER 2
Background
The research I present in this dissertation straddles and builds upon ideas from
multiple areas of prior work that have traditionally been pursued by disparate research
communities. It is therefore unsurprising that a comprehensive discussion of all
background work relevant for my research would fill many volumes of books and is well
beyond the scope of my dissertation. In this chapter, I overview the most pertinent
areas of prior work so that the reader can better understand how my contributions
and approach are situated with respect to the existing research literature. When
more detailed understanding is necessary for comprehending my representational and
algorithmic contributions, I delve more deeply into the necessary technical material.
The rest of this chapter is structured into two major components, operational deci-
sion making (Section 2.1) and organizational decision making (Section 2.2). Broadly
speaking, operational decision making focuses on the representations and algorithms
that agents use to reason about their local and/or joint decisions within a single
problem episode. That is, given a specific decision problem, how does an agent plan its
actions and coordinate with other agents so that the MAS can operate (approximately)
optimally for the currently encountered episode. Complementarily, organizational
decision making focuses on the representations and algorithms that the MAS and/or
ODP use to reason about the long-term coordination patterns exhibited across problem
episodes. That is, given a distribution of expected decision problems, how should the
MAS be organized so as to streamline the agents’ operational reasoning and promote
effective interactions across the space of episodes the agents are likely to encounter.
2.1 Operational Decision Making
As mentioned in Section 1.3, I ground my agent-driven approach to organizational
design by first committing to a particular agent reasoning framework. In this disser-
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tation, I have elected to adopt the Dec-MDP modeling paradigm, which falls under
the broader class of decision-theoretic models. Decision-theoretic models are a widely
studied and commonly adopted paradigm within the research community due to
their principled mathematical foundation, and their inclusion of expressively-powerful
modeling constucts like uncertainty, utility, and sequential reasoning. In this section,
I provide a description of the decision-theoretic modeling techniques and concepts
that are necessary to understand the organizational representations and algorithms
that I develop throughout this dissertation.
I begin with the single agent decision-theoretic model my agents utilize, namely
the Markov decision process (MDP) in Section 2.1.1, and then discuss a related
model that incorporates partial observability, the partially observable Markov decision
process (POMDP) in Section 2.1.2. While the basic MDP and POMDP models
provide the formal basis for my agents’ local reasoning, my methods also make
heavy use of factoring, a concept that extends the basic models by decomposing the
representation of model components into conditionally independent factors, which
provides specification compactness and computational efficiency (Section 2.1.3). I
then turn to the cooperative multiagent case, the decentralized (partially observable)
Markov decision process (Dec-(PO)MDP) in Section 2.1.4, which provides a multiagent
foundation for decision-theoretic models. To mitigate computational intractability,
my algorithms incorporate hierarchical abstractions into the decision-theoretic models
(Section 2.1.5), which allows agents to reason about tasks to accomplish instead of
primitive actions to perform.
Formal definitions will be provided in the sections that follow, but generally
speaking, the idea behind decision-theoretic models is that there exists a problem
environment that is currently in some state. The agent obtains information about the
current state by making an observation, and must make a decision about which action
it should execute. The agent decides which action to execute based upon a function
that associates a reward with each state, where the agent’s objective is to maximize its
expected total reward.1 After the agent executes an action, the environment transitions
to a (potentially) new state according to its (stochastic) dynamics and the agent’s
action. This process (i.e., the agent making an observation, then executing an action,
and then the environment transitioning) repeats for a predetermined, finite number of
iterations.
1 In this dissertation, I only consider finite horizon models, and thus the expected total reward is
the agent’s optimization objective. More generally speaking, decision-theoretic models can be infinite
horizon, in which case there would be a discount factor instead of a time horizon, and the agent’s
objective would be to optimize the expected discounted reward.
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2.1.1 Markov Decision Process
The Markov decision process (MDP) (Bellman, 1957) is a mathematical framework
for sequential decision making for a single agent that incorporates rewards as well as
transition uncertainty. More formally, a MDP is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. A finite horizon MDP is given by the tupleM = 〈S, α,A, P,R, T 〉,
where:
 S is the finite set of possible states in the environment. For notational clarity, I
will sometimes use superscripts to denote the decision point at which a state is
encountered, for example, st is state s at the t-th decision point.
 α : S 7→ [0, 1] is the initial state distribution, where α(s0) specifies the probability
that the environment will initially begin in state s0 ∈ S.
 A is the finite set of possible actions. Each state may have a different (sub)set
of available actions, and Ast ⊆ A represents the actions available to the agent in
state st ∈ S. I will be notationally explicit in this initial definition, but neglect
this notational nuance in subsequent discussions to reduce notational clutter
(though the set of actions available in a state will still be a function of that state).
 P : S × AS × S 7→ [0, 1] is the transition function, where P (st+1|st, a) denotes
the probability of the environment transitioning to state st+1 ∈ S after the agent
executes action a ∈ Ast in state st ∈ S.
 R : S × AS × S 7→ R is the reward function, where R(st, a, st+1) denotes the
immediate reward the agent associates with executing action a ∈ Ast in state
st ∈ S and the environment transitioning to state st+1 ∈ S.
 T ∈ N is the finite time horizon and specifies the number of decision points,
after which the problem terminates.
An important property for computational tractability in an MDP is the Markov
property, which asserts that the transition dynamics, P (st+1|st, a), and reward,
R(st, a, st+1) are conditionally independent of any other past states, actions, transitions,
or rewards, given the current state.
Consider a single agent version of the firefighting domain from Section 1.2 (I
present a multiagent version in Section 2.1.4), where a firefighting agent and fires to
be fought exist in a grid world with C cells (Figure 2.1). The (factored) environment
state representation captures: the system time, t ∈ N; the location of the agent, ` ∈ C;
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Figure 2.1: Example state of a 5×5 firefighting grid world. A1 designates the cell
corresponding to the location of the agent, and I = x indicates that there is a fire in
that cell with intensity x. Letters designate a (H)igh, (M)edium, or (L)ow delay in
that cell.
the fire intensity, Ic ∈ N for each cell c; and a delay, δc ∈ [0, 1] for each cell c, which
stochastically prevents movement into that cell with probability δc. Figure 2.1 shows
an example environment state, with the location of the agent, along with the intensity
of fire in the two cells with Ic > 0. For illustration, suppose (H)igh, (M)edium, and
(L)ow delay in Figure 2.1 correspond to δc equal to 0.8, 0.5, and 0.0 respectively. For
simplicity (this will be relaxed in the multiagent case), suppose the agent can precisely
observe exactly which state the environment is in. The agent has six actions: a NOOP
action that makes no change to the environment state except to increment the time
by one (the other five actions also increment the time by one); four possible movement
actions, (N)orth, (S)outh, (E)ast, and (W)est, that each stochastically move the agent
one cell in the specified direction (into cell c dest) with probability 1 − δc dest, and
equates to a NOOP with probability δc dest (or if there is no cell in that direction);
and a fight-fire (FF) action that decrements by one the intensity of the agent’s current
cell (to a minimum of zero) and otherwise behaves like a NOOP. The agent executes
actions for a predetermined number of steps, T . Suppose the reward associated with
a state is −∑c Ic.
The agent’s objective in a MDP is to maximize its expected total reward, which is
recursively defined by the Bellman equation.
Q∗(st, a) ≡
∑
st+1∈S
P (st+1|st, a)
[
R(st, a, st+1) + max
a′∈A
Q∗(st+1, a′)
]
(2.1)
Q∗(st, a) designates the expected total reward of executing action a ∈ A in state
st ∈ S and then behaving optimally (i.e., executing actions that maximize expected
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total reward) from that point onward (i.e., the next T − t− 1 decision points).
An agent’s plan for how it will act in each state is described as a policy, pi :
S × A 7→ [0, 1], where pi(st, a) specifies the probability that the agent will execute
action a ∈ A in state st ∈ S. Reformulating Equation 2.1 in terms of pi yields Qpi(st, a),
the expected total reward of executing action a ∈ A in state st ∈ S and then following
policy pi from that point onward:
Qpi(st, a) ≡
∑
st+1∈S
P (st+1|st, a)
[
R(st, a, st+1) +
∑
a′∈A
pi(st+1, a′)Qpi(st+1, a′)
]
(2.2)
With this formulation, the agent’s objective is restated as finding an optimal policy
pi∗ in its policy space Π that maximizes the expected total reward.
pi∗ ≡ arg max
pi∈Π
∑
s0∈S
α(s0)
∑
a∈A
pi(s0, a)Qpi(s0, a) (2.3)
The optimal policy is also referred to as the solution to the MDP, and similarly, solving
a MDP refers to the process of computing pi∗.
Several alternative algorithms exist for solving MDPs, the best of which have
P-complete computational complexity in the number of states, actions, and representa-
tional size (Papadimitriou & Tsitsiklis, 1987). Throughout this proposal, I will refer to
the computational cost of solving for pi as C(pi). Notable algorithms for solving a MDP
include value and policy iteration (Russell & Norvig, 2009) which iteratively apply the
Bellman equation to gradually converge on pi∗, as well as linear programming, which I
utilize throughout this dissertation. In particular, I utilize a variation of the linear
program as formulated by Kallenberg (1983), which frames the policy creation process
as a linear optimization problem:
max
x
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
x(s, a)
∑
s′∈S
P (s′|s, a)R(s, a, s′)∣∣∣∣∣∣
∀s′ ∈ S, ∑
a′∈A
x(s′, a′)− ∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
x(s, a)P (s′|s, a) = α(s′)
∀s ∈ S,∀a ∈ A, x(s, a) ≥ 0
(2.4)
where the vector of variables x is referred to as the occupation measures, and x(s, a)
denotes the total expected number of times that action a ∈ A is performed in state
s ∈ S. Further, if the state space is non-recurrent, that is, upon transitioning from
any state s ∈ S it is impossible to ever transition back to that state (e.g., in the
firefighting domain, system time is included within the state representation, and since
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time increments with every action, the state space is non-recurrent), then x(s, a) is
equal to the probability of reaching state s ∈ S and executing action a ∈ A. Upon
solving this linear program, the optimal policy can be directly computed from the
optimal occupancy measures, x∗:
pi∗(s, a) =
x∗(s, a)∑
a′∈A
x∗(s, a′)
(2.5)
Note that occupancy measures are effectively an alternative representation for a
policy, and one can easily convert between policies and occupancy measures using
Equation 2.5.
2.1.2 Partially Observable Markov Decision Process
In the MDP framework, it is assumed that the environment is fully observable to
the agent, that is, the agent makes an observation that informs it of exactly which
state the environment is in. However, in many domains, the environment is only
partially observable to the agent, that is, the agent makes an observation that might
only partially inform it of which state the environment is in. Thus the agent might
have uncertainty about the actual environment state, and the agent must reason
about its beliefs of the environment’s actual state. This type of uncertainty is formally
represented within the partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP), which
is defined as follows.
Definition 2.2. A finite horizon POMDP is defined by the tuple M = 〈S, α,A,
P,R,Ω, O, T 〉, where:
 S is the state space, α is the initial state distribution, A is the action space, P
is the transition function, R is the reward function, and T is the time horizon,
exactly as they were defined in the fully observable MDP (Definition 2.1).
 Ω is the finite set of observations the agent could receive. As with actions, each
state may have a subset of possible observations the agent could receive, Ωs ⊆ Ω.
I will be notationally explicit in this initial definition, but neglect it in subsequent
discussions to reduce notational clutter.
 O : S × AS × S × ΩS 7→ [0, 1] is the observation function, where O(o|st, a, st+1)
specifies the probability that the agent makes observation o ∈ Ωst+1 after executing
action a ∈ Ast in state st ∈ S, and the environment arriving in state st+1 ∈ S.
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Note that the MDP is a special case of the POMDP where the agent’s observation
uniquely determines which state the environment is in, ∀o ∈ Ω,∃s ∈ S, Pr(s|o) = 1.
Although the state space for a POMDP still possesses the Markov property, the
agent is unable to fully exploit this property since it does not necessarily know the
actual state of the environment. Rather, the agent knows only observations that
inform it of which state(s) the environment could potentially be in, implying the
history vectors of past observations and actions are relevant for determining which
action the agent should execute next. Consequently, a policy for a POMDP is defined
as pi : ~Ω × ~A × A 7→ [0, 1], where ~Ω and ~A are the history vector spaces of past
observations and actions respectively, and pi(~o,~a, a) specifies the probability the agent
will execute action a ∈ A when its observation and action histories are ~o ∈ ~Ω and
~a ∈ ~A respectively.
The above policy definition is problematic from a computational perspective
because the policy space increases exponentially as the history of observations and
actions grows. To combat this issue, prior research has identified that the agent’s
probability distribution over states is a sufficient statistic to capture its knowledge
of which state(s) the environment might be in (Smallwood & Sondik, 1973). This
distribution over states is referred to as the agent’s belief state, and is comprised of
a vector b containing the probability of each s ∈ S being the environment’s current
state. Let b(s) = Pr(s|~a, ~o) refer to b’s estimate of the probability that state s ∈ S
is the current environment state, and let b be initialized to α to reflect the initial
uncertainty about the environment state. Smallwood & Sondik (1973) also identified
a means for an agent to update its belief state using the following update rule:
bt+1(st+1) =
O(o|st, a, st+1)∑st P (st+1|st, a)bt(st)
normalizing factor
(2.6)
It is important to note that constructing belief states this way makes them display
the Markov property, and moreover Equation 2.6 defines a transition function over the
belief state space. This means any POMDP to be reduced to an equivalent, belief-state
MDP, where: the state space is the belief-state space; the initial state distribution is
the singleton b initialized to the POMDP’s α; the transition function is Equation 2.6;
the reward function is the expected reward given the belief distribution; and the action
space and time horizon are identical to the respective POMDP components. The
belief-state MDP can then be analyzed and solved using any of the techniques from
Section 2.1.1.
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2.1.3 Factored Markov Decision Process
In the formulation of MDPs given in Section 2.1.1, states are represented as atomic
objects, and then the other MDP model components are defined in terms of these
atoms. The basic MDP is thus simple and easy to describe, but has the notable
limitation that, as the size and/or complexity of the model increases, representing
the MDP becomes computationally expensive (or even infeasible). In many domains,
however, the environment consists of several state factors, which together constitute
the state of the environment, as opposed to opaque, atomic states. Moreover, these
factors often exhibit structure such as conditional independence between factors that
provides opportunities to more compactly represent the model. For example, the
firefighting domain previously described was naturally defined in terms of a factored
state representation (e.g., system time, the location of the agent, the intensity of fire
in each cell, etc.). Notice that some of these factors are conditionally independent; for
example, the intensity in a cell is conditionally independent of the cell delays given
the agent’s location.
Factored MDPs (Boutilier et al., 2000; Guestrin et al., 2003) were developed to
explicitly exploit factored structure, and are defined in what follows. While I present
only the definition for a factored MDP, an analogous factored POMDP definition also
exists by additionally factoring the observation set, Ω, and observation function, O.
Definition 2.3. A factored MDP is given by the tuple M = 〈S, α,A, P,R, T 〉 as
in an unfactored MDP (Definition 2.1), but now the components are factored to exploit
the structure of the domain:
 S = F1 × F2 × · · · × FmS where Fj is the finite domain of state factor j and
there are mS factors.
 α = α1×α2×· · ·×αmα where αj : (⊗kFk) 7→ [0, 1] is the jth factor of the initial
state distribution (out of mα factors), and {Fk} is partitioned across the αj’s.
 A is the finite set of possible actions. As before, each state may have a different
(sub)set of available actions, and Ast ⊆ A represents the actions available to the
agent in state st ∈ S. I will be notationally explicit in this initial definition, but
neglect it in subsequent discussions to reduce notational clutter.
 P = P1 × P2 × · · · × PmP where Pj : (⊗kFk)× AS × (⊗k′Fk′) 7→ [0, 1] is the jth
factor of the transition function (out of mP factors), and {Fk′} is partitioned
across the target of the Pj’s. {Fk} need not be partitioned across the source of
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the Pj’s (i.e., a state factor may contribute to the transition dynamics of several
state factors).
 R =
∑mR
i=1Ri where Rj : (⊗kFk) × AS × (⊗k′Fk′) 7→ R is the jth factor of the
reward function (out of mR factors). Neither {Fk} nor {Fk′} need be partitioned
across their respective elements of the Rj’s (i.e., state factors may contribute to
multiple reward factors).
 T ∈ N is the finite time horizon and specifies the number of decision points,
after which the problem terminates.
Note that every unfactored MDP can be represented as a factored MDP where
each model component has a single factor. Additionally, every factored MDP can
be represented as an unfactored MDP, for example by enumerating all possible
combinations of factors; however, doing so loses information about which factors are
conditionally independent. Thus the factored MDP representation is strictly more
expressive than the unfactored representation since it explicitly captures conditional
independencies among factors.
Factored MDP’s are often depicted graphically as two-stage dynamic Bayesian
networks (2DBNs) (Guestrin et al., 2003), which allow for intuitive visualization of
the dependencies among the factors. Figure 2.2 presents an example 2DBN for the
single agent firefighting domain. The state factors are time (t), the agent’s current
position (`), the intensity of fires in each of the C cells (Ic for cell c), and the delay
conditions in each cell (δc for cell c), thus in this example, mS = 2C + 2. The agent
has six actions (mA = 6), NOOP, N, S, E, W, FF. The fire intensity factors determine
the reward factors (there are C reward factors, mR = C), each of which is the negative
intensity of the fire at that location. There are four transition factors (mP = 4),
the first (P1) increments the time every step. The second (P2) decrements a cell’s
intensity if the agent performs the fight fire action in that cell. The third (P3) changes
the agent’s position depending on the agent’s current position, action, and delay
conditions. Finally, the fourth (P4) represents that delay conditions in each cell do
not change. The agent has four initial state distribution factors (mα = 4), which are
analogous to the transition factors.
2.1.4 Decentralized (Partially Observable) Markov Decision Process
The first formal model for cooperative multiagent sequential decision making is
that of Boutilier (1996) who created the multiagent Markov decision process (MMDP).
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Figure 2.2: An example factoring for the single agent firefighting domain represented
as a two-stage dynamic Bayesian network (2DBN).
While the MMDP was groundbreaking in its explicit focus on cooperative multiagent
settings, it makes the often unreasonable assumptions that every agent can fully
observe the entire state of the environment as well the actions executed by every agent.
For these reasons, the MMDP was extended to the decentralized partially observable
Markov decision process (Dec-POMDP) by Bernstein et al. (2002), which they defined
more precisely in what follows. Note that the following definition is presented in an
unfactored form, but factored versions of the Dec-POMDP have been constructed via
factoring analogous to the methods discussed in Section 2.1.3.
Definition 2.4. A finite horizon Dec-POMDP is a tuple M = 〈N , S, α,A, P,
R,Ω, O, T 〉, where:
 N is the finite set of n fully cooperative agents.
 S is the finite set of global states.
 α : S 7→ [0, 1] is the initial state distribution.
 A : A1×A2× · · · ×An is the joint action space, where Ai is the finite action set
for agent i. As with previous models, each state may have a subset of available
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actions for each agent, Aist ⊆ Ai, and thus each state effectively may have a
subset of available joint actions Ast ⊆ A. I will be notationally explicit in this
initial definition, but neglect it in subsequent discussions to reduce notational
clutter.
 P : S × AS × S 7→ [0, 1] is the joint transition function.
 R : S × AS × S 7→ R is the joint reward function.
 Ω : Ω1 × Ω2 × · · · × Ωn is the joint observation space, where Ωi is the finite
observation set for agent i. As with actions, each state may have a subset of
possible observations for each agent, Ωist ⊆ Ωi, and thus each state effectively
may have a subset of available joint observations Ωst ⊆ Ω. I will be notationally
explicit in this initial definition, but neglect it in subsequent discussions to reduce
notational clutter.
 O : S × AS × S × ΩS 7→ [0, 1] is the joint observation function.
 T ∈ N is the finite time horizon.
Bernstein et al. (2002) also define the related model of the Dec-MDP, which is a
special case of the Dec-POMDP.
Definition 2.5. A finite horizon Dec-MDP is a Dec-POMDP in which the model
is jointly observable. That is, there exists a mapping J : Ω 7→ S such that if
O(o|st, a, st+1) 6= 0, then J(o) = st+1.
They then go on to prove that both the MDP and MMDP are subclasses of the
Dec-MDP, which is in turn a subclass of the Dec-POMDP, and finally prove that both
the Dec-MDP and Dec-POMDP have NEXP-complete complexity for two or more
agents. Due to this high complexity, both the Dec-MDP and Dec-POMDP are widely
considered computationally intractable.
Analogously to MDPs, the agents’ objective in a Dec-POMDP is to maximize
their expected total joint reward, which can be accomplished through the creation
of an optimal joint policy, pi∗. Several algorithms have been proposed for solving
Dec-POMDPs and their subclasses using both centralized approaches (Boutilier, 1996;
Guestrin et al., 2001; Hansen et al., 2004; Szer et al., 2005; Bernstein et al., 2009), as well
as through distributed methods (Nair et al., 2003; Becker et al., 2004a; Varakantham
et al., 2009; Witwicki, 2010; Velagapudi et al., 2011). In centralized approaches, the
entire Dec-POMDP model is known by a single computational entity (or equivalently
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the entire model is known by each of the agents), who searches through the joint policy
space to find the optimal joint policy, and then informs the agents of their constituent
parts within the joint solution. To execute this policy, the agents must communicate
with each other (e.g., exchanging their local observations after each action) to maintain
a joint belief about the environment state. Such approaches are ensured to yield
a globally-optimal, joint policy, but make often unreasonable assumptions about
the centralized availability of the complete model and communication capabilities
required to execute the resulting policy. Distributed approaches seek to mitigate the
weaknesses of centralized ones by exploiting structure within the Dec-POMDP. In
distributed approaches each agent i creates its own local policy pii, and the joint policy
is defined as pi = 〈pi1, pi2, · · · , pin〉. This type of approach may or may not yield a
globally-optimal, joint policy depending on the structural properties of the problem
(see Section 2.1.4.1) and how the agents coordinate their local policies (if at all), but
makes fewer assumptions about the centralized availability of the joint model and
runtime communication capabilities.
Consider now a multiagent version of the firefighting domain. The (factored)
environment state representation captures: the system time, t ∈ N; the location of
each agent, `i ∈ C for each agent i; the fire intensity, Ic ∈ N for each cell c; and a
delay, δc ∈ [0, 1] for each cell c, which stochastically prevents movement into that cell
with probability δc. Figure 2.3 shows an example environment state, with the location
of each of two agents, along with the intensity of fire in the two cells with Ic > 0.
Suppose (H)igh, (M)edium, and (L)ow delay in Figure 2.3 correspond to δ equal to
0.8, 0.5, and 0.0 respectively. For illustration, suppose that each agent can precisely
observe the system time, the fire intensity in each cell, the delay in each cell, and its
position. That is, an agent can not observe the position of the other agent. Each
agent has the same six actions, NOOP, N, S, E, W, and FF, which behave similarly
to the single agent case. Here, however, suppose movement actions are independent
(agents can occupy the same location), but FF actions are not: the intensity of a
cell only decreases by 1 even if multiple agents simultaneously fight it. The agents
simultaneously execute actions for a predetermined number of steps, T . Suppose the
reward function is identical to the single agent case, and the joint reward associated
with a state is −∑c Ic.
2.1.4.1 Special Cases of the Dec-POMDP
While the general form Dec-POMDP is generally considered computationally
intractable, substantial progress has been made by constraining the problem to
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Figure 2.3: Example state of a 10×5 firefighting grid world. Ai designates the cell
corresponding to the location of agent i, and I = x indicates that there is a fire in
that cell with intensity x. Letters designate a (H)igh, (M)edium, or (L)ow delay in
that cell.
subclasses of the Dec-POMDP which contain certain types of structural properties.
These subclasses are typically based upon factored versions of the Dec-POMDP
formalism (Goldman & Zilberstein, 2004; Becker et al., 2004a,b; Varakantham et al.,
2009; Witwicki, 2010; Velagapudi et al., 2011). Several definitions and properties are
useful for categorizing these subclasses, which I overview now by adapting definitions
taken from the above citations.
Definition 2.6. Given a factored state representation, agent i’s local state is defined
as the (sub)set of global state factors that agent i’s local observations are informative
about (either partially or completely). Si = ⊗kiFki, refers to agent i’s local state.
Definition 2.7. A state factor, Fk is affectable by agent i if ∃ai ∈ Ai such that ai
affects the transition dynamics for Fk. Note that a state factor that is affectable by
agent i need not be in Si, and a state factor in Si also need not be affectable by agent i.
Property 2.1. We say that a Dec-POMDP is locally fully observable if each
agent’s local observations uniquely determine its local state, ∀i∀oi∃si, P r(si|oi) = 1.
Note that in Definitions 2.6 and 2.7, and Property 2.1, global state factors need
not be partitioned across the agents, and it is possible for multiple agents to observe
and/or affect the same state factor(s). Moreover, in interesting problems, it will almost
always be the case that some state factors are observable and/or affectable by multiple
agents, since otherwise the agents cannot interact and the MAS is just n independent,
isolated agents.
Property 2.2. We say that a Dec-POMDP has transition independence (Becker
et al., 2004b) if the transitions over each agent’s local state factors are independent of
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non-locally modeled state factors and the actions of other agents, ∀i, P (st+1i |st, a) =
P (st+1i |sti, ai).
Property 2.3. We say that a Dec-POMDP has observation independence (Becker
et al., 2004a) if the joint observation function is decomposable into local observation
functions. That is, O(o|st, a, st+1) = ∏iOi(oi|sti, ai, st+1i ), where Oi(oi|sti, ai, st+1i )
designates agent i’s local observation function.
Property 2.4. We say that a Dec-POMDP has reward independence (Becker
et al., 2004b) if the joint reward function is decomposable into a function of local
reward functions. That is, R(st, a, st+1) = f
(
R1(s
t
1, a1, s
t+1
1 ), R1(s
t
2, a2, s
t+1
2 ), · · · ,
Rn(s
t
n, an, s
t+1
n )), where Ri(s
t
i, ai, s
t+1
i ) is agent i’s local reward function and f(· · · ) is
monotonic (typically the summation function).
These properties can be combined together (perhaps with variants to reduce
the expressive limitations of the property) to formulate a Dec-POMDP subclass
in terms of local models (Varakantham et al., 2009; Witwicki, 2010; Velagapudi
et al., 2011). That is, rather than define the problem in terms of a joint model as
in Definition 2.4, we can instead define it in terms of a set of local models. The
problem is then modeled by M = 〈N , {Mi}〉, where N is a set of n fully cooperative
agents, and Mi = 〈Si, αi, Ai, Pi, Ri, Ti〉 is the local model for a MDP agent i, or
Mi = 〈Si, αi, Ai, Pi, Ri,Ωi, Oi, Ti〉 is the local model for a POMDP agent i (depending
on the specific structure present in the domain).
While expressing most of these local components is intuitive, expressing the transi-
tion function in terms of local models is more challenging. That is, if a local state factor
is affectable by other agents, then the transition function for that factor is dependent
on the actions of other agents (i.e., the factor contains non-local effects (Witwicki,
2010)). Prior research has identified methodologies to address this issue by calculating
a summary of the expected non-local effects and incorporating them into Pi (Varakan-
tham et al., 2009; Witwicki, 2010; Velagapudi et al., 2011). Given the set of expected
non-local effects on each agent, the agents’ local models are conditionally independent,
which allows the agents to reason in parallel without further coordination, and the
joint policy is the aggregation of the local policies. Several strategies exist to compute
expected non-local effects such as: assume (potentially incorrectly) that there are no
non-local effects; have the agents coordinate to calculate the optimal set of non-local
effects (Witwicki, 2010); or have the agents coordinate to approximate the likely
non-local effects (Varakantham et al., 2009; Velagapudi et al., 2011).
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For illustration of representing a problem in terms of local models, consider the
multiagent version of the firefighting domain. Each agent i’s local state consists of: t,
`i, Ic for each c, and δc for each c. That is, an agent does not observe the positions of
the other agents, and thus its local state does not include the other agents’ positions.
Each agent has the same six local actions as before: NOOP, N, S, E, W, and FF.
Since movement actions are independent, Pi can precisely represent the transitions for
`i. Similarly, t, and δcs are unaffectable by other agents, and Pi can represent them
precisely as well. Ics, however, are affectable by other agents, and thus Ic transitions
contain non-local effects, which must be summarized (e.g., via one of the previously
described methods) within Pi in addition to agent i’s effects on Ic transitions. As
before, each agent executes actions for a predetermined number of steps, ∀i, Ti = T ,
and since each agent can observe the fire intensity in each cell, let the local reward of
each agent be identical to the previously described joint reward.
2.1.4.2 Approximate Techniques
Another, orthogonal approach for coping with the computational intractability of
general case Dec-POMDPs is to utilize techniques that yield approximately optimal
solutions. Intuitively, such approximation techniques have been shown to reduce
computational costs of solving the Dec-POMDP, but do not ensure that the resulting
policy is globally optimal, and may not make any solution quality guarantees at all. For
example, in the JESP algorithm (Nair et al., 2003) the agents calculate a joint policy
by iteratively revising their local policies to be the optimal best response to the other
agents’ policies on the previous iteration. The agents’ policies are ensured to converge
to a (Nash) equilibrium that must also be a local optimum in the joint policy space,
but may not be a (Pareto-efficient) global optimum. Another approximately optimal
technique is TREMOR (Varakantham et al., 2009) and the subsequent extension
D-TREMOR (Velagapudi et al., 2011). In these methods, agents again compute best
response policies, but use pre-identified coordination locales as a means to shape
each agent’s local model to estimate the non-local effects, resulting in approximate
best responses. In this way, TREMOR and D-TREMOR do not provide any bounds
on the joint policy’s quality, but have been shown to scale better than many other
Dec-POMDP subclass approaches.
One other potential caveat that can arise when the agents plan using approximate
techniques is that their local policies may not encompass every possible situation that
could arise. Namely, if an agent only creates a policy for states in its reachable state
space, it is possible that when the agent is executing its policy, it could encounter a
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state for which it has not determined the action it should execute. This can occur,
for example, if the expected non-local effects reflected in the agent’s local model are
inaccurate. In such situations, we say the agent has fallen off policy, and requires
additional reasoning to determine an action to execute. This problem is the study
of plan repair research that attempts to reuse (Krogt, 2005; Fox et al., 2006) and/or
warp (Musliner et al., 2007) existing sub-policies as well as incremental planning
techniques (Hansen & Zilberstein, 2001a; Koenig & Likhachev, 2002; Wu & Durfee,
2007). The idea in such approaches is to reuse the agent’s existing policy as a basis
for creating a new policy, that is to “fix” the current policy rather than replan from
scratch. In this way, if the necessary changes to the agent’s policy are relatively small
(i.e., most of the current policy is still valid), the computational costs for the agent to
determine a new policy can be much less than completely replanning.
2.1.5 Hierarchical Abstractions
The just-described decision-theoretic models each assumed that the actions spec-
ified within an agent’s model are primitive actions, that is, each a ∈ A is a single,
atomic action that an agent can execute in exactly one time step. However, in many
approaches (notably in problem-driven organizational approaches like those I describe
in Section 2.2.2), it is common to identify a hierarchical task structure that defines
abstract tasks in terms of primitive actions and/or other sub-tasks. By utilizing a
hierarchical task structure, an agent can reason about its high-level behavior policy
without complicating the process with the typically larger space of low-level primitive
actions. For ease of explanation, I will assume a single agent, non-factored domain
in the descriptions that follow; however, hierarchical abstractions have also been
developed for both factored and multiagent models (Barto & Mahadevan, 2003; Stone
et al., 2005; Ghavamzadeh et al., 2006; Goldman & Zilberstein, 2008; Amato et al.,
2014) using concepts similar to those in Sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.4.
Researchers have identified several methods for incorporating hierarchical decom-
positions into decision-theoretic paradigms (Parr & Russell, 1998; Sutton et al., 1999;
Dietterich, 2000). At the core of these approaches is the formalism of the semi-Markov
decision process (SMDP), which generalizes upon the MDP by allowing the time
between one decision point and the next to be a random variable (Howard, 1971). The
modeling differences between the SMDP and MDP are centered on the addition of τ ,
which is the (positive) time until the next decision point after executing action a ∈ A
in state s ∈ S. The transition and reward functions are then extended to incorporate
τ , and yield the following definition.
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Definition 2.8. A discrete-time SMDP model is defined as M = 〈S, α,A, P,R,
T 〉, where:
 S is the finite state space, α is the initial state distribution, A is the action
space, and T is the time horizon as in an MDP (Definition 2.1).
 P : S × AS × S 7→ [0, 1] is the transition function, where P (st+τ |st, a) specifies
the probability of the environment transitioning to state st+τ ∈ S after τ ∈ N
time steps when the agent executes action a ∈ Ast in state st ∈ S.
 R : S × AS × S 7→ R is the reward function, where R(st, a, st+τ ) specifies the
immediate reward associated with executing action a ∈ Ast in state st ∈ S
yielding state st+τ ∈ S after τ ∈ N time steps.
The Bellman equation is reformulated for SMDPs as follows:
Q∗(st, a) =
∑
τ
∑
st+τ∈S
P (st+τ |st, a)
[
R(st, a, st+τ ) + max
a′∈A
Q∗(st+τ , a′)
]
(2.7)
and solved using analogous methods to those in Section 2.1.1.
Using this underlying formalism, Sutton et al. (1999) define options as a means
to hierarchically decompose a task structure and represent the decomposition within
SMDPs.
Definition 2.9. An option is defined as o = 〈S , µ, β, 〉, where:
 S ⊆ S is set of states in which the option may be initiated.
 µ : S ×A 7→ [0, 1] is a policy for executing the option, where µ(s, a) specifies the
probability that the agent will decide to execute action a ∈ A in state s ∈ S.
 β : S 7→ [0, 1] is the termination condition, where β(s) specifies the probability
that the option will terminate upon reaching state s ∈ S.
Throughout this document, I will use the dot operator to refer to an option’s
components. That is, o.S , o.µ, and o.β refer to option o’s initiation set, policy, and
termination condition respectively.
An agent can decide to begin executing an option o from any s ∈ o.S . The agent
then executes actions according to o.µ, the environment transitions to subsequent
states according to the SMDP transition dynamics P , and the agent associates reward
according to R as usual. In each state s ∈ S the agent encounters, o stochastically
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terminates with probability o.β(s), and after o terminates, the agent can select another
option o′ (assuming s ∈ o′.S). For example, in the firefighting domain, an agent could
have an option, omove(1,2) to move to the cell at coordinates (1, 2), in addition to its
primitive actions of N, S, E, W, NOOP, FF. The above option might have the following
properties: omove(1,2).S contains all states with I(1,2) > 0 (i.e., there is a fire in cell
(1, 2)); omove(1,2).µ specifies the movement actions to move the agent to cell (1, 2); and
omove(1,2).β(s) = 1 if ` = (1, 2) in s, otherwise omove(1,2).β(s) = 0.
As just illustrated, one way to view an option is as a temporally extended macro-
action. In this way, an option encodes a higher-level task, and the option’s policy
determines how that task is decomposed into subtasks. Along this line, Sutton et al.
(1999) defined options to support recursive nesting and to allow one option to be
defined in terms of other options, which are themselves composed of options, and so
on, until only primitive actions remain at the lowest level. An agent’s “action” space
in the SMDP is thus actually its option space, O, in addition to its primitive action
space A ≡ O ∪ Aprimitive.
For an agent to utilize an option, o, while solving the SMDP for its policy, models of
the option’s expected reward, R(st, o, st+τ ), and transitions P (st+τ |st, o) are required.
These values are directly calculated using the SMDP’s reward/transition components
and o’s policy and termination condition, using an algorithm similar to Algorithm 3.1
that unrolls the state space for τ iterations using P and o.µ to determine the next
states at each iteration, and calculating the probability of being in each of the reachable
states after exactly τ iterations. The expected reward of o is given by the reward
accrued along the reachable trajectory while following o.µ for τ time steps.
Options have been shown to improve system performance (Sutton et al., 1999;
Barto & Mahadevan, 2003; Stone et al., 2005) assuming that options are correctly
identified and encoded. These studies found that a good heuristic for creating the
option space, O, is to associate an option with a subgoal, such that the option
terminates when the subgoal is achieved, and its policy directs the agent to accomplish
the subgoal. Subgoals can either be identified using expert knowledge and then hand
coded, or alternatively discovered by automated methods (Iba, 1989; Stolle & Precup,
2002; McGovern, 2002). These automated methods identify good subgoals as those
states/actions that the agent typically encounters/executes on successful trajectories
but not on unsuccessful ones.
In this dissertation, I use the options framework (e.g., in Section 4.2.2) as a
mechanism to both expedite computing optimal joint policies, and also to focus an
ODP’s computational efforts on the MAS’s joint interactions rather than agents’
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primitive actions.
2.2 Organizational Decision Making
Despite a large volume of prior research, the organizational research community
has been largely unsuccessful in creating a precise, consensus definition of what an
organization or its purpose is (Butts & Carley, 2007). As alluded in Chapter 1,
however, recent approaches roughly fall into two main categories:
Problem-driven. In this perspective (discussed more in Section 2.2.2), the starting
point of an organization (and the subsequent MAS) is distribution over expected
decision problems. The purpose of forming an organization, in this context, is to
represent a strategy for decomposing and solving the problem as a MAS, where a
top-down, knowledge-based algorithm first creates an organizational design. This
design is subsequently populated with appropriate agents to enact the organization.
In prior work, it is assumed that an organization exists as an explicit, first-class
object independently of any agents that might enact it, and moreover, though the
organization itself is assumed to change very little over time, the agents enacting the
organization may change comparatively frequently. Traditionally, the problem-driven
research community has emphasized the development of languages for expressing an
organization, and given less attention to the study of how to create the organization.
In these works, an expert human usually serves as the ODP, who uses their knowledge
to identify and represent an appropriate organization for the domain.
Experience-driven. In this perspective (discussed more in Section 2.2.3), the
starting point of a MAS (and subsequent organization) is a group of cooperating
agents. These agents are already working together (or at least trying to), and the
purpose of forming an organization, in this context, is to reason over and codify
expectations about appropriate actions and interaction patterns in order to improve
and streamline cooperation. In prior work, experience-driven approaches have an
emergent, self-organization flavor, and do not explicitly represent the organization
as a first-class object. Rather, the MAS’s organization is only implicitly observable
via the agents’ policies. In contrast to problem-driven approaches, organizations in
experience-driven approaches are fluid, and adapt in response to the environment the
MAS encounters; however, the agents in the MAS are fixed and not easily replaceable
because of their local expertise (Property 1.3) that has been finely-tuned in response to
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the agent’s experiences. Traditionally, the emphasis of experience-driven approaches
is on the process of creating coordinated polices (that are implicitly organized), and
gives less attention to the end product (i.e., how the organization is represented). The
policy adaptation algorithm serves as the ODP, and adapts agents’ policies over time
in response to problem episodes the MAS encounters.
Unsurprisingly, each of these general approach categories has advantages and
disadvantages. In an effort to achieve the benefits of both approach categories,
several mixed approaches have been proposed (my agent-driven approach is also
a mixedapproach). Like problem-driven approaches, mixed approaches represent
the organization as an explicit, first-class object, but like with experience-driven
approaches, the specific influences that the organization exerts emerge dynamically
in response to the environment. In this way, mixed approaches can leverage the
advantages of each approach. The problem-driven aspect provides explicit context
for the organization to adapt within, which helps to speed up convergence, increase
the likelihood of convergence, and/or steer the adaptations into more globally desired
organizations (as opposed to locally optimal). Meanwhile, the experience-driven
aspect provides a basis for dynamic adaptations, which tailors the organization to the
actual environment the agents encounter. I discuss such mixed approaches more in
Section 2.2.4.
The remainder of this section is structured as follows. I begin in Section 2.2.1 with a
discussion of the early MAS research that developed the foundational ideas of organizing
a MAS. Then I provide more detailed discussions of problem-driven, experience-
driven, and mixed approaches (Sections 2.2.2, 2.2.3, and 2.2.4, respectively) and their
relationships to the organizational design problem I focus on in this dissertation and
my approach towards solving it. Then, in Section 2.2.5, I discuss several operational
reasoning techniques that do not directly consider organizations, but nevertheless
yield valuable insights when viewed from an organizational perspective. Finally, I
briefly discuss the relationship between human organizations and the techniques I
develop for organizations for computational MASs in Section 2.2.6.
2.2.1 Early MAS Research
The relationship between organizations and MASs has been studied since the
1980s; however, early approaches are difficult to categorize into problem-driven or
experience-driven. Rather, early approaches are more easily viewed as precursors
that developed the foundations upon which problem-driven and experience-driven
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approaches were subsequently investigated (e.g., established the intuitions reflected
in Properties 1.1– 1.5). Unsurprisingly, in some cases, early approaches are even
proto-versions of later research. In this section, I briefly overview some of the most
significant early MAS research as related to organizations, and discuss how it relates
my agent-driven approach.
One of the earliest MAS research lines was done at the University of Mas-
sachusetts (Corkill, 1979; Corkill & Lesser, 1983; Durfee et al., 1987). In this work,
organizational reasoning is viewed as a meta-level of operational reasoning. An im-
portant result of this research is the notion that organizational reasoning should
provide explicit, high-level guidelines that steer the agents into coordinated interaction
patterns. While an agent is planning, it then uses its local expertise to temper its
organizational guidelines. As I will show in Section 4.1, my agent-driven approach re-
inforces this result both in my empirical experiments as well as my theoretical analysis.
Additionally, later problem-driven approaches (and my agent-driven approach) built
upon the emphasis of an explicit organizational representation found in this work.
Fox also viewed organizations as a mechanism for providing high-level guidelines,
but focused on how to balance between uncertainty (e.g., in task distribution, resource
utilization, etc.) and the decentralization of a MAS (Fox, 1981). Fox & Smith (1984)
also looked at methods for decomposing and representing tasks and their associated
resource requirements as part of organizing a MAS.
Another line of MAS research viewed organizational reasoning as part of a con-
tinuum alongside operational reasoning. For example, Durfee & Montgomery (1991)
developed a framework showing how plans, schedules (i.e., a specific, applied plan),
and organizations (i.e., the abstract, long-term MAS objectives) can be unified within
a single reasoning framework. Subsequent research built on this perspective, investigat-
ing how agents can effectively coordinate over this hierarchical behavior space (Durfee,
1993; Castelfranchi, 1995). These techniques can be viewed as proto-influences (see
Section 2.2.5 for a discussion of influences) in that they provide a framework for agents
to efficiently coordinate their interactions at an abstract level.
Ishida et al. (1992) studied how organizations—in particular work-allocation and
load-balancing—can be adapted in response to the environment. Subsequent research
into experience-driven and mixed approaches builds on the intuitions of this research to
develop techniques for adapting organizational structures (see Sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4
respectively).
Finally, Fox & Gruninger (1998) investigated how to model enterprises, and
discussed ontologies for representing concepts such as activities, resources, goals, etc.
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Subsequent research into organizational modeling languages (OMLs) (see Section 2.2.2)
builds on the intuitions developed in this proto-OML research.
2.2.2 Problem-driven Approaches
As previously mentioned, problem-driven approaches focus on utilizing expert
knowledge of a problem domain to identify and encode an organizational strategy for
decomposing and solving the distribution of expected decision problems as a MAS.
Commonly, this knowledge is specified via an organizational modeling language (OML),
which provides syntax for expressing organizational knowledge that can later be enacted
as a MAS. The research community has proposed a large number of OMLs including:
Gaia (Wooldridge et al., 2000), SODA (Omicini, 2001), ISLANDER (Esteva et al.,
2001), OperA (Dignum, 2004), Tropos (Bresciani et al., 2004), OMNI (Va´zquez-Salceda
et al., 2005), MOISE+ (Hu¨bner et al., 2007), ODML (Horling & Lesser, 2008), and
ORG4MAS (Hu¨bner et al., 2010) among others. While the specifics of these OMLs vary,
there are several features that the community has identified as important for encoding
organizational knowledge. In what follows, I overview the most commonly included
features to provide a greater intuition behind the types and forms of knowledge that
are encoded within a OML, but for more details please consult the papers cited above.
Throughout the following discussion, I make use of a scientific conference domain
that the research community frequently uses to illustrate knowledge-based approaches
(e.g., Va´zquez-Salceda et al. (2005)).
Task Structure. Problem-driven approaches typically assume an organization cre-
ates a MAS that performs a complex task involving many interconnected subtasks
that themselves might recursively contain interconnected sub-subtasks, and so on.
For example, the TAEMS framework (Lesser et al., 2004) is a common method for
representing such a hierarchical task structure. Therefore, part of the expert knowledge
encoded in an OML is how the global task is decomposed into its respective subtasks,
and the relationships between those constituent subtasks (i.e., must the agents per-
form all subtasks to complete the parent task or only a subset of them; are there
sequentiality/simultaneity constraints; etc.). For example, in the conference domain
the global task is to hold a successful conference, and the subtasks are to collect a
set of high-quality papers, secure a venue, etc. Each of the above subtasks must be
completed to achieve the global task, although there is no strict ordering requirement
between them. Further, each subtask itself consists of multiple sub-subtasks, for
example the collect-papers subtask might include sub-subtasks to issue a call for
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papers, gather submissions, review those submissions, make decisions to accept/reject
the submissions, etc. In this case, the sub-subtasks must be performed sequentially,
and each of them must be completed to accomplish the parent collect-papers task.
Environment Model. Related to the task structure is an environment model, which
captures information about the expected environmental parameters such as: available
resources and constraints over resources; expected resource requirements and costs for
completing tasks; expected agent capabilities; expected communication availability,
channels, bandwidth, and latency; etc. In the conference domain, environment
parameters include: a set of deadlines for the tasks; financial limitations for securing
the venue; expectations that agents can freely communicate with high bandwidth and
low latency; etc.
Roles. In each of the above OMLs, a primary mechanism for encoding expert
knowledge is through organizational roles, which are a mechanism for summarizing
the organization’s expectations about the agents’ actions and interactions. More
precisely, an organizational structure can contain multiple roles that are then adopted
by (some of) the available agents (this mapping can be many-to-one, one-to-one, many-
to-many, or one-to-many depending on the system). For example, in the conference
domain, some roles might be author, reviewer, senior-reviewer, attendee,
etc. Specific definitions of roles vary across OMLs, but typically a role is associated
with:
 Constraints about which agents can/should enact the role. These constraints can
be in terms of capabilities the agent must/should have (e.g., an agent enacting
the reviewer role should have expertise in the conference’s field) as well as in
terms of relationships between roles (e.g., an agent enacting the author role
can not also enact the reviewer role for that paper).
 Expected relationships that an adopting agent should have with other roles, along
with associated communication protocols. Continuing the scientific conference
example, the reviewer role is expected to interact with an associated senior-
reviewer role to make a decision about the paper’s acceptance to the conference.
This interaction could be communicated in the form of numerical scores of the
paper’s quality and associated text discussing thoughts on the paper.
Norms. Norms are a formal specification of required, permitted, obliged, and/or
forbidden actions expressed using deontic logic. Within OMLs, a norm can be viewed
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as a singleton piece of organizational guidance that is independent of any one agent,
but rather associated with some organizational role(s). Additionally, a norm is
often associated with a means of enforcement and penalty for non-conformance to
the specified actions by any agent enacting the associated role. For example, the
reviewer role might have an associated norm requiring each reviewer agent to
review one paper by a pre-determined deadline, and if an agent enacting the reviewer
role fails to meet this norm it will not be allowed to adopt the reviewer role in the
future.
Unsurprisingly, there are a large number of structures that one could use to organize
a MAS (e.g., hierarchy, coalition, etc.). However, as surveyed by Horling & Lesser
(2004), several popular classes of structures account for the majority of organizations
studied in MAS research.
Given an OML specification of an organization, the next step to is to populate it
with agents to enact the various roles, which can be performed using a mechanism such
as contract net (Davis & Smith, 1983; Sandholm, 1993), STEAM (Tambe, 1997), service
oriented computing (Papazoglou, 2003; Bichier & Lin, 2006), or RETSINA (Sycara
et al., 2003), among others. The specifics of these mechanism vary, but broadly they
serve to identify, recruit, and enlist agents with the necessary expertise (as specified
by the norms of a role) to adopt the roles in the organizational specification.
Compared to my agent-driven approach described in Section 1.3, problem-driven
approaches have many similar components (e.g., norms are analogous to organizational
influences, both approaches have an environment model, etc.); indeed my agent-
driven approach intentionally builds on the problem-driven idea that an organizational
representation should exist as an explicit first-class object. Despite these similarities,
however, there are significant differences in how these ideas are manifested between my
approach and problem-driven ones. Most importantly, in problem-driven approaches,
the task structure and environment model features described above constitute the
output of a human ODP’s expert knowledge, and serve to delineate the necessary
task decompositions, agent capabilities, communication channels, etc. required for
the organized MAS to solve the expected distribution of decision problems. In stark
contrast, the task structure and environment model features constitute the input to
my agent-driven, computational ODP techniques, which my ODP analyzes to identify
organizational patterns from first principles.
As a consequence, a fundamental disadvantage of problem-driven approaches is an
absence of solid, theoretical foundations. As illustrated by the large number of OMLs
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cited above, the research community has incrementally identified additional and/or
alternative organizational modeling techniques that provide more expressive OMLs
and/or more intuitive OMLs for human organizational designers to encode organiza-
tional expertise. However, since the OMLs lack a formal mathematical foundation,
it is impossible to determine if prior OMLs are complete, or if future research will
yield yet more evolutions. Moreover, since the OMLs are intentionally designed to be
independent of any particular agent architecture, the agents in the eventual MAS can
not be assumed to necessarily understand how to map the organizational specification
to their local reasoning processes. As a result, middleware has been developed to
allow agents to understand and integrate the organization’s influences into their local
reasoning (Pynadath & Tambe, 2003; Esteva et al., 2004; Hu¨bner et al., 2005, 2007).
Since my agent-driven approach bases the organization’s representation on the agents’
reasoning framework, agents can natively incorporate their organizational influences
into their local reasoning, and such middleware systems are unnecessary in my research.
Complementarily, the fundamental advantage of problem-driven approaches com-
pared to my agent-driven one is that they do not commit to a particular group of
agents, which makes the methods particularly useful for open systems. In an open
system, the agents enacting an organization are allowed (and moreover assumed)
to join and leave the organization as they please, but the organization structure as
encoded in the OML remains relatively unchanged regardless of which particular
agents are currently enacting it. For example in the conference domain, the organiza-
tional structure responsible for setting up and leading the conference is practically
unchanging from year to year (although could change, for example, to add a new track
to the conference); however, the specific agents enacting the organization typically
change each year, with existing agents adopting different roles over time. In contrast,
my agent-driven approach commits to specific group of agents, which provides a
mathematical basis for organizational reasoning, but also makes it more cumbersome
for agents to come and go as in open systems (see Section 6.2.7 for brief thoughts on
extending my agent-driven approach to open systems).
2.2.3 Experience-driven Approaches
As opposed to the problem-driven approaches described in Section 2.2.2, experience-
driven approaches begin by assuming a fixed set of agents that gradually make local
adaptations to their policies as they interact with the environment and each other.
Over time, these adaptations (hopefully) converge the agents’ joint policy to de facto
organized patterns of joint interactions. However, in stark contrast to the explicit, first-
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class organizational representations in problem-driven and my agent-driven approach,
experience-driven approaches do not explicitly represent the organization, rather the de
facto organization is only implicitly observable in the MAS’s joint behaviors. As such,
the focus of experience-driven approaches is on the process of determining appropriate
policies, with little consideration given towards representing the final organizational
product.
The research community has proposed several classes of experience-driven methods
that I summarize below; for more details, please consult the respective papers cited
below. In this section, I reuse the firefighting domain previously presented in Section 1.2
to illustrate concepts.
Swarm Intelligence. (Bonabeau et al., 1999; Dorigo et al., 2006; Gauci et al.,
2014). Fundamentally, the idea of swarm intelligence is to utilize a multitude (i.e.,
often hundreds or thousands) of simple agents that each learn and follow primitive
rules for deciding their actions rather than collectively creating policies accounting
for future effects of sequential decision trajectories. These agents then either leave
signals in the environment (e.g., pheromones that fade over episodes) to influence the
other agents’ actions (in subsequent episodes), and/or learn primitive decision rules to
directly translate environmental stimuli into actions. For example, in the firefighting
domain, each agent could leave a pheromone in each cell that it visits that fades over
time, which could signal to the other agents that the cell is already covered (and
thus the other agents should focus their efforts elsewhere). The agents’ cooperation
patterns (and thus organizational influences) are implicitly represented within these
environment-encapsulated signals and/or decision rules, and only observable indirectly
via the agents’ actions.
Multiagent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). (Hu & Wellman, 1998; Bowl-
ing & Veloso, 2002; Stone et al., 2005; Busoniu et al., 2008). In MARL, individual
agents learn local policies via reinforcement both within and across problem episodes,
where these local policies are conditional on the local policies of the other agents.
There are several strategies that the agents could employ to coordinate their local
policies (see Busoniu et al. (2008) for a more detailed survey), such as: explicitly
communicating with each other to select a joint action; implicitly cooperating by
estimating the policies of the other agents (e.g., estimated joint action learning); or
incorporating additional, organization-like constraints such that an agent can make
globally-useful local decisions (see Section 2.2.5 for more details of these techniques).
In the firefighting domain, for example, the agents could over time learn policies where
each agent tends to fight fires in a respective region of the grid.
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A fundamental advantage of experience-driven approaches is the principled, mathe-
matical foundation that the algorithms use as a basis for adapting the agents’ policies.
That is, adaptations are made when they increase the expected performance of the
MAS, resulting in a (locally optimal) joint policy. My agent-driven approach builds
on this concept by extending these mathematical foundations to explicit organizations,
where an organization is selected if it has (approximately) optimal benefit to the MAS.
Moreover, experience-driven approaches do not require extensive domain knowledge
in order to yield an organization, thus making them particularly useful when there is
high a priori uncertainty about the environment or agent capabilities. In such cases,
the agents themselves can still converge towards an appropriate, implicitly-organized
policy through repeated adaptations, whereas a problem-driven approach might lack
sufficient initial information to create an equally effective organization. Experience-
driven approaches, however, can sometimes require extensive iterations of adaptations
before the agents’ policies converge (if ever) due to the large space of possible joint
actions and/or limited local awareness of each agent. Further, while convergence
has been theoretically proven in some cases (Bowling & Veloso, 2002), the resulting
joint policy is ensured to be only a Nash equilibrium, and thus could be suboptimal
from the global, fully-cooperative perspective. My agent-driven approach lies between
problem-driven and experience-driven approaches in this regard, requiring a model of
the domain from which to derive organizational patterns, but not for an expert to
pre-determine organizational patterns. This is an intentional choice, however, since
model based planning allows an ODP to account for rare, critical problem episodes
without needing to actually experience them.
As mentioned, a drawback of experience-driven approaches is the distinct lack of ex-
plicit organizational representation, though function approximation techniques (Sutton
et al., 2000; Whiteson & Stone, 2006; Busoniu et al., 2010) can provide a higher-level
perspective of the agents’ policies with aspects more akin to an organizational repre-
sentation. This deficit can make understanding or justifying the agents’ final policy
difficult for system administrators, and also challenging for agents to join, leave, or
change roles within the MAS (e.g., as part of an open system).
2.2.4 Mixed Approaches
The research community has proposed several mixed approaches to organiza-
tional reasoning in an attempt to achieve the advantages of both problem-driven and
experience-driven approaches. These approaches explicitly represent the organiza-
tion, which is typically initialized via top-down knowledge (like in problem-driven
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approaches). Then, as the agents solve problem episodes, they adapt the organization
in response to the environment (like in experience-driven approaches). Thus, in many
senses, mixed approaches can be viewed as employing a problem-driven approach for
designing the components of the organization, and then utilizing a experience-driven
approach to tune and configure the details of how their organization is implemented.
By explicitly representing the organization, the agents have additional context from
which to make adaptations to their policies, which can increase the likelihood of
convergence, increase the quality of the converged upon joint policy, and/or decrease
the number of iterations until convergence (Zhang, 2011). Meanwhile, the adaptive
aspect allows the agents to overcome imperfections in the organization (e.g., brought
about by unanticipated problem episodes), and tailors the organization to the actual
execution environment.
The research community has proposed several classes of mixed approaches, which
I overview below; for more details, please consult the respective papers cited below.
Structural Configuration and Adaptation. (Sims et al., 2003; Gaston & des-
Jardins, 2005; Butts & Carley, 2007; Hoogendoorn, 2007; Horling & Lesser, 2008; Sims
et al., 2008; Kota et al., 2009). The primary idea in these techniques is to configure
and/or adapt the organization (especially the structure between roles) to be suited
for the environment that the MAS experiences. Like problem-driven approaches, the
organization is an explicit, first-class object that exists independently of any agents
that might enact it. The significant difference from problem-driven approaches, is
that after a (human) ODP initially designs the overarching organizational components
(e.g., task structure, roles, etc.), the organization is configured via a computational
optimization algorithm. The configuration algorithm (and conceptually-identical,
subsequent adaptation algorithm) is related to experience-driven concepts, since the
organization is optimized in response to expected and/or experienced problem episodes
that the MAS encounters.
Organizationally Adept Agents (OAAs). (Horling et al., 2001; Corkill et al.,
2011, 2012). The underlying principle of OAAs is that agents should be empowered
to make informed decisions about their organization in response to the environment
they are encountering. The difference between OAAs and the other mixed approaches
lies in the distinction between adaptations and adeptness, where OAAs not only
adapt their organization, but explicitly make adaptations because they are aware of
the broader context and relationship between their organization and environment.
That is, OAAs are made aware of the underlying expectations and assumptions that
the ODP has about their organization, and use this second-order information as a
42
basis for adapting their treatment of the organization. In this way, the OAAs can
adapt to an organization that is aligned with the ODP’s intent (which presumably
is appropriate even if its current configuration was not), which serves as a heuristic
to reduce and/or focus the space of possible adaptations. In the firefighting domain,
for example, the organization could designate regions of responsibility for each agent,
and the underlying expectation for this organization is that the fires are uniformly
distributed in these regions. If the OAAs observe that this expectation is not being met
in the execution environment, they could adapt the regions within the organization,
such that the fires are uniformly distributed among these revised regions.
Coalition and Team Formation. (Brooks & Durfee, 2003; Stone et al., 2010). The
premise of these techniques is for the (often self-interested) agents to dynamically form
cooperative groups, which can be thought of as (typically shorter-term) organizations.
While details vary, the group formation process is usually initiated by the agents,
who identify that cooperating with other agents would be mutually beneficial, for
example, cooperating with the group could provide expertise and/or resources that
would otherwise be unavailable to an individual. Like in experience-driven approaches,
the cooperative groups emerge via repeated interactions with other agents; however, as
in problem-driven approaches, the organizational structure and influences are explicitly
represented. This explicit representation provides context for the agents’ decisions,
which allows them to more efficiently compute effective, coordinated policies. Unlike
problem-driven approaches, however, the organization exists only within the context
of the agents enacting it, and if agents leave the organization, then it ceases to exist
(of course, agents could (re-)form a new group as necessary).
Since my agent-driven approach is also a mixed approach designed to achieve
the benefits of both problem-driven and experience-driven approaches, it shares
several significant attributes with the related works described above. Namely, mixed
approaches represent an organization as an explicit, first-class object, and utilize
computational algorithms to create, configure, and/or adapt the organization to
optimize expected MAS performance.
The distinctions between my agent-driven approach and the techniques described
above lie in where the techniques fall in the spectrum between problem-driven and
experience-driven approaches. Structural configuration/adaptation and OAA tech-
niques are closely related to problem-driven approaches, but additionally incorporate
experience-driven concepts to permit the organization to be fitted to the actual
environment. My agent-driven approach takes the experience-driven ideas a step
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further, where rather than just configuring/adapting the organization in response
to the environment, I use expectations about the MAS’s agents (e.g., capabilities,
expected joint interactions, etc.) as the foundation for creating the organization. The
coalition/team formation techniques are yet another step closer to experience-driven
approaches; as opposed to a globally-informed ODP creating the organization (as
in my agent-driven approach and problem-driven approaches), self-interested agents
locally decide to form cooperative groups for mutual benefit.
2.2.5 Operational Techniques from an Organizational Perspective
Beyond organizational approaches, there are a number of operational reasoning
techniques that are conceptually related to organizational reasoning, despite tradition-
ally being studied in an operational context. In this section, I discuss the benefits and
limitations of these approaches when viewed from an organizational perspective.
Reward Shaping. (Ng et al., 1999; Wolpert & Tumer, 2001; Agogino & Tumer,
2005; Babes et al., 2008; Zhang, 2011). The central idea of reward shaping is to alter
the agents’ local reward functions so as to bias each agent into globally desirable local
actions, for example via a potential function, φ(s), such that
Ri shaped(s
t
i, ai, s
t+1
i ) = Ri(s
t
i, ai, s
t+1
i ) + φ(s
t+1
i )− φ(sti)
where φ(sti) estimates the expected joint value of being in s
t
i. By doing so, reward
shaping can lead an agent to establish conditions that have no inherent local reward,
but that enable other agents to then perform actions that result in high joint reward.
Traditionally, reward shaping has been applied as part of the agents’ operational
decision making, with specialized reward shaping values (φ) developed for a single
problem episode. I build on these ideas to apply reward shaping for organizational
reasoning in Section 3.5.3, the primary difference being that the shaped reward function
must apply across problem episodes, and thus the method for shaping rewards must
account for the variability of appropriate agent actions across the episode space.
Coordination Locales. (Varakantham et al., 2009; Velagapudi et al., 2011). The
central idea in this approach is that if agents have a relatively small number of
explicitly-specified joint interaction possibilities, then they can plan independently
of each other most of the time, and in the explicitly identified coordination locales,
the agents’ local reward and transition models are shaped to bias the agents into a
good joint interaction. For example, in disaster rescue domains where agents can
detrimentally collide in narrow corridors, two agents can plan independently unless
44
they anticipate both (potentially) being in a single corridor at the same time. In these
states, the agents’ local transitions are shaped to reflect the joint transition (e.g., the
agents would be disabled due to colliding), and their local rewards are shaped so that
the agents avoid that state. Unsurprisingly, prior research has focused on leveraging
coordination locales for operational decision making within a single problem episode,
and indeed, pre-specifying all possible coordination locales for every possible problem
episode could be a daunting task. Stepping back, however, the idea of shaping the ways
in which the agents interact is similar to what an organization is trying to accomplish,
albeit at a single episode scope rather than across episodes. Tractably extending
coordination locale techniques to an organizational perspective implies constructing
more abstract coordination locales that, for example, represent interaction patterns
across episodes.
Influence Abstraction. (Witwicki, 2010; Witwicki et al., 2012; Oliehoek et al.,
2012). The central idea of this line of research is that the non-local effects on an
agent’s local model can be summarized via influences. Broadly speaking, an influence
shapes an agent’s transition model to reflect non-local effects of the other agents,
and given a statistically-sufficient set of influences, the agents’ decision problems
are conditionally independent. Put another way, an influence summarizes a joint
interaction, and the approach provides an abstraction layer upon which the MAS can
directly coordinate the agents’ interactions for a problem episode without conflating
the coordination with details about how the agents’ will execute their respective
portions of the coordinated global policy. My research extensively leverages the ideas
of influence abstraction, but generalizes on them in two primary ways. Firstly, I
adapt the idea of an influence from an operational perspective to an organizational
one, where rather than an influence representing the expected non-local effects in a
single problem episode, it represents the expected non-local effects over a space of
episodes. Secondly, I identify that in an organizational perspective, it can sometimes
be beneficial to summarize the non-local effects on other modeling components besides
transitions (e.g., states, actions, etc.), and as such, the definition of organizational
influence I develop in Section 3.1 encompasses the full set of an agent’s modeling
components.
Constrained Multiagent Reinforcement Learning. (Abdallah & Lesser, 2007;
Zhang, 2011; Lau et al., 2012). As a technique for improving the convergence properties
of multiagent reinforcement learning algorithms, research has identified that additional
constraints can be added to an agent’s local action space (both hard and soft constraints
have been considered), which serve to guide the agents’ action selections into more
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globally desired policies. These constraints are created via a hierarchical supervisor,
who reasons using an abstracted view of the environment created from the agents’
observations as a summary of the execution environment they have experienced.
The supervisor is repeatedly invoked as the agents experience the environment, and
determines the appropriate action constraints to enforce through a process similar
to reinforcement learning (and in some of the approaches cited above is exactly
reinforcement learning). Though these techniques have been applied for operational
reasoning, from an organizational perspective, such action constraints are analogous
to organizational influences, and the supervisor is analogous to an ODP. A difference
however, is that, even viewed from an organizational reasoning perspective, they
represent a sequence of organizations that is learned rather than a single organization
created upfront via model-based planning. This is significant if the performance of
the transient organizations is relatively poor, the learning period is extensive, and/or
rare episodes occur where performance is critical.
Hierarchical Learning/Planning. (Barto & Mahadevan, 2003; Stone et al., 2005;
Ghavamzadeh et al., 2006; Goldman & Zilberstein, 2008). Recall from Section 2.1.5,
that utilizing a hierarchical task structure, an agent can reason about its high-level
behavior policy without complicating its decision process with the typically larger
space of low-level primitive actions. In decision-theoretic models, hierarchical methods
are typically utilized as part of an agent’s operational reasoning, although hierarchical
methods have been used for knowledge-based models as an aspect of organizational
reasoning as seen in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.4. The abstract reasoning of hierarchical
methods is essentially computing the best ways for the agents to interact in a given
problem episode. Aggregating the results of such reasoning across episodes provides
an organizational perspective of the agents’ interactions, which an ODP could use as a
basis for constructing an organizational design. Indeed, the ODP techniques I develop
in Section 4.2.2 build on exactly this notion, and use hierarchical options to construct
statistics of the expected impact to the MAS associated with an organizational
influence.
2.2.6 Human Organizations
Organizational structuring and design for human organizations has received con-
siderable attention from a managerial and operations research perspective (Galbraith,
1973; Wood & Bandura, 1989; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Bernstein, 2012). While
concepts developed for human organizations can provide useful insights in to how
one might approach organizations for computational agents, it is important to note
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that human organizations are targeted towards a problem with inherently different
requirements. That is, human organizations must address issues such as motivation,
satisfaction, ego, personality conflicts, etc. that are not present with computational
agents. Thus, many human-organizational techniques (e.g., inserting a manager be-
tween two individuals who dislike each other but must collaborate) are unnecessary
for computational agents.
Similarly, computational agents present several challenges and opportunities for
organizational techniques that are not present with humans. For example, the ways
in which an organization can affect a human might be limited as compared to the
ways in which it can (potentially) affect a computational agent. Human organization
might be limited to providing (dis-)incentives for performing some action or reaching
some state; however, for computational agents, in addition to (dis-)incentives, an
organization might directly affect the ways in which an agent can observe the world,
or the actions an agent can even consider executing. This additional expressive
power creates opportunities for more rigid, fail-safe organizations (i.e., with provable
guarantees on the agents’ policies), but also increases search space size for creating an
appropriate organizational design.
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CHAPTER 3
Organizational Design Problem
Intuitively, the first step in my investigation of agent-driven organizational design
is to formulate a well-defined organizational design problem. Viewing organizational
design as search, I formulate an organizational design problem via two primary steps.
First, I develop an agent-driven organizational specification language, which serves to
define and delimit the organizational design (i.e., search) space. Second, I develop
quantitative, agent-driven metrics of organizational performance, which serve to define
the objective function over the organizational design space.
Like in the problem-driven and mixed organizational reasoning approaches discussed
in Section 2.2, an important aspect of my agent-driven approach is representing a
MAS’s organization as an explicit, first-class object. The significant departure in my
approach, however, is that I do not adopt an existing organizational specification
language from the research literature or construct a new top-down knowledge-driven
language, as is typical in prior organizational design research (e.g., see Section 2.2.2).
Rather, I follow my agent-driven approach to construct a specification language that is
mathematically grounded in the agents’ reasoning framework. In Section 3.1, I describe
my agent-driven specification language for Dec-MDP-based agents, and show how
the constructs in my language are natively integrated into the agents’ local reasoning
processes. Then, I formally analyze the theoretical properties of my specification
language in Section 3.2.
Leveraging the agent-driven foundation of my specification language, I identify
quantitative metrics of organizational performance in Section 3.3, and use them to
formulate a well-defined organizational design problem. One consequence of my agent-
driven treatment of organizational specification languages is a theoretical understanding
that all MASs have some form of (perhaps implicit) organization, and that the inherent
default, baseline organization of a MAS—as well as the inherent demands on the MAS
(i.e., problem episodes are neither trivial nor insurmountable)—can have substantial
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impact on the effectiveness of additional organizational design. In Section 3.4, I
provide a more well-defined baseline against which to compare my organizational
design techniques, derived from the premise that a MAS’s default organization should
be faithfully representative of the execution environment but should not contain further
information to distinguish effective coordination patterns beyond what is necessary
for faithful problem representation.
To demonstrate the potential for my organizational techniques to improve MAS
performance as well as to empirically validate the effects that organizational influences
in each of my language constructs has on MAS performance, in Section 3.5, I present
empirical evaluations of organizations that I hand-construct and encode using my
specification language. Finally, I briefly discuss the generality of my approach to other
agent reasoning frameworks in Section 3.6.2 before concluding with a summary of the
chapter’s contributions and results in Section 3.7.
3.1 Specification Language Formalism
To illustrate my agent-driven approach for specifying an organization (I describe
the generality of my approach more in Section 3.6), I commit to a factored Dec-
MDP agent reasoning framework (Definition 2.5) where the agents have a locally-
fully observable local state representation (Property 2.1). Consequently, this means
the problem domain is modeled by M = 〈N , {Mi}〉, where N is a set of n fully
cooperative agents, and Mi = 〈Si, αi, Ai, Pi, Ri, Ti〉 is the local MDP model for agent
i. (MDP semantics are given in Definition 2.1.) The objective of this section is to
leverage the mathematical formalism of this reasoning framework to derive a principled
organizational specification language where each of the constructs has well-defined
effects on the agent(s) local reasoning processes.
3.1.1 Organizational Specification Language
At the center of my specification language is the concept of an organizational
influence, so named because the idea is a generalization of inter-agent transition
influences (Section 2.2.5) from operational to organizational reasoning. Intuitively, an
organizational influence is an atomic piece of information that biases an agent’s local
reasoning process. Formally, I define an organizational influence as follows.1
1 From this point forward, “influence” refers to an organizational influence (Definition 3.1) unless
otherwise specifically noted.
49
Definition 3.1. An organizational influence for agent i, ∆i : (⊗jFj) × Ai ×
(⊗kFk)×R 7→ (⊗jFj)×Ai × (⊗kFk)×R is a modification to Mi at (sti ∈ Si)× (ai ∈
Ai)× (st+1i ∈ Si).
Note that for expressive generality, Definition 3.1 defines organizational influences
in terms of modifications to a tuple of state factors, action, successor state factors,
and a real number, but as we will see, this expressive power is not always necessary.
An organization is then defined in terms of organizational influences for each agent.
Definition 3.2. An organizational design, Θ ≡ 〈θ1, · · · , θn〉, where θi ≡ {∆i} is
the set of organizational influences for agent i.
Analyzing the components of the agents’ reasoning framework allows enumeration
of the possible ways that an influence could modify Mi. I step through these now,
along with brief, high-level examples of why an organization might want to modifyMi
in each of the modeling constructs. Together, modifications to each of these modeling
components constitutes the specification language I use to express organizational
influences to agents that reason with the Dec-MDP framework I have adopted.
 State factors: (⊗jFj) ⊆ S. For example, this type of modification could inform
agent i that, given its part in the organization, a locally-observable state factor is
unimportant for deciding its local policy, or that a new, previously-unobservable
state factor is critical for deciding its policy (in which case additional ∆is are
also necessary for the agent to correctly model this new factor).
 Action space: ai ∈ Ai. For example, this type of modification could prevent
agent i from considering and executing an organizationally undesirable action,
or that previously-neglected actions are important to consider and/or execute.
Such ∆is are similar to constrained action choices in MARL (Section 2.2.5)
but summarize expectations over the expected distribution of problem episodes
rather than within a single episode.
 Transition function factors: (⊗jPj) ⊆ Pi. For example, this type of modification
could inform agent i of organizationally-determined non-local effects that other
agents are expected to have on its local state space. Such ∆is are similar to
operational transition influences (Section 2.2.5) but summarize expectations
over the expected distribution of problem episodes rather than within a single
episode.
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 Reward function factors: (⊗jRj) ⊆ Ri. For example, this type of modification
could persuade agent i into executing actions and/or achieving states that might
look poor from a local perspective, but actually contribute positively to collective
performance (or vice versa for dissuading actions/states). Such ∆is are similar
to reward shaping (Section 2.2.5) but summarize expectations over the expected
distribution of problem episodes rather than within a single episode.
 Initial state distribution factors: (⊗jαj) ⊆ αi. For example, this type of modifi-
cation could inform agent i about the initial distribution over new, previously-
unobservable state factors.
 Time horizon: Ti. For example, this type of modification could inform agent i
that, given its part in the organization, the agent can expect its local actions to
conclude sooner, and thus it should plan for fewer decision points (or vice versa
for a longer planning horizon).
3.1.2 Incorporating Organizational Influences into Local Reasoning
Broadly, there are three classes of modifications that can be done to a model
component: adding an entirely new factor, removing an existing factor, or overwriting
an existing factor. When incorporating an organizational specification into its local
model, each agent i overlays θi onto Mi to create its augmented model, M|θii , by
modifying its Mi according to each ∆i ∈ θi. That is, each agent adds new factors
to its model, removes existing factors from its model, and overwrites existing factors
in its model as directed by its respective organizational influences. This overlaying
process thus resembles how, for example, coordination locales model domain dynamics
by overriding an agent’s local transition/reward models (Varakantham et al., 2009;
Velagapudi et al., 2011), and social model shaping augments those local models to
coerce coordination (Babes et al., 2008). Each agent then computes its optimal local
policy, pi
∗|θi
i , from M|θii in exactly the same way as it did before.
To illustrate this overlaying process, consider a simple organization for the fire-
fighting domain that designates a region of responsibility for each agent to consider
fighting fires within. Suppose the organization specifies these responsibility regions
by removing fire intensity factors (Ics) from the agents’ state representation for fires
outside of the agent’s region, adding a new reward factor for being located within
its region, and overwriting the Ic-transition factor to account for Ics in its region
decreasing over time (due to other agents’ efforts). Figure 3.1a illustrates agent i’s
Mi as a two-stage dynamic Bayesian network (2DBN), and Figure 3.1b illustrates the
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Figure 3.1: (a): An example Mi for the firefighting domain represented as a 2DBN.
(b): An exampleM|θii created by organizationally modifying theMi from (a). Shaded
regions indicate factors that were organizationally overwritten or added, while dotted
regions indicate factors that were organizationally removed.
M|θii obtained after incorporating the example organization, where agent i is assigned
responsibility for cells 1 through λ.
To prevent several under-defined scenarios that could occur when overlaying θi
onto Mi to create M|θii , I make the following restrictions on valid Θ specifications:
 The influences must be internally consistent. That is, a well-formed Θ can not
contain two contradictory ∆is. For example if one ∆i modifies a transition factor
in Mi to make Pi(f t+1k |sti, ai) = 0.5 for state factor Fk, then another ∆i cannot
modify that factor to Pi(f
t+1
k |sti, ai) = 0.2.
 A valid Θ must be well-formed with respect to Mi. That is, an influence in
Θ cannot modify something that does not exist in Mi, except by adding new
modeling factors. For example, ∆i cannot remove a state factor that does not
exist in Mi.
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 A Θ must leave each agent with a well-defined MDP. Specifically, M|θii must
contain: a finite time horizon; at least one state factor; at least one action in
every state; at least one reward factor; transition factors that cover M|θii ’s state
factors; and initial state distribution factors that cover M|θii ’s state factors.
Note that these additional restrictions on valid Θs could potentially be relaxed
if the agent and ODP iteratively communicated with each other to resolve any
such inconsistencies; however, for simplicity, in this dissertation I will require these
restrictions to enforce that Θ is consistent with what the agents can internally model.
3.2 Language Properties
A primary advantage of my agent-driven approach for creating an organizational
specification language is that the mathematical formalism of the agents’ underlying
reasoning framework is inherited by the specification language, which provides the
necessary axioms to theoretically analyze my specification language and formally prove
several important characteristics.
3.2.1 Size of Organizational Design Space
Na¨ıvely examining my definition of organizational influence (Definition 3.1) and
organization (Definition 3.2) reveals that a distinct organization exists for every
legal combination of modifications that could be made to the agents’ local models.
By stepping through each of the model components, one can conclude that there
are an uncountably infinite number of possible modifications than an organization
specification could possibly represent. More precisely, if one assumes a finite number
of modeling factors, the set of possible modifications has cardinality i1. This can be
seen by considering, for example, that modifications to the reward constructs include
a real number (i.e., an influence could modify a reward to be any real value), thus
the set of reward modifications alone has cardinality i1. Taking the cross product
between (a finite number of) factors with cardinality no higher than i1 yields the
final cardinality result of i1.
A more pragmatic perspective for viewing an organizational influence, however, is
that ∆i represents a constraint and/or re-prioritization of agent i’s local policy space
(brought about via a modification to Mi). The difference in perspective allows us to
see that multiple influences could have the same net effect on the agent’s reasoning
and behaviors; for example, a ∆i that modifies Ri(s
t
i, ai, s
t+1
i ) = 4.3 may have the
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same effect on agent i’s reasoning and behaviors as an alternative ∆′i that modifies
Ri(s
t
i, ai, s
t+1
i ) = 4.3 + , where  is some small constant. From this perspective, the
size of the pragmatically-distinct organizational design space is given by the number
of different joint policy spaces an organization could induce a MAS to consider, and
equates to the number of total orderings of every subspace of the joint policy space.
Formally, this quantity is given by
∑|pi|
i=1
|pi|!
(|pi|−i)! = O(|pi|!), where |pi| is the cardinality
of the joint policy space. The above quantity is finite for the Dec-MDP framework I
have adopted; however, unsurprisingly, direct enumeration of the organizational design
space is computationally intractable. Consequently, the automated ODP techniques I
develop in later chapters only search the design space for an approximately optimal
organization.
3.2.2 Language Completeness and Necessity
Intuitively, my organizational specification language is complete since it can modify
any of the agents’ reasoning components. This idea serves as the premise for a more
formal proof.
Theorem 3.1. My organizational specification language (Section 3.1) is complete for
the Dec-MDP reasoning framework I have adopted.
Proof. By Contradiction. Assume my specification language is not complete, then
by definition there must exist an influence to the agents’ decision making processes
that is not expressible with my specification language. However, by construction, my
specification language covers the full range of information expressible to an agent in
the Dec-MDP framework I have adopted. That is, beyond state factors, initial state
distribution factors, actions, transition factors, reward factors, and time horizon, there
does not exist another mechanism that such an agent uses to make decisions. Thus,
there cannot exist an influence to the agents’ decision making processes that is not
expressible with my specification language, which is a contradiction.
Leveraging the mathematical foundations of the Dec-MDP framework I have
adopted, it is also possible to formally prove the necessity of each construct in my
organizational specification language. Broadly speaking, these proofs each construct
an example organizational influence that an ODP might want to express for various
reasons, and then formally prove by exhaustion that a particular construct in the
specification language is the only way to express that influence. In many of these
examples, a critical aspect is that an agent has local expertise that is not known
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to the ODP (i.e., Property 1.3). I discuss a particularly evident example of when
agents possess local expertise and how this information uncertainty can be compactly
represented in an ODP (i.e., abstract organizational influences) more thoroughly in
Chapter 5. However, in order to present my formal proofs of language necessity as
clearly as possible, I have elected to utilize the associated terminology that I develop
in that chapter for discussing such issues. As such, to avoid unnecessarily confusing
readers with terminology that has yet to be presented, the formal proofs for language
necessity can be found in Appendix A.
It is worth noting that under special, more-restrictive circumstances, some of the
specification language constructs may be unnecessary (though the language will always
be complete). For example, suppose an ODP knows a specific policy pi (e.g., the
optimal policy pi∗) that it wants the agents to always execute for every episode—e.g., an
assembly line in a factory. In this case, the organizational specification could prevent
the agents from considering any action counter to pi by modifying their action spaces,
and all the other specification language constructs are thus unnecessary. However, as
formally proven in Appendix A, all of the language constructs are necessary within
the general space of possible organizational design problems.
3.3 Measuring Organizational Performance
Building on the organizational design space defined by my agent-driven specification
language in Section 3.1, in this section I identify principled, quantitative metrics of
organizational performance to serve as an objective function over that design space.
Together, my specification language and performance metrics constitute a well-defined,
agent-driven organizational design problem (Definition 3.6 below).
Following my agent-driven approach, the performance of an organization reflects
the performance of the MAS while solving problem episodes. For the Dec-MDP model
I have adopted, the metrics of interest are the expected joint reward and expected
computational costs of the MAS, which are quantitatively defined as follows:
Definition 3.3. The operational reward under Θ, ROp(Θ), is given by the expected
joint reward of the agents’ joint policy w.r.t. their organization, pi|Θ:
ROp(Θ) ≡
∑
s0∈S
α(s0)
∑
a∈A
pi|Θ(s0, a)Qpi
|Θ
(s0, a)
Definition 3.4. Assuming agents reason in parallel, the operational reasoning
cost under Θ, COp(Θ), is given by the expected operational reasoning cost for an agent
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to calculate its individual pi
∗|θi
i , notated as C(pi
∗|θi
i ):
COp(Θ) ≡ Ei
[
C(pi
∗|θi
i )
]
Throughout this dissertation, I compute C(pi
∗|θi
i ) as the agents’ actual CPU time
required to compute pi
∗|θi
i .
Definition 3.5. The operational performance of Θ, POp(Θ), selects from the
Pareto front of the operational reward and operational reasoning cost:
POp(Θ) ≡ f (ROp(Θ),COp(Θ))
Naturally, the specific form of f is defined by the problem domain; however,
throughout this dissertation, I will assume that f is monotonic in each dimension such
that higher ROp and lower COp is preferable.
Given these performance metrics, it is straightforward to formulate a well-defined
organizational design problem.
Definition 3.6. The optimal organization, Θ∗ is the Θ with maximal operational
performance.
Θ∗ ≡ arg max
Θ
POp(Θ)
As just shown in Section 3.2.1, enumerating the organizational design space is
computationally intractable, and thus an important aspect of my research in future
chapters is the identification of more efficient techniques for (approximately) solving
this organizational design problem. For now, however, Definition 3.6 provides a
well-defined organizational design problem, and consequently also provides a method
for comparing alternative organizations.
3.4 Baseline Organization
As described in Section 3.1.2, an organizational design modifies the agents’ local
models by adding new factors, removing existing factors, and/or overwriting existing
factors. This approach raises an important question: Where does an agent’s (original)
local model come from? Clearly, the opportunities for an organization to impact
a MAS depends on how (dis-)organized the agents are when following their initial
local models. Consequently, one could demonstrate arbitrarily good performance
improvements from an organizational design by initializing the agents that will adopt
the design with arbitrarily bad local models to begin with.
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Examining the following biconditional relationship M|θii =Mi ↔ θi = ∅, we can
see that the combination of initial local models of agents essentially do comprise an
organization. This observation is essentially an embodiment of the experience-driven
aspects of my problem-drivenapproach, where a MAS’s organization is implicitly
observable in the agents’ joint actions. Alternatively, viewed from a problem-driven
perspective, when assembling a MAS, agents might be selected based on the inherent
alignment between their local models and the (organizational) biases of whomever
is assembling the system. The actions agents are capable of, the states they can
represent, their predispositions about what states are rewarding, etc. can all factor
into decisions about which agents are included in the system.
Evaluating my agent-driven approach thus depends on defining a baseline organi-
zation. To develop as even-handed a baseline as possible, I advocate initializing local
decision models by performing an uninformed mapping of the joint Dec-MDP models
into localized versions. In this way, the local models are perforce aligned with the
global model, but they are not crafted to differentiate and/or coordinate the policies
of the agents. Essentially, the philosophy is to endow each agent with a local model
that directly makes the individual agent responsible for solving the global problem, to
the extent its awareness and capabilities allow.
Specifically, my methodology for initializing agents’ local models to provide an
experimental baseline is as follows:2
1. The subset of state features directly observable to the agent defines its local
state representation.
2. The action space of an agent is simply its component of the joint action space.
3. The local reward function is the same as the global reward function, except that
any components involving features outside of the agent’s local state representation
are dropped, since the agent does not have values for those features.
4. The local transition model corresponds to the joint transition entries where the
other agents do not affect the agent.
5. The initial local state distribution maps the global distribution into the local
state space.
6. The local finite time horizon is identical to the global value.
2 Throughout this dissertation, I use the terms “local organization”, “baseline organization”, and
“local baseline” interchangeably to refer to the baseline MAS constructed using my methodology.
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In the firefighting domain, the baseline organization is the local model as I have
previously described in Section 2.1.4.1.
While this method for creating a baseline model is still dependent on somewhat
arbitrary decisions (e.g., which features are included in an agent’s local state), the idea
is that aspects that influence how an agent formulates a policy (what is rewarding,
what might happen in the world, etc.) are aligned with the “true” global model but
contain as little information as possible about what an agent might expect others to
do in the world. An ODP’s primary objective is to provide such information.
Despite adopting this uninformed-but-aligned baseline, other factors can also
influence the difference that an organizational design can make. A simple example
is that the initial configuration of state can greatly affect whether the baseline
organization is effective. In the firefighting domain, if we suppose that the fires
pop up across the space with uniform probability, then where should the agents
initially be located? If they are uniformly distributed in the environment, then their
local models (where they tend to prefer fighting nearby fires) inherently lead to a
good allocation of fires to agents, and results in a relatively high-performing local
baseline. If they instead all start in the same location, on the other hand, then
the local models inherently lead to agents moving around en masse and yields no
parallelism benefits (but note that if multiple firefighters on the same fire had a super-
additive effect, instead of a sub-additive effect, then initially spreading out could be
disadvantageous, while moving around in a pack might be beneficial). Even randomly
placing firefighters is not conclusive, because distributing fires and agents in the same
uniformly random way introduces its own bias. To mitigate these concerns in my later
empirical evaluations, I present results from the two extreme initial conditions: the
agents beginning uniformly distributed; and the agents beginning clustered in the
center of the grid world, which represents the best and worst case in expectation for
the baseline organization respectively.
Beyond the effects that the baseline organization can have on organizational
performance, the inherent demands on the MAS can also have substantial impact on
improvement from organizational design (Corkill et al., 2015). That is, the nature
of the domain impacts the degree to which an organization matters. For example,
in the firefighting domain, if there were only one fire per problem episode, then an
organization cannot improve joint reward because the agents can achieve the optimal
joint policy without coordination (although an organization could reduce the agents’
computational costs). Similarly, if every grid cell contained a fire, then organization also
does not improve joint reward because severe over-utilization of the agents’ capabilities
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precludes meaningful joint interactions (though again, an organization could reduce
the agents’ computational costs). In these cases, an organization could be a significant
improvement for some POp Pareto topologies (where low computational costs are
important), but will not improve the quality of the agents’ joint policy. However,
organizations can improve the MAS’s joint reward when the agents’ capabilities are
in the middle, transient portion of domain “difficulty”. We will explicitly observe
these effects more in Chapter 4 (e.g., Figure 4.1 illustrates a manifestation of this
observation in the firefighting domain with two fires per episode).
3.5 Empirical Demonstration
While the semantics and impact of influences to each of the agents’ modeling
components is well-defined by the agents’ reasoning framework, it is nonetheless
illustrative to demonstrate that my specification language can be practically used to
specify an organization for a MAS. In this section, I describe two empirical evaluations
performed using organizations that I hand-constructed and tuned for use in the
firefighting domain. I begin next, by describing the overarching process that I use
for empirically evaluating organizations in a MAS throughout this dissertation. In
Section 3.5.2, I use my specification language to demonstrate how organizations can
be used to improve the performance of a MAS. Then, in Section 3.5.3, I investigate
the effects that encoding organizational influences in each of the model components
has on MAS performance.
3.5.1 Empirical Evaluation Process
In this section, I describe several aspects of my empirical evaluation pertaining
to simulation details. Unless otherwise explicitly noted, the details I describe in this
section hold for all of the empirical evaluations I perform in this dissertation.
Episodic performance. To test the degree to which an organization provides long-
term benefit to a MAS, I run a fixed organization over a space of randomly-generated
problem episodes, where by the luck of the draw, some episodes might be well suited
to one organization over another. I focus on expected performance over episodes
not only to smooth out the randomness of the episodes but moreover to identify
an organization’s effectiveness over the long term, since an organization should be
relatively stable over an extended period (i.e., Property 1.5). To reduce the statistical
variance of my results, each organization that I evaluate encounters exactly the same
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problem episodes (for a given experiment) in exactly the same order (though since
the organization is fixed, episode order does not impact performance).
Agents’ Operational Reasoning. In each episode, each agent uses its M|θii (as
computed via the methods in Section 3.1.2) to locally compute its pi
∗|θi
i . To create
its local policy, an agent uses CPLEX (IBM, 2012) to calculate the optimal local
policy for its reachable state space (see below for an overview of reachability) using
the linear program as formulated by Kallenberg (1983) (Equation 2.4). The joint
policy is then simply defined as pi|Θ = 〈pi∗|θ11 , pi∗|θ22 , ..., pi∗|θnn 〉, which is not ensured to
be optimal with respect to Θ (i.e., pi|Θ is distinct from pi∗|Θ), since the agents do not
perform any explicit operational coordination. (See the “Communication” paragraph
below for a discussion of runtime coordination in my experiments.)
In the firefighting domain, it is the case that an agent i’s reachable state space
from a given initial state, which I denote as S˜i(S
0
i ), for a problem episode, is several
orders of magnitude smaller than the complete state space. A state is reachable,
s˜ti ∈ S˜i(S0i ) ⊆ Si, if and only if there exists a policy, pii (note that this policy need
not be optimal), such that by beginning in some s0i ∈ S0i and following pii, s˜ti will
be reached with non-zero probability. The reachable state space can be directly
enumerated using Algorithm 3.1, which performs breadth-first search by iteratively
“unrolling” the reachable state space from S0i forward via the transition function (Wu
& Durfee, 2007).
Reachability is important because, if |S˜i(S0i )|  |Si| as it is here, then creating a
policy for only the reachable states can result in substantial computational savings
as compared to creating a policy for the entire state space. As such, in my empirical
evaluations the agents only create policies for their respective reachable state spaces
(w.r.t. M|θii ). However, since an agent i is unaware of the actions of the other agents
at policy creation time, and the effects those actions have on agent i’s local state space
are also unknown, it is common for an agent to “fall off policy” during execution (i.e.,
reach a state that was thought to be unreachable). In these cases, I assume that agent
i extends its current policy to include the reachable state space from the new state
forward, and that this planning is instantaneous with respect to events in the world.
For the purposes of my experiments this assumption favors less informed organizations
(that fall off policy more frequently) more than informed ones. As my empirical results
in the next sections show, the organizations I create in my experiments are more
informed than the local baseline, and thus they typically fall off policy less frequently.
Consequently, the benefits of an organization relative to the local baseline will tend to
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Algorithm 3.1 Reachable state space enumeration via “unrolling”
Input: The agent i’s MDP model Mi, set of possible starting states S0i
Output: The set of states reachable from S0i , S˜i(S
0
i )
1: S˜i(S
0
i )← ∅
2: List l← S0i
3: while l is not empty do
4: sti ← l.pop
5: if sti /∈ S˜i(S0i ) then
6: S˜i(S
0
i )← S˜i(S0i ) ∪ sti
7: l.add(∀st+1i ∈ Si s.t., ∃ai ∈ Ai where P (st+1i |sti, ai) > 0)
8: end if
9: end while
10: return S˜i(S
0
i )
be, if anything, understated.
Communication. A commonly studied aspect of many MASs is communication; for
example, in Dec-MDPs, agents could exchange messages to share non-local information
or coordinate joint actions. As described in Section 2.2.2, inter-agent communication
has also been studied within the context of organizations, where an organization
might streamline the agents’ communication by influencing when the agents initiate
communication and what information is exchanged. In the firefighting domain, it is
intuitive that runtime communication to coordinate the agents’ local policies (i.e., to
compute pi∗|Θ rather than pi|Θ) could increase ROp (at the expense of increased COp),
and gainfully augment an organizational approach. For example, an organization
could inform the agents that each agent should send a message to inform the others of
which fire it is currently pursuing, which would ensure the agents do not redundantly
pursue the same fire.
In my empirical experiments, however, I prevent all of the agents’ communication,
instead forcing each agent to make decisions from its local perspective, and moreover
forcing all non-local information to come from the organization. Intuitively, this
pushes the problem domain to an extreme parameterization, and presents a compelling
evaluation space that stresses the ODP to identify an organization that does not rely
on runtime coordination to facilitate the agents’ interactions. Additionally, preventing
communication eliminates a confounding factor in my results since the agents are
unable to use runtime coordination to overcome a poorly designed organization. For
example, in the firefighting domain, agents could achieve optimal coordination with a
relatively simple communication protocol (i.e., exchange information about which fire
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each agent should pursue), and consequently only poorly designed organizations (i.e.,
that preclude the optimal joint policy) would not achieve the optimal joint reward.
In Dec-MDP frameworks, communication is often modeled as an action, albeit
communicative actions are explicitly, distinctly represented (Pynadath & Tambe, 2002;
Goldman & Zilberstein, 2003). One natural approach for incorporating communication
into my representations and algorithms would be to simply represent the agents’
various communication capabilities as actions in the agents’ action spaces. While
this simplistic approach would not theoretically require any modifications to my
organizational representations and algorithms, it is arguably an oversimplification in
many cases. That is, communicative actions have qualitatively different effects on the
MAS’s decision problem as compared to non-communicative actions. For example,
communicative actions often have delayed-effects, a distinct class of resource constraints
(e.g., bandwidth), etc.—indeed, this is a reason that communicative actions are
distinctly modeled in the prior works cited above. Thus, while it seems intuitive that the
techniques I develop in this dissertation should extend to communication, identifying
the best, practical way to incorporate communication into my representations and
algorithms is an interesting direction for future work.
One particular way that I have identified where influencing the agents’ commu-
nication could be especially significant is if the organization adds a new state factor
to the agents’ state representation. For example, a new state factor could act as
a blackboard (Corkill, 1991) for facilitating cooperation among the agents. In this
example, influences to the agents’ communication protocols could inform the agents
of when and how they should modify the blackboard.
Agent Interactions in the Firefighting Domain. In the firefighting domain, it
is intuitive that the agents could potentially interact in a variety of ways. For example,
simultaneously fighting the same fire could have: a redundant effect where multiple
agents have diminished returns or punitive effects (i.e., sub-linear scaling); an additive
effect where each agent contributes the same regardless of how many other agents
simultaneously fight a fire (i.e., linear scaling); or a bonus effect where multiple agents
as a team are better than a group of individuals (i.e., super-linear scaling). While the
linear scaling case is less interesting since joint interactions are essentially unimportant,
both the sub- and super-linear cases have joint interactions that can force the MAS
to cooperate in order to achieve high performance. Throughout this dissertation,
I somewhat arbitrarily decided between the sub- and super-linear cases, and elect
to experiment with the sub-linear case where multiple agents have the same effect
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as a single agent when fighting a fire (i.e., simultaneously fighting a fire in a cell is
completely redundant). However, the super-linear case would have been equally valid,
and the important aspect here is that the domain has joint interactions that force the
MAS to cooperate, where failure to effectively cooperate diminishes performance.
Another intuitive way for the agents to interact is in their movement actions, where
simultaneously occupying the same grid cell could be: prevented (e.g., agents bounce
off of each other); punished (e.g., collisions cause damage to each other); positively
rewarded (e.g., allows agents to share supplies or information); ignored (i.e., no effect
for occupying the same cell); etc. In this dissertation, I elected to not associate any
special effects with simultaneously occupying the same grid cell (i.e., the ignored case
above). This choice essentially reduces the number of joint interactions in the domain,
which is arguably a drawback; however, it also delimits the space of joint interactions
to the firefighting actions, which affords me greater control of the evaluation domain.
3.5.2 Specification Language Demonstration
To provide a more concrete example of how my specification language can be used
to encode an organization, I step through specifications for several hand-designed
organizations, and then use them to illustrate how an organization can increase POp
compared to the baseline MAS. I designed the example organizations in this section
for a relatively straightforward two agent version of the firefighting domain, which
allows comparison of POp against not only the local baseline but also the optimal joint
policy, which can be computed for these small problems.
Specifically, for this set of experiments, the domain is a simple 10×5 grid world
with 2 cooperative agents and 2 fires, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. The distribution of
fires’ locations in the initial state is uniformly random (without replacement) over the
entire grid, and the initial fires’ intensities are i.i.d. uniformly random over {1, 2, 3}.
The agents always begin each episode in the same locations (those in Figure 3.2).
Note that in this set of experiments there are no cell delays—movement actions are
deterministic. To speed up the tests without pruning any viable solutions, the finite
time horizon, T , is the maximal time either agent would require to put out both fires
alone (varies per episode). Each agent’s local reward (as well as the joint reward) in a
state prior to reaching T is −∑c Ic. When T is reached, the problem episode ends,
and each agent’s local reward is −10∑c Ic, encouraging the agents to put all the fires
out before the deadline.
For each organization that I develop in this section, the underlying structure is that
each agent is assigned a primary area of responsibility (PAR). The first organization,
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Figure 3.2: Example initial state of a 10×5 firefighting grid world domain. Ai is the
position of agent i, and I = x indicates that there is a fire in that cell with intensity x.
called fullOverlapOrg, assigns both agents to be responsible for all cells in the
entire grid. However, unlike the baseline organization where agents have no model
of each other, fullOverlapOrg influences the agents’ transition factors to account for
the expected non-local effects of the other agent. Specifically, the organizational
specification encodes the heuristic assumption that an agent will always move (within
its PAR) to fight the fire closest to its current location. So, the organizational influences
modify the other agent’s transition function to anticipate that some fires (typically
on the other side of the grid) will have decreasing intensities even without fighting
them itself, helping it refrain from rushing to distant high-intensity fires that will be
addressed by the other agent.
A second organization, called partitionOrg, partitions the grid cells, assigning
responsibility for fires in the western 5×5 subgrid to A1, and the eastern subgrid to
A2. This assignment is encoded by preventing the agents from considering a local
action that would move them out of their respective PARs (i.e., modifying the agents’
action spaces so those actions are no longer available in the appropriate states).
The third organization is called smallOverlapOrg, in which the 4 middle columns
of the grid are in both agents’ PAR. Like in partitionOrg, agents’ action spaces are
modified so that an agent doesn’t consider moving out of its PAR. Additionally, like
fullOverlapOrg, the smallOverlapOrg modifies each agent’s transition factors to reflect
that fire intensity state factors in its PAR (i.e., those in the overlapping PAR space)
have a chance of going out without it fighting them.
I generated 1,500 episodes with random initial states (as described above) and the
agents solved each using the 3 organizational designs (partitionOrg, smallOverlapOrg,
and fullOverlapOrg), as well as the uninformed baseline organization. I also used
CPLEX with the joint problem specification to generate the optimal joint policy for
each episode to compute the optimal attainable ROp, if the agents could afford the
computational costs to generate it.
These experiments are summarized in Table 3.1, and highlight several important
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ROp COp Replans
Baseline -15.97 86 1.32
ParitionOrg -16.15 12 0.26
SmallOverlapOrg -14.74 27 0.16
FullOverlapOrg -14.70 70 0.14
Joint Policy -14.37 24558 0.00
Table 3.1: Results for experiments in Section 3.5.2 for ROp, COp, and expected number
of times the replanning mechanism was invoked per agent per episode.
points. Firstly, even these simple organizations can improve ROp considerably compared
to the baseline, but overly restrictive organizations (e.g., partitionOrg) can degrade
ROp because the same agent too often must fight both fires. As one would expect,
more restrictive organizations increasingly simplify agents’ local decision problems,
resulting in lower COp. Moreover, note that all of the organizations decrease COp
compared to the baseline, because in the baseline both agents solve larger problems
(plan to put out all the fires by themselves) than when they are informed (e.g., through
the transition function) that they will have help.
Note that the fullOverlapOrg provides greater global awareness to the MAS than
the other organizations, which allows that organization to achieve superior ROp at the
expense of increased COp. Unsurprisingly, Table 3.1 illustrates that ROp is inversely
correlated with COp. To provide a sense of when a system administrator should prefer
each of the organizations, I encoded a Pareto front of POp = ROp − 1bCOp, which
is shown in Figure 3.3. Figure 3.3 confirms intuitions that when computation is
expensive (low b) paritionOrg is best due to its highly simplified decision process.
Then as computation becomes cheaper (b increases), the more flexible organizations
become superior, and finally when computation is very cheap, computing the optimal
joint policy becomes best. However, note that the local baseline is never optimal.
3.5.3 Isolated Impact of Specification Constructs
To provide an empirical perspective of the impact of specifying an organization
along different influence specification dimensions, I developed another set of hand-
designed organizations for the firefighting domain. Unlike Section 3.5.2 where I
evaluated different organizational structures (i.e., different methods for allocating
PARs), in this set of experiments, I encode a single overarching organizational structure
in a variety of ways using the different specification language constructs individually.
For this set of experiments, the domain has 10 cooperative agents and 10 fires
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Figure 3.3: POp curves for each organization.
on a 25×10 grid. The rest of the experimental domain parameters for this set of
experiments are identical to those in Section 3.5.2.
The overarching structure for the organizations I develop in this section inherits
from the smallOverlapOrg previously described (Section 3.5.2), which leverages the
notion of organizationally-directed PARs to narrow the local policy space that each
agent respectively considers while still providing the agents with some flexibility to
load balance by encoding overlapping regions of responsibility. Specifically, the 25×10
grid is divided into 10 distinct 5×5 subgrids, one for each agent, to act as the agent’s
PAR (Figure 3.4). In each direction (where cells exist), the subgrid is expanded
by 3 cells to introduce overlap; conceptually, this is an agent’s secondary area of
responsibility (SAR). I encoded five organizations that implement this fundamental
structure in different ways:
 actionOrg modifies an agent’s action space to prevent it from moving out of
its combined PAR and SAR.
 stateOrg modifies an agent’s state factors so that it cannot model the fire
intensity state factors for cells outside of its combined PAR and SAR.
 rewardOrg modifies the agent’s reward factors to penalize the agent with
increasing severity for leaving its PAR (specifically, Manhattan distance from
the PAR squared).
 transitionOrg modifies the agent’s transition factors to model how fires in
its PAR and SAR might go out due to another agent’s actions using the same
heuristics as in the fullOverlapOrg from Section 3.5.2. Additionally, like stateOrg,
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Figure 3.4: Illustration of PARs for 10 agent organizations.
transitionOrg modifies the agent’s state factors to prevent it from representing
fire intensity state factors for cells outside its combined PAR and SAR, which is
necessary to curb the substantial increase to an agent’s reachable state space
resulting from the richer transition model.
 fullOrg uses all of the dimensional levers just described.
Recalling from Section 3.4, the effectiveness of the local baseline can depend on
the problem domain, especially on the available opportunities to improve coordination
by organizationally differentiating agents’ policies to yield effective interactions. To
provide a general idea of these performance bounds, in these experiments, I consider
two extreme cases of initial locations for the agents (corresponding to the “best” and
“worst” case for the baseline respectively): where they are evenly spread throughout
the grid; and where they are clustered at the center of the grid. Note that these
cases do not represent formal bounds on performance (indeed the formally-provable
bounds are so loose as to be rendered practically meaningless), and it is possible to
construct domains where the local baseline would perform (arbitrarily) better/worse
than found in these cases. The point of presenting results from these two cases is
merely to demonstrate the effects that the problem domain can have on baseline
effectiveness, and to evaluate organizational effectiveness in domains indicative of
good/poor baseline performance.
I generated 100 random episodes using the initial state distribution previously
described, for each of the spread and clustered variations of agents’ initial locations.
For each episode, I evaluated each of the five organizations above, as well as the baseline
organization—computing optimal joint policies to compare against for these problems
was computationally intractable. For each episode, I recorded each organization’s ROp,
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COp, and number of replanning invocations just as was done in Section 3.5.2.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 present the results for these experiments, and illustrate many
of the intuitions for how each influence construct impacts an agent’s decision-making
process. As others have discovered, reward influences (aka reward shaping) can be a
powerful tool for increasing ROp; however, they do not generally reduce COp since an
agent must still consider every policy even though some turn out to have less reward.
Influencing the agents’ transition functions can also yield a large increase to ROp;
however, doing so substantially increases COp since the richer transition model increases
the size of the reachable state space. Notice that organizations with modified transition
functions invoke the replanning mechanism much less, indicating that if recovering
from falling off policy incurs non-negligible penalties (i.e., results in decreased ROp or
increased COp), then transition influences could be the implementation strategy of
choice. Note that the Baseline having no replanning invocations on Table 3.3 is because
the agents have exactly identical local policies, thus move around en masse and each
think they are the one responsible for fighting the fires. I also find that influencing
the agents’ action or state spaces can greatly simplify the agents’ decision problems
(and thus reduces COp) and can also increase ROp. Finally, with fullOrg, I identify
that despite attempting to encode the same overarching organizational structure, the
organizational influences in the components are not completely redundant, as it is
largely possible to obtain the additive benefits found in each of the other organizations.
The drop in ROp of fullOrg as compared to transitionOrg is due to the reward influences
urging agents to quickly go to their respective PARs (and stay there) rather than stop
and fight fires along the way and discouraging them from moving into their respective
SARs to fight fires. However, also note that COp is drastically reduced, indicating
that the Pareto tradeoff would be beneficial unless COp is an insignificant contribution
to POp. (Optimal organizations for different points along the Pareto front could be
determined from a figure analogous to Figure 3.3.)
Examining the results between the two different initial agent configurations high-
lights the significant impact that the problem domain can have on an organization’s
relative effectiveness as compared to the baseline MAS. When the agents initially
begin spread throughout the grid, the local baseline performs relatively well (since
agents can generally just focus on fighting the fires nearest to their current location
without coordinating those actions with other agents), and there are fewer, limited
opportunities for an organization to improve the agents’ coordination. However, when
the agents begin clustered in the center of the grid, it is important for an organization
to differentiate the agents’ policies so that they will efficiently disperse throughout the
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ROp COp Replans
Baseline -107.40 1646 7.89
RewardOrg -91.45 1817 7.49
TransitionOrg -85.14 14606 0.86
ActionOrg -94.14 551 7.70
StateOrg -94.14 1237 2.60
FullOrg -87.51 5476 0.88
Table 3.2: Results for experiments in Section 3.5.3 when agents initially began spread
throughout the grid for ROp, COp, and number of times the replanning mechanism
was invoked per agent per episode.
ROp COp Replans
Baseline -436.7 10912 0.00
RewardOrg -242.0 11051 9.38
TransitionOrg -222.5 10859 0.55
ActionOrg -264.5 621 8.56
StateOrg -254.4 1588 1.50
FullOrg -250.4 2652 1.02
Table 3.3: Results for experiments in Section 3.5.3 when agents initially began clustered
in the center of the grid for ROp, COp, and number of times the replanning mechanism
was invoked per agent per episode.
grid (to avoid redundantly pursuing the same fire), and consequently the organizations
all perform substantially better than the baseline.
The reader may have noted that these experiments did not evaluate the impact
of influencing the initial state distribution or the time horizon. One could envision
organizations that modify Ti to give agents specific roles for planning horizons, where
some agents focus on the near-term and others on the long-term, but this kind of
organizational decomposition is obviously unsuited for the firefighting domain since
the focus is on (relatively) short time horizons. If αi summarizes the exogenously-
determined initial state, then an organization can only map this into the agent’s
modified state space, as was implicitly done for the organizational variations above.
However, as seen in the relative performance between the spread and clustered domains,
if the organization can impose initial states on agents (e.g., spreading them out in
anticipation of expected fire configurations), then this provides an additional lever for
improving collective performance.
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3.6 Generality of Approach
In order to provide more precise discussions throughout this chapter, I have made
various restrictions on the space of problems that I considered. In this section, I briefly
describe the generality of my approach beyond the specific problems that I previously
described. Note that these discussions are by no means comprehensive, but rather are
intended to shed insight on my approach’s generality.
3.6.1 Generality to Other Problem Domains
Throughout this chapter, and indeed throughout this dissertation, my empirical
evaluations are limited to the firefighting domain, which could be viewed as a weakness
of my evaluations. It is important to recognize, however, that the problem domain
specifics are only significant insofar as they present interesting challenges for orga-
nizational design. In this regard, the firefighting domain is a nuanced testbed for
evaluating my organizational design techniques. By altering the domain parameters
(as I will do throughout this dissertation), the firefighting domain can be controlled to
pose progressively difficult organizational design challenges. Moreover, by consistently
using different parameterizations of the same problem domain, I can systematically
investigate the isolated effects of various organizational techniques, and incrementally
provide the reader with an intuitive understanding of how my techniques are affecting
the MAS.
Of course, generality to other problem domains is nevertheless important. Theo-
retically speaking, my specific techniques rely only on the existence of a well-formed
Dec-MDP model, and nowhere did my representations rely on specific domain informa-
tion. That said, one possible challenge to generalizing my discussions in this chapter
would be in hand identifying appropriate organizational influences for other domains.
In the firefighting domain, I relied heavily on my intuitions and recognition of spatial
patterns to hand design organizations, which could be difficult in other domains. A
possible solution to this concern would be to use automated organizational design
techniques like the ones I develop in Chapters 4 and 5.
3.6.2 Generality to Other Reasoning Frameworks
To delimit the scope of my discussions in this dissertation, I have elected to adopt a
Dec-MDP framework to model the agents’ reasoning processes, which subsequently pro-
vides the theoretical foundations for the specific organizational specification language I
developed (and for the ODP techniques I create in Chapters 4 and 5.). Fundamentally,
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however, the specific representations and algorithms I develop for this Dec-MDP
framework are an illustration of my broader agent-driven approach, which could be
applied to other agent reasoning frameworks. That is, an agent-driven organizational
specification language can hypothetically be created for any well-defined reasoning
framework by enumerating the framework’s dimensions. To give a better sense of this
generality, in the remainder of this section, I briefly describe what the agent-driven
specification language would consist of for two other popular agent reasoning frame-
works. More rigorous examination (e.g., formal analysis like in Section 3.2, and/or
empirical demonstrations like in Section 3.5) for these other reasoning frameworks is
beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Factored Dec-POMDP. Closely related to the Dec-MDP model I use throughout
this dissertation, the Dec-POMDP model additionally models partial-observability
(whereas the Dec-MDP model I adopted is locally-fully observable). Recalling Defini-
tion 2.4, the Dec-POMDP model is expressed as states, an initial state distribution,
actions, a transition function, a reward function, and a finite horizon just like the Dec-
MDP model I utilized, but additionally includes an observation set and an observation
function. Intuitively, then, the agent-driven organizational specification language
would include influences that can modify any of those dimensions. An organization
might modify an agent’s observation set to reflect that certain observations are no
longer possible due to the non-local effects of the other agents’ actions. Similarly, an
organization might modify factors of an agent’s observation function to reflect the
non-local effects of the other agents’ actions.
Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI). BDI frameworks for agent decision making have
been widely studied by the research community (Rao & Georgeff, 1991; Wooldridge,
2000; Bordini et al., 2007; Dastani, 2008) but, unfortunately, there is no consensus,
formal definition of the components in a BDI-agent’s reasoning framework. Broadly
though, BDI frameworks consist of belief, desire, and intention dimensions, each of
which an organization could modify via organizational influences.
 Beliefs represent the information that the agent believes to be true, and are
analogous to (belief) states in (PO)MDP models. An organization could modify
an agent’s belief space to, for example, inform the agent that given its part in
the organization, certain aspects of the environment are unimportant for it to
model, much like influences to state factors in (PO)MDP based frameworks.
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 Desires represent the agent’s motivations, often in terms of goals for the agent
to achieve, and are roughly analogous to rewards in (PO)MDP models. An
organization could modify an agent’s desires to, for example, influence the goals
that the agent tries to achieve to be better aligned with the MAS’s collective
needs, much like influences to reward factors in (PO)MDP based frameworks.
 Intentions represent what an agent has chosen to do, often in terms of (hierar-
chical) plans that the agent can execute, and are roughly analogous to a mix
of actions and transitions in (PO)MDP models. An organization could modify
an agent’s intentions to, for example, influence the agent into specific plans
(e.g., that contend for fewer global resources), much like influences to actions in
(PO)MDP based models.
3.6.3 Generality to Hierarchical Organizational Structures
A common attribute of previously developed organizational modeling languages
(e.g., see Section 2.2.2) is the ability to express a hierarchical organizational struc-
ture (Horling & Lesser, 2004). Hierarchical organizational structures can also be
expressed in my agent-driven approach, albeit they do not need to be explicitly
represented like in prior approaches. Whereas prior approaches are intended for
open systems and thus must explicitly represent the organizational structure to allow
agents to be recruited to enact the roles entailed in the structure, in my agent-driven
perspective, an organization is designed for a particular MAS. Consequently, an
agent only needs to be informed of how its local reasoning and behaviors fit into
the organizationally-influenced MAS, and an explicit representation of the structural
hierarchy is unnecessary.
Implicitly representing a de facto hierarchical structure in my agent-driven ap-
proach instead relies on the agents in the MAS possessing the requisite individual
capabilities (e.g., to fuse information from subordinates, accept task-delegations from
superiors, etc.). For example, an agent could be organizationally influenced into acting
as a manager in a hierarchical organization if its local model included managerial
capabilities. In the firefighting domain, managerial actions might include actions
to obtain expected response times for subordinate agents to fight a fire at a target
location, and actions to designate which fires its subordinate agents should pursue
next.
Noteworthy, however, is that in my agent-driven approach, such managerial capa-
bilities must be included in the organizational designer’s model of the environment.
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That is, some prior research (Horling & Lesser, 2008; Sims et al., 2008) studies how
to optimize the organizational structure under the expectation that agents can be
recruited to enact the full range of possible structures. My agent-driven approach, on
the other hand, instead optimizes over the organizational structures possible within a
given MAS, and will not attempt to consider any organizations that would require
changing the population of agents in that MAS, such as injecting a new agent with
managerial capabilities into the MAS. Of course, one could circumvent this limitation
by encapsulating my agent-driven techniques with an outer loop to search through
alternative, hypothetical MASs, albeit at the expense of greatly increased computa-
tional costs. Keeping the number of hypothetical MASs tractable could require good
heuristics and/or local search techniques, such as greedily adding managers into the
MAS until performance doesn’t improve. However, further exploration of such ideas
are beyond the scope of this dissertation
3.7 Conclusion
There are two primary contributions in this chapter. Firstly, I contribute an
agent-driven approach to defining the organizational design space. The fundamental
advantage of this approach is that the design space inherits the mathematical for-
malism of the agents’ underlying reasoning framework. In Section 3.1, I defined the
concept of an organizational influence as a modification to an agent’s local decision
problem, and formulated the definition of an organization in terms of such influences.
After committing to a specific Dec-MDP based agent reasoning framework, I illus-
trated my agent-driven approach by enumerating the agents’ modeling constructs to
create a principled organizational specification language for this Dec-MDP framework.
Specifically, for the Dec-MDP framework I adopted, the specification language consists
of modifications to the agents’ state factors, initial state distribution factors, action
spaces, transition function factors, reward function factors, and finite time horizon.
Then, in Section 3.2, I demonstrated an advantage of my agent-driven approach by
leveraging the mathematical foundation of the agents’ reasoning framework to formally
analyze the theoretical properties of my organizational specification language.
As is, my specification language contributes to Dec-MDP based reasoning tech-
niques since it provides a mathematically-sound approach for incorporating organi-
zational reasoning techniques (e.g., like those I develop in later chapters) into the
agents’ operational reasoning processes. More broadly, my agent-driven definition of
the organizational design space contributes to the body of organizational reasoning
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techniques, and provides a well-defined, systematic method for understanding how an
organization can relate to a MAS given the agents’ reasoning framework, whereas prior
research (Section 2.2) only informally understood this relationship. Moreover, my
agent-driven definition of the organizational design space establishes a mathematical
foundation for the study and development of computational representations and algo-
rithms for organizational design, in contrast to prior research that relies on implicit
organizational representations (e.g., Section 2.2.3) or human expertise to identify an
organization (e.g., Section 2.2.2).
The second primary contribution of this chapter is the development of a well-
defined, principled organizational design problem (Section 3.3), which provides a
mathematical basis for discussing the effectiveness of an organization and choosing
from among alternative organizational designs. By examining the formal, agent-driven
characterization of the organizational design space, in Section 3.4 I identified that
all MASs have an inherent local organization which can play a significant role in
determining the effectiveness of additional organizational design. I then defined a
systematic methodology for constructing a baseline MAS that is faithfully aligned
with the environment model, but does not differentiate and/or coordinate the agents’
policies. Finally, in Section 3.5, I illustrated the practical applicability of my agent-
driven approach by empirically demonstrating how hand-encoded organizations can
improve the expected performance of the MAS relative to the local baseline.
My agent-driven definition of the organizational design problem contributes to the
body of organizational reasoning techniques, and provides a formal, mathematical
foundation for selecting between alternative organizations. Moreover, my problem
formulation establishes the basis for computational ODP techniques that create an
organization from first-principles (e.g., like I develop in later chapters), in contrast to
prior research that relies on an expert human to identify appropriate organizational
constructs (e.g., Section 2.2.2) that may subsequently be configured/adapted (e.g.,
Section 2.2.4). Finally, my methodology for constructing a baseline organization
contributes a performance benchmark to the organizational research community that
can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of an ODP technique to identify beneficial
organizational influences.
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CHAPTER 4
Selecting Organizational Influences
In Section 3.2 (and Appendix A), I formally proved that my organizational spec-
ification language is a general purpose programming language for the Dec-MDP
framework I have adopted (i.e., since it is a necessary and complete language for
modifying agents’ local models), and that the size of the influence space is intractably
large. Moreover, in Section 3.5 I illustrated that the choice of organizational influences
and encoding mechanism can have significant impact on the performance of a MAS
following an organization, even between seemingly similar organizations. For example,
the organizations in Section 3.5.3 are all intended to embody the same overarching
organizational patterns, yet have substantially different ROp and COp performance
characteristics when evaluated in the MAS.
Combining these observations, it is evident that selecting appropriate organizational
influences to specify to a MAS can be challenging. Not only is the space of possible
organizational specifications large and complex, but na¨ıvely innocent choices (e.g.,
encoding an influence as a modification to a reward function factor versus to an
action space) can have significant impact on the MAS’s subsequent ROp and COp
performance when following the organization. This argues for techniques to focus the
organizational reasoning of an ODP (either human or computational) on the most
pertinent aspects of organizing the MAS as well as to aid an ODP in selecting and
specifying appropriate organizational influences.
In this chapter, I leverage my agent-driven approach to identify the mathematical
foundations of selecting appropriate organizational influences for a MAS. I begin in
Section 4.1 by describing a heuristic approach for restricting the space of influences
that an ODP should consider. Specifically, an ODP should focus its design efforts on
influencing the agents’ interdependencies rather than on how the agents complete their
individual aspects of a joint interaction. Empirically evaluating this heuristic shows
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that it results in organizations that are robust to imperfections in the ODP’s infor-
mation (e.g., when agent’s have local expertise), but still increase MAS performance
relative to the local baseline.
Even with this design principle, however, designing an organization can be com-
plex, time-consuming, and error-prone if done by hand, as teasing out the pertinent
interdependencies can be difficult, which argues for automated ODP techniques. In
Section 4.2, I describe a general-purpose, agent-driven strategy for automated organi-
zational design, and formulate concrete representations and algorithms to implement
this automated ODP approach. Briefly, the underlying insight behind my automated
ODP is to apply my agent-driven approach to model and reason about the agents’ joint
policy abstractly to predict desirable patterns of joint action, and then influencing the
agents into these coordination patterns. My empirical evaluations demonstrate that my
ODP implementation is able to identify organizations that are both intuitively sensible
and also find and exploit domain structure that my hand-generated organizations
overlook.
Finally, my experiments illustrate that a single organizational design typically
cannot dominate the entire POp = f(ROp,COp) Pareto front, which argues that an
ODP should intentionally design an organization to optimize for the anticipated Pareto
parameterization. In Section 4.3, I extend my ODP techniques to explicitly reason
about the metareasoning regime (i.e., balance between ROp and COp) that the designed
organization will impart on the MAS. My evaluation of these extensions shows that
my ODP implementation can efficiently identify an organization with (approximately)
optimal POp given a provided Pareto parameterization.
4.1 Influence Selection Heuristic
In Chapter 3, one may have noticed that a syntactically correct Θ could completely
overwrite an agent i’s entire local model, Mi, and if desired could completely micro-
manage the agent by dictating exactly which action should be executed in each state.
While such micromanagement could be desirable if the ODP has perfect information
about the agents’ capabilities and the problem episodes the MAS will encounter, it is
more common to assume that the agents possess a non-negligible amount of exper-
tise that is not precisely known by the ODP (Property 1.3). Otherwise, the agents
are really just effectors for a centralized (ODP) reasoner. If the agents have local
expertise, then influences that completely micromanage an agent would override that
expertise, and likely lead to an organization with diminished effectiveness. Natural
76
questions, therefore, are whether there is a mathematically-grounded explanation for
these organizational intuitions, and how these intuitions can be formally understood
and codified for aiding an ODP. In this section, I answer these questions by proposing
and testing one such principle to guide decisions about which portions of the agents’
models an organizational design should influence.
As just mentioned, organizations should not dictate or micromanage because
individual agents might (and generally do) possess their own expertise, and leaving
them room to exercise their local expertise benefits the collective organizational
objectives. Assuming that agents are locally skilled, then, what an ODP possesses that
individual agents lack is global awareness of how the agents’ local actions assemble
into coordinated, collective interaction patterns, where if individual agents had such
awareness they could make more informed decisions. Hence, an ODP should use its
more global perspective to influence agents into acting like they would if they were
more globally aware themselves, and otherwise should allow agents to exercise their
local capabilities.
I codify this observation in the following organizational design principle:
Principle 4.1. A well-designed organizational specification should influence only the
factors of agents’ models that are associated with agent interactions.
This principle is surprisingly applicable for creating organizational designs for
Dec-MDP based agents, where factors associated with interactions are directly cap-
tured in joint reward/transition functions, and indeed where the specification of
agents’ decision models sometimes explicitly separates out the dependent factors (e.g.,
coordination locales (Varakantham et al., 2009; Velagapudi et al., 2011)) from the
independent ones. This is neatly illustrated in my specification of the firefighting
domain, where agent movements are independent (agent i’s movement actions do not
directly affect the states/rewards of another agent), but firefighting actions are not
(agent i’s states/rewards are affected by another agent fighting a fire).
To test Principle 4.1, I enumerated a space of factored organizations, each of which
draws on the same, fully-specified organization (specifically the smallOverlapOrg from
Section 3.5.1), but adopts a different subset of factors taken from that full specification.
In particular, in its factored form, the transition component for the firefighting domain
has one factor for the effects of agent movement actions, and another for firefighting
actions. (There are also transition factors for the system time and cell delays, but
these factors are unaffectable by the agents and thus omitted from my discussion
here.) I draw on my organizational design principle to combine only the factors
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that correspond to reward/transition-dependencies (R/T-Ds). Revisiting the
smallOverlapOrg’s components, R/T-D factors include: the entire state and action
components (since these reflect the organization’s global awareness that agents can
depend on each other to fight fires in their respective PARs); and the transition factor
for Ics (summarizing expectations of when fires will be extinguished by other agents in
the overlapping PARs). On the other hand, the transition factor for agents’ movement
actions is a non-R/T-D factor, because agent movements are independent.
Principle 4.1 thus leads to the hypothesis that a specification including only
these R/T-D factors will capitalize on the global perspective of the ODP without
overstepping into micromanagement: it will perform as well or better than other
combinations of factors, especially when the agents possess significant local expertise.
To test this hypothesis, I constructed this R/T-DOrg organizational specification, as
well as an organization that includes only non-R/T-D factors, the non-R/T-DOrg.
For completeness, I also considered the full set of factors yielding the unfactore-
dOrg (identical to the unfactored smallOverlapOrg), and the empty set of factors
corresponding to the local baseline (where agents are uninfluenced by any explicit
organization).
My experiments in this section use the two agent version of the firefighting domain
previously described in Section 3.5. However, to stress that agents can have local
expertise that is imprecisely known to an ODP, the cell delays, δc, are allowed to be
non-zero, which introduces stochastic movement actions to the problem domain. In
these experiments, cells delays are i.i.d. uniformly sampled from δc ∈ {0.0, 0.5, 0.8} for
each cell c, but do not change from their initial values within a single episode. That is,
at the beginning of each episode, the cell delays are randomly selected (independently
of each other as well as any delays from past episodes), but then they are static for
the episode. Figure 4.1 shows example initial states for this domain.
I artificially controlled the relative amount of the agents’ local expertise by de-
grading the ODP’s view of the cell delays via applying a smoothing filter over the
true environment’s (M∗) delays (Figure 4.2). As the ODP’s view of the cell delays is
increasingly blurred by the smoothing filter, the agents possess comparatively more
local expertise (e.g., about the best paths to take through the grid to most efficiently
reach the fires to fight). By controlling the ODP’s information in this way, the ODP’s
model remains accurate in terms of cells’ mean delays but loses precision (about the
physical distribution of delays) as additional smoothing iterations are performed. For
example, the 100-smoothed setting had a smoothing filter iteratively applied to the
grid 100 times, leaving the ODP with what amounts to the average cell delay in each
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(a) “Hard” firefighting episode. (b) “Easy” firefighting episode.
Figure 4.1: Illustration of “easy” and “hard” firefighting episodes. An episode is “hard”
if the local baseline MAS miscoordinates.
Figure 4.2: Illustration of how I controlled agent expertise.
cell. Comparatively, in the 0-smoothed setting the ODP’s view precisely matches the
real delays in M∗, etc. An agent’s knowledge of the cell delays (contained in Mi) is
perfect in these experiments, and thus exactly equals M∗ in this regard.
I generated 3000 episodes for the two agent firefighting domain described above,
and simulated each episode 5000 times to smooth out the effects of stochastic move-
ment actions. The procedure described in Section 3.5.1 was used to incorporate
organizational specifications into the agents’ local models and to compute their local
policies with respect to their organization. To evaluate the hypothesis that agents
in an organization should be allowed to retain and contribute their local expertise, I
evaluated each of the four organizations across a spectrum of settings where I varied
the relative quality of agent expertise compared to the ODP’s. Unfortunately, I was
unable to fully contrast the organizations against computing the optimal joint policy,
pi∗, as I was computationally unable to calculate pi∗ for all 3000 episodes. However,
in a small subsample of the episodes that I could complete (∼100), I observed that
computing pi∗ costs approximately two orders of magnitude more COp and achieves
approximately three percent more ROp as compared to the local baseline.
Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 present results from these experiments and highlight several
important points. Firstly, observe in Table 4.1 that, in expectation over all problem
episodes, my organizations only increase ROp by 1.45% in this domain. While this
initially seems disappointing, on reflection it is unsurprising: for most episodes, an
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ROp COp
Improvement (%) Reduction (%)
# Smoothing Iterations 0 10 100 0 10 100
R/T-DOrg 1.45 1.40 1.40 34.08 33.02 33.12
unfactoredOrg 1.45 -6.24 -7.30 34.08 33.00 33.13
non-R/T-DOrg 0.01 -7.41 -8.29 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 4.1: Expected percent ROp and COp improvement of organizations compared to
the local baseline for all 3000 problem episodes.
ROp COp
Improvement (%) Reduction (%)
# Smoothing Iterations 0 10 100 0 10 100
R/T-DOrg 6.05 5.92 5.98 34.81 34.04 33.77
unfactoredOrg 6.10 -9.61 -10.70 34.84 30.83 30.90
non-R/T-DOrg 0.00 -12.26 -13.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 4.2: Expected percent ROp and COp improvement of organizations compared
to the local baseline for the 750 problem episodes with largest expected impact (top
25%) to ROp. The same subset of episodes is used to calculate the COp reduction.
The subset of episodes used varies by organization as well as by number of smoothing
iterations.
ROp COp
Improvement (%) Reduction (%)
# Smoothing Iterations 0 10 100 0 10 100
R/T-DOrg 23.27 23.55 23.44 27.88 27.79 27.76
unfactoredOrg 23.21 -19.48 -19.76 28.03 28.63 29.36
non-R/T-DOrg 0.00 -24.88 -24.47 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 4.3: Expected percent ROp and COp improvement of organizations compared
to the local baseline for the 150 problem episodes with largest expected impact (top
5%) to ROp. The same subset of episodes is used to calculate the COp reduction. The
subset of episodes used varies by organization as well as by number of smoothing
iterations.
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agent’s lack of global awareness is inconsequential, because the initial placement of
agents and fires is such that, for most cases, agents’ local decisions lead them into
complementary actions (e.g., Figure 4.1b). However, in episodes where a high-intensity
fire is located between the agents’ initial positions (e.g., Figure 4.1a), agents acting
locally often miscoordinate, providing opportunities for an organization to improve
ROp. This observation is a manifestation of how the domain inherently impacts the
potential effectiveness of an organizational design, as also observed by Corkill et al.
(2015)
Moreover, this observation suggests that the average performance hides a heavy-
tailed distribution. If we sort the episode results by the magnitude of the percent
ROp difference versus the local baseline, |baseline−org|baseline , and filter the sorted results
to only include the episodes where an organization has the largest impact to ROp
(either positively or negatively), then we observe in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 that when an
organization does impact performance, it has a noticeable impact. For example, R/T-
DOrg has a 23.27% expected improvement to ROp in 5% of the episodes (Table 4.3).
Note that the decrease in the COp improvement of the unfactoredOrg and R/T-DOrg
as episodes are filtered (i.e., moving from Table 4.1 to Table 4.2 to Table 4.3) is
also caused by this domain property. These R/T-D inclusive organizations (i.e.,
unfactoredOrg and R/T-DOrg) coordinate correctly when a high-intensity fire is
located between the agents due to Ic transition shaping (thus increasing ROp relative
to the baseline); however, transition shaping also increases the size of the agents’ state
spaces (thus decreasing their COp advantages).
Secondly, as shown in all three tables, the organizations that influence R/T-D
factors outperform those without R/T-D based influences, both in terms of ROp as well
as reducing COp. Moreover, the non-R/T-D based influences (i.e., in unfactoredOrg and
non-R-/T-DOrg) can severely degrade MAS performance as agents possess relatively
more local expertise, as demonstrated by the distinct ROp drops for these organizations
as the ODP’s information becomes increasingly imprecise via smoothing its view of cell
delays. This illustrates the costs of heavy-handed micromanagement that undervalues
agents’ expertise, and supports my claim that organizations that omit non-R/T-D
based influences allow agents to exercise their expertise to avoid these performance
deficiencies.
While this concludes my explicit evaluation of Principle 4.1, as we will see in
the remainder of this chapter, Principle 4.1 serves as an underlying premise of my
computational ODP techniques. As such, the subsequent experiments I perform to
evaluate my ODP techniques can also be viewed as further evidence in support of
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Principle 4.1 This complete body of experiments, along with the theoretical deriva-
tioPrinciple 4.1 earlier in this section, suggest that Principle 4.1’s effectiveness is not
limited to the specific experiments I performed in this section, but rather it is a more
robust, generally-validated heuristic for selecting effective organizational influences.
4.2 Automated Organizational Design
Thus far, the organizations I have presented in this dissertation have been hand
created and tuned for use in the firefighting domain. Generally speaking, designing an
organization for a MAS by hand can be challenging. For example, the organizations
I hand-created in the previous sections required intricate knowledge of how the
agents should best interact as well as several iterations of careful tuning to get the
organizational influences just right. Automated techniques for organizational design
can address these challenges in two primary ways:
1. A computational ODP could serve as an alternative to hand-designing an
organization. Rather than relying on a human ODP to comprehend the MAS’s
nuanced interaction patterns and my specification language’s influence encoding
strategies, an automated ODP can determine interaction patterns itself and
search through the space of influence encodings to find the best one.
2. Computational techniques for organizational design necessitate a more formal,
explicit understanding of how to create an organization for a MAS. As such,
developing an automated ODP provides mathematically-grounded insights that
could guide a human ODP in creating organizations (e.g., as part of a problem-
driven approach).
In this section, I describe the core representations and algorithms that my auto-
mated ODP techniques utilize to create an organization for a MAS.
4.2.1 ODP Overview
As described in Section 4.1, an ODP should use its global perspective to identify
patterns of interactions that would arise when agents cooperate effectively, and then
codify these patterns into influences that agents internalize. For example, the R/T-
DOrg stops agents from even thinking about fighting fires that another agent is clearly
better positioned to fight, and focuses them on fighting nearby fires. Stepping back,
the organizational design principle I presented in Section 4.1 suggests the foundations
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Figure 4.3: Overview of how my automated ODP and how it relates to the MAS.
of a process for automating organizational design: use the ODP’s global perspective
to identify the R/T-Ds; deduce from these a space of joint actions to seek/avoid; and
then use these patterns to select influences to agents’ local models that steer agents
to/from local decisions that lead to the good/bad interactions.
Unfortunately, identifying R/T-Ds can sometimes be difficult in models where joint
interactions are not explicitly provided as part of the model specification. For this
reason, the automated ODP I have devised exploits domain knowledge if it is provided,
but still functions (although with increased computational costs) without explicit
R/T-D specifications. Figure 4.3 illustrates a high-level overview of my automated
ODP and how it relates to the MAS. The ODP begins with a Dec-MDP model of the
global domain, and I assume that this model is accurate with respect to the global
interactions, but may be imprecise with respect to the details of how agents will
complete their respective components of a joint interaction (i.e., Property 1.3). Then,
as shown in Figure 4.3, there are three main stages to my ODP:
1. Compute organizational patterns. The ODP uses its global perspective of the
domain to compute a quantitative description of organizational patterns. This
stage of the ODP will be described in detail in Section 4.2.2.
2. Organizational search. Using the quantitative description of organizational
patterns from the previous stage, the ODP searches through the space of
organizational influences to identify the subset that comprise an organization
to specify to the MAS. This stage of the ODP will be described in detail in
Section 4.2.3.
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3. Agent decision making. The agents then incorporate the organization into their
local reasoning processes and solve their local decision problems as previously
described in Section 3.1.2.
It is important to note that my ODP is intentionally decomposable into these
distinct stages. Not only does the stage decomposition help to conceptualize my
representations and algorithms, but moreover, it allows a user to employ a subset
of the stages. For example, suppose a system administrator has expert knowledge
consisting of a quantitative description of organizational patterns. This administrator
could use the organizational-search stage to compute an organization from those
statistics, bypassing the unnecessary compute-organizational-patterns stage.
4.2.2 Compute Organizational Patterns
The objective of this stage in my ODP approach is to compute a quantitative
description of organizational patterns. At a high level, a quantitative description
of organizational patterns corresponds to statistical information about the expected
performance of the MAS’s possible interaction patterns. A quantitative description of
organizational patterns could be represented in a variety of forms; however, in terms of
the organizational design problem I previously defined (Definition 3.6) it corresponds
to the expected operational performance (i.e., expected reward and reasoning costs)
associated with each of the agents’ interactions. For example, an action ai is expected
to increase agent i’s computational costs by some amount, and also contribute and/or
enable some amount of expected joint reward to the MAS. (Note statistics about the
expected joint reward correspond to Q-values and thus encapsulate both immediate
and future rewards.)
At a high-level, my ODP computes a quantitative description of organizational
patterns via a Monte Carlo estimation since enumerating the agents’ optimal actions
for all possible problem episodes the MAS could encounter is assumed to be computa-
tionally intractable. The ODP begins by randomly sampling a problem episode from
its global Dec-MDP perspective of the domain (e.g., using the initial state distribution
α). Then, the ODP computes the optimal joint policy for the sampled episode using a
centralized perspective. Finally, the ODP repeats this process for numerous samples,
and aggregates the joint policies across the sampled episodes to form its quantitative
description of organizational patterns. In the remainder of this section, I step through
this process in full detail.
Also, note that while my discussions in this section may suggest a sequential
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Algorithm 4.1 Compute Organizational Patterns
Input: ODP’s domain model, M, and (optionally) a set of subgoals for task decom-
position, G.
Output: A quantitative description of organizational patterns, Φ
1: Φ← ∅
2: while ∃sample =NextSample() do
3: pi ← ComputeJointPolicy(sample,M, G)
4: Φ←AggregateInformation(Φ, pi)
5: end while
6: return Φ
algorithm with three stages (i.e., sample episodes, solve the episodes for joint policies,
and aggregate across samples), it is straightforward to interleave these stages to create
a more anytime-esque algorithm. Indeed, my ODP implementation (Algorithm 4.1)
interleaves these stages.
Episode Sampling. Using its Dec-MDP model of the global domain, it is straight-
forward for the ODP to sample the initial state distribution for a problem episode.
Note, however an important subtlety that must be considered in the ODP’s sam-
pling process: if the ODP does not sample a set of episodes that covers the space of
important agent interactions patterns, then the ODP’s quantitative description of
organizational patterns will not be fully informative of the interaction patterns the
ODP should influence the agents into. For example, in the firefighting domain, in
order for the ODP to recognize the value of an agent i fighting a fire in a cell c near i’s
initial location, the ODP must sample a problem episode where there is a fire in cell c.
Information inaccuracies caused by poor episode sampling could negatively impact to
the ODP’s organizational search algorithm (Section 4.2.3) that uses these statistical
estimates.
Consequently, the ODP should not simply use i.i.d. sampling of the initial state
distribution to generate problem episodes. Rather, the ODP should sample problem
episodes to provide maximal coverage of the patterns of the agents’ interactions
weighted by the importance of the interaction (e.g., interactions with inconsequential
impact on MAS performance are less important for the ODP to recognize than ones
with critical impact). Unfortunately, this optimal sampling strategy is theoretically
infeasible since the ODP cannot know how the agents should interact for an episode
without actually solving for the agents’ optimal joint policy in that episode (at which
point that data may as well be included in the ODP’s statistics). As a proxy for this
optimal strategy, for the firefighting domain my ODP generates samples in batches,
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where the samples in a batch are biased such that the ODP is ensured to encounter a
fire in each of the grid cells. Specifically, in my experiments, the batch size is equal to
the number of grid cells, where the first fire for the kth sample in the batch is placed
into the kth cell, and then subsequent fires are selected uniformly randomly (without
replacement) from the other cells. More generally, Bayesian sampling of the initial
state distribution could be used to generate samples, although doing so implies that
different initial states lead to different agent interactions.
Computing a Joint Policy. Theoretically, the ODP could use any Dec-MDP
solution technique to solve a problem episode for the optimal joint policy (e.g., from
among the methods described in Section 2.1.4). Practically, however, the computational
intractability of computing a joint policy limits an ODP’s ability to na¨ıvely solve the
Dec-MDP model for an episode, especially for domains with tightly interconnected
agents (Property 1.2).
As such, my ODP uses the options framework (Section 2.1.5) from the hierarchical
learning community to abstract its primitive-action Dec-MDP model into a task-level
Dec-MDP model that focuses on tasks to accomplish rather than actions to take.
Reasoning with task-level options serves two primary purposes. Firstly, reasoning with
options reduces the ODP’s computational burden since a Dec-MDP solution algorithm
can exploit structure in the action sequences an agent should typically perform (i.e.,
rather than considering primitive actions individually, sequences of primitive actions
can be considered as a whole). Secondly, task-level reasoning naturally emphasizes
the most significant interactions among agents while remaining largely agnostic about
how the agents will translate their options into detailed actions, which embodies
Principle 4.1.
As is customary, my ODP creates one option for each task in the problem episode,
where a task corresponds to achieving a particular subgoal. For simplicity, in the
experiments that follow, I informed the ODP that good subgoals are states where
Ic → 0; however, subgoal detection could be automated using techniques from the
hierarchical learning community (see Section 2.1.5). Of course, the ODP still requires
an estimate of each option’s properties (i.e., its expected reward, Ri(s
t
i, oi, s
t+1
i ), and
transitions, Pi(s
t+1
i |sti, oi)), which my ODP computes by standard hierarchical reasoning
techniques (Section 2.1.5).
The ODP then solves the task-level Dec-MDP as a centralized process using
standard algorithms (see Section 2.1.4), which results in occupancy measures, x(st, o),
and Q-values, Q∗(st, o), for state-option pairs in the optimal task-level joint policy.
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Finally, the ODP inverts its option abstraction using the respective policy of each
option (i.e., o.µ), which projects the task-level joint policy downward to estimate the
primitive-action joint policy, pˆi. For example, the occupancy measures in the primitive-
action joint policy are the product of the task-level occupancy measures multiplied
by the occupancy measures of the options’ policies, x(st, a) =
∑
o (x(s
t, o) · o.µ(st, a)).
Note that while the resulting pˆi is not exactly identical to if the ODP had directly
solved the primitive-action Dec-MDP for pi∗, it does have the same optimal policy
trajectory. That is, for any states that are reachable when following pi∗, both pˆi
and pi∗ are ensured to be identical. As I discuss below, my ODP only aggregates
information from along the optimal policy trajectory, so this distinction is ultimately
inconsequential.
The particular options I created for my ODP are fairly domain-dependent—
although automated techniques exist for option creation (Iba, 1989; Stolle & Precup,
2002; McGovern, 2002). Moreover, it is important to note that the abstraction to
the task-level representation has no effect on the resulting occupancy measures and
Q-values in the detailed problem representation. Rather, the ODP would compute
exactly the same detailed policy if it did not use the options abstraction, albeit at
a significantly higher computational cost. The options abstraction serves only to
expedite the policy solving process. The issue of identifying appropriate options is
addressed further in Section 4.2.4.
Aggregating Information Across Samples. To aggregate information across the
sampled problem episodes, my ODP computes a weighted expectation. Specifically,
information (e.g., Q-values or probabilities of non-local effects) is weighted by the
occupancy measures (recall that in a non-recurrent state space, an occupancy measure
x(st, a) is equivalent to the probability of reaching state st and then performing action
a). For example, the probability of a non-local effect Pi(f
t+1
k |st, a) exerted on agent i
is weighted by the occupancy measure x(st, a).
A caveat in this method is that the linear program used to calculate occupancy
measures (Equation 2.4) only returns informed values for states along the optimal
policy trajectory. That is, state-action pairs that are not part of the optimal policy
trajectory have zero occupancy by definition (i.e., there is no probability of reaching
these states); however, x(st, a) = 0 for these types of states is not informative of
whether the MAS should perform a, only that st should not be reached. Consequently,
including these zero-valued occupancies in the expectation calculation dilutes the
ODP’s statistics without providing any actual information. This effect is especially
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significant in domains where the optimal policy trajectory is a small subset of the state
space (like in the firefighting domain), since the informative occupancy measures will
be scarce relative to the complete set of occupancies (essentially making it incorrectly
appear as though all agent actions have no value). As such, my ODP disregards any
occupancy measures for states that are not part of the optimal policy trajectory, i.e.,
states where
∑
a x(s
t, a) = 0. In contrast, state-action pairs along the optimal policy
trajectory could be zero or non-zero. Obviously a non-zero occupancy is informative
of the MAS’s actions in the ODP’s statistical estimates; however, x(st, a) = 0 for these
types of states informs that a is not the optimal action, and thus should be included
in the ODP’s statistical estimates as well.
Illustrative Example. Figure 4.4 illustrates an example of how my ODP computes
its quantitative description of organizational patterns via Algorithm 4.1. On each
iteration (i.e., row of Figure 4.4), the ODP first samples a problem episode, translates
its representation of the episode into the options-level representation, and solves
for the optimal options-level joint policy, which corresponds to the first column of
Figure 4.4. Then, the ODP inverts its options to compute the occupancy measures
and Q-values (note that Q-values are not shown in Figure 4.4) in the detailed problem
representation, which corresponds to the second column of Figure 4.4. Finally, the
ODP aggregates the information from the current sample into its cumulative statistics,
which corresponds to the third column of Figure 4.4.
Stepping down the rows, one can see that, as the ODP samples problem episodes,
its statistics give it an increasingly accurate quantitative description of organizational
patterns. Looping this process until the cumulative statistics stabilize results in the
information shown at the bottom of the third column in Figure 4.4.
4.2.3 Selecting Organizational Influences
As illustrated in Figure 4.3, the second stage of my ODP is to use the quantitative
description of organizational patterns as a basis for selecting organizational influences.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this a complex, multifaceted subject (essentially tantamount
to the organizational reasoning problem), and even limiting scope to within my agent-
driven approach there are numerous methods and orthogonal aspects of the algorithm
that could be investigated (e.g., metareasoning issues like I do in Section 4.3 or abstract
organizational influences like I do in Chapter 5). In this section, I describe a relatively
simple version of the influence selection stage in my ODP. Not only does this simple
version provide a starting point for subsequent discussions in this dissertation (and
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Figure 4.4: Walkthrough of my ODP’s process for computing its quantitative description of organizational patterns. Darker
shading in the occupancy measure columns indicates higher occupancy measure.
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future research beyond the scope of my dissertation), but moreover, its deficiencies
provide context for guiding my subsequent efforts. At a high level, my broader ODP
approach selects organizational influences by first computing the expected impact that
each candidate organizational influence will have on MAS performance, then searching
through the influence space to identify an (approximately) optimal set of influences,
and finally encoding these influences in my organizational specification language.
For now (this will be revisited in Section 4.3), my ODP selects influences as follows.
 Actions: For agent i, if the occupancy measure x(si, ai) = 0 then remove ai
from the set of available actions in si for agent i. For example, in the firefighting
domain, if the ODP’s statistics from computing joint policies for sample episodes
never have an agent move into certain cells (e.g., cells always serviced by closer
agents), then actions that would move the agent into those cells are removed
from consideration.
 States: If agent i’s action choice under the joint policy is invariant with respect
to state factor Fik given any values for the other state factors, then Fik can be
removed from agent i’s local state factors (since it contributes no information).
For example, in the firefighting domain, the intensity of cells distant to an agent
(always fought by someone else) do not impact the agent’s action selection and
thus are removed from the agent’s state representation.
 Transitions: For an agent, modify the transition factors for each of its remaining
state factors (after removing state factors as above) to include the probabilistic
non-local effects of the other agents. For example, in the firefighting domain, an
agent’s transition factor for an overlapping cell’s intensity would be altered to
reflect the probability that some other agent executes the FF action in that cell
at certain times.
The reader may note that influences to the agents’ reward function factors are
not included above (nor are initial state distribution and time horizon influences). I
focus on action, state, and/or transition influences over reward influences since they
provide hard constraints that can affect the agents’ computational costs (COp), e.g.,
as demonstrated in Section 3.5. However, reward influences could be useful as a
fallback mechanism when hard constraints are not possible to formulate or otherwise
undesirable. For example, if the ODP has an option-level model, but lacks knowledge
of how options translate into local actions, states, and transitions, it could influence
agents via local reward factors to induce coordinated policies. As another example,
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reward influences could be useful if the ODP has doubt in the agents reliably adopting
organizational influences (e.g., in semi-cooperative settings beyond the scope of this
dissertation), where an agent might be unwilling to constrain its action space, but could
be influenced by providing it with additional incentives. Like in Section 3.5, influences
to an agent’s initial state distribution and time horizon are broadly inappropriate
for the firefighting domain. I revisit the issue of other influence mechanisms again in
Section 6.2.2.
4.2.4 ODP Limitations and Concerns
In this section, I describe some of the potential limitations and/or concerns of my
ODP thus far, and discuss some preliminary thoughts of how they might be addressed
(either later in this dissertation or in future work).
Heuristics for Identifying Hierarchical Options. The techniques I employ in
my ODP leverage relatively conservative assumptions about the availability of external
knowledge about the problem domain (specifically the identification of subgoals for
the ODP to translate into options); however, there are ways of generalizing my ODP
to incorporate additional knowledge, should it be available, or function without the
option abstraction, should it be unavailable. For example, if an explicit specification
of the R/T-Ds is provided, then the joint policy creation process could simply create
a policy directly from the R/T-Ds. Even stronger, if (partial) information of good
joint interactions is known (e.g., a partial-order plan), then the joint policy creation
process could be sped up by constraining the Dec-MDP solution algorithm to reflect
this knowledge. Alternatively, knowledge of the R/T-Ds could be reflected by directly
providing the ODP with an options-level model (along with properties of the options
to be used for inverting the abstraction) as opposed to the primitive-action Dec-MDP
that the ODP translates into a task-level model.
In my experiments that follow, I informed the ODP that good subgoals are
states where Ic → 0, but did not systematically validate this abstraction choice
(though intuitively, extinguishing a fire seems to be the natural task-decomposition
for the firefighting domain). I did not systematically validate this abstraction because
ultimately the options abstraction is only to expedite solving Dec-MDP problem
episodes, and has no impact on the organization that the ODP creates. As such,
optimal abstraction choice is not a core ODP problem, but rather a secondary topic
for future research.
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Centralized ODP Limitations. My ODP algorithms throughout this dissertation
employ centralized techniques for computing a quantitative description of organiza-
tional patterns, which unsurprisingly is intractable as the problem domain scales (see
Section 2.1.4). This computational intractability inevitably limits the scale of the
problems that this aspect of my specific ODP implementation can solve (note, however,
that the other aspects of my organizational representations and algorithms are not
limited by this scaling problem). Intuitively speaking, there are several approaches
one could use to mitigate these scaling concerns, including:
 Compute an approximately optimal joint policy, for example using techniques
as described in Section 2.1.4.2.
 Use the options framework hierarchically, like I do in Section 5.7.
 Obtain a quantitative description of organizational patterns from a different
source such as a system administrator or the agents themselves.
Approximate Dec-MDP Solution Techniques. If information about pertinent
subgoals is unavailable for seeding an options abstraction (and optimally solving the
primitive-action Dec-MDP is computationally infeasible), the ODP could instead rely
on approximate solution techniques for computing an approximately optimal joint pol-
icy (e.g., see Section 2.1.4.2). Throughout this dissertation, however, I avoid using such
approximation techniques to avoid confounding factors in my results. That is, solution
techniques for solving Dec-MDPs are not the focus of this dissertation, but rather a
means for my ODP to estimate a quantitative description of organizational patterns.
If the joint policies found were only approximately optimal, then it would be difficult
to discern whether an ineffective organization were the result of the approximate
statistics, or a more fundamental deficiency of my organizational reasoning techniques.
Of course, robustness to information inaccuracies is a desirable characteristic for an
ODP, but I have elected to evaluate such robustness using more controlled methods
(e.g., degrading the ODP’s domain model like in Section 4.1) rather than the more
unpredictable information inaccuracies possible with approximate joint policy solvers.
Rigidity of Influence Selection Criteria. It is important to recognize that the
influence mechanisms in Section 4.2.3 use very strict criteria for when to remove a
factor. Essentially, the ODP finds the maximal reduction to an agent’s model that does
not decrease the expected joint reward. In principle, however, further reductions could
sacrifice some amount of reward in order to further influence the agents. For example
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in the firefighting domain, it could be the case that agent i rarely needs to know the
intensity of a relatively distant cell, so the expected reward loss from not modeling that
state factor is very small. Thus, removing that factor from consideration has negligible
impact on the expected joint reward, but could yield significant computational savings
during agent planning. Tradeoffs like these are the focus of metareasoning research,
and I investigate this issue more deeply in Section 4.3.
4.2.5 Evaluation
To evaluate the initial ODP algorithm just described, I use the same parameteri-
zation of the firefighting domain as in Section 4.1. However, to evaluate this simple
version of the ODP, I did not perform any smoothing of the ODP’s model because I
wanted to evaluate if the ODP could exploit structure that it identifies in the domain
(this assumption will be relaxed in later experiments). In this domain, the space of
possible initial global states is exceedingly large (∼22,000), and furthermore, the total
reachable state space from the set of initial states contains millions of states. For these
reasons, the ODP is computationally unable to exactly solve for the complete, optimal
joint policy in every state, and instead relies on the sampling process described in
Section 4.2.2. To test the impact the sample size has on the resulting organizations,
I present results from two different parameter settings, 50 (0.23% of possible initial
states) and 150 (0.68%). X AutoOrg refers to the organization designed using X
∈ {50, 150} initial state samples. The effects of sampling size on the ODP will also be
revisited in Chapter 5.
I begin my evaluation by confirming that the ODP’s designs are intuitively sensible.
Figures 4.5a and 4.5b show the cumulative occupancy measures by cell (shaded
by magnitude),
∑
ai
xi(si, ai), for each agent, created in response to the delays in
Figure 4.5c, and represent a summary of the action shaping specified to each agent (i.e.,
cells with low cumulative occupancy measure typically have more tightly restricted
actions). Darker shaded cells thus represent those that the ODP expects the agent
will more likely visit. Observe in Figures 4.5a and 4.5b that the agents’ influences are
correlated, and each agent is more or less expected to be responsible for a particular
region (with some overlap in between). Further, as seen by comparing Figure 4.5c
to Figures 4.5a and 4.5b, the ODP recognized the domain structure, and tailored its
influences to skew the agents’ regions towards those cells they can efficiently reach.
I also tested the X AutoOrgs using the same empirical methodology and episodes as
in Section 4.1 to ensure that they improve ROp and COp in addition to being intuitively
sensible. Table 4.4 presents the results of these experiments as well as repeats the
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(a) Agent 1 (b) Agent 2
(c) Cell Delays δc
Figure 4.5: Cumulative cell occupancy measures,
∑
ai
xi(si, ai), for each agent that
the ODP calculated in response to the cell delays in (c)
% Results Included 100% Top 25% Top 5%
R/T-DOrg 1.45% 6.05% 23.27%
50AutoOrg 2.06% 3.33% 4.11%
150AutoOrg 2.17% 5.25% 13.63%
(a) Expected ROp improvement.
% Results Included 100% Top 25% Top 5%
R/T-DOrg 37.07% 34.81% 30.39%
50AutoOrg 38.84% 39.29% 49.15%
150AutoOrg 19.36% 20.75% 38.91%
(b) Expected COp reduction.
Table 4.4: Percent ROp and COp improvement compared to the baseline MAS for
experiments in Section 4.2.5. The same subsets of episodes are used to calculate
the COp reduction. The subset of episodes used varies by organization as well as by
number of smoothing iterations.
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results from the best hand-designed organization from Section 4.1. As Table 4.4
illustrates, the X AutoOrgs compare well against the hand-designed R/T-DOrg, but
make different tradeoffs as demonstrated by the top 25% and 5% columns. That is,
R/T-DOrg has little to no ROp impact in most episodes, but then has substantial ROp
gains in a few episodes, whereas the X AutoOrgs yield a slightly larger overall ROp
improvement, but accomplish this by having moderate ROp gains in many episodes.
This observation suggests that the X AutoOrgs are not over-specialized to particular
situations the ODP might have encountered, but rather provide general influences,
since their ROp gains are more uniformly distributed over the problem space relative to
R/T-DOrg. Also observe that, as the ODP gains a more complete input model, it uses
this additional information to infer more specialized organizational patterns and thus
exerts more specialized influences, as evidenced by the 150AutoOrg having statistically
significant ROp gains relative to 50AutoOrg in the 25% and 5% cases. Finally, observe
that the X AutoOrgs’ COp improvements actually increase as we filter out episodes—in
stark contrast to the R/T-DOrg. Recalling from Section 4.1, the episodes where
organizational influence are most meaningful are those where a high-intensity fire is
between the agents’ initial locations. While the R/T-DOrg approaches these cases
with Ic transition shaping, the X AutoOrgs instead address them with state/action
shaping (e.g., by delegating the northern cells to one agent and the southern to the
other), which reduces COp rather than increasing it.
4.3 Metareasoning through Organizational Design
As one may have noticed throughout my empirical results thus far, ROp and COp are
essentially inversely correlated, where an ODP can create an organization that improves
ROp by inducing the MAS to reason about additional actions, which increases COp (and
vice versa). Moreover, there is often not a single organization that Pareto dominates
the others for all operational performance, POp = f(ROp,COp), parameterizations.
For example, in Figure 3.3, computing the optimal joint policy is best when COp is
unimportant compared to ROp, but as the POp parameterization increasingly values
low COp, the fullOverlapOrg becomes best, then the smallOverlapOrg, and finally the
partitionOrg is best when ROp is relatively unimportant compared to COp. A natural
question, therefore, is whether an ODP can design an organization that optimally
selects from the POp Pareto front, given a target Pareto parameterization as input.
This question also relates to an observation from Section 4.2.4, where the mechanism
for selecting organizational influences only specified influences that were not expected
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to decrease ROp. Even if an influence would only sacrifice a negligible amount ROp to
reduce COp by orders of magnitude, the mechanism would not include that influence
in the organizational specification. If agents have unlimited/sufficient computational
resources (i.e., COp is insignificant), then such a strategy is justified; however, commonly
(especially in Dec-MDP models where policy spaces can quickly become impractical
to solve) computational costs can exceed the time before decisions must be made. A
possible technique in response to this observation is to allow the ODP to specify an
influence that sacrifices some amount of ROp (beyond zero) in proportion to the COp
savings that the influence imparts.
Determining how much and/or which reasoning an agent should perform is the
subject of metareasoning research, which I briefly overview next in Section 4.3.1. Taking
an organizational stance to multiagent metareasoning, in Section 4.3.2, I describe
how to extend my ODP to (approximately) optimally solve the organizational design
problem (Definition 3.6) including metareasoning issues by framing it as incremental
search of the organizational influence space. Then, in Section 4.3.2.3, I illustrate an
implementation of this search process for influences to agents’ action spaces. Finally,
I evaluate my ODP in Section 4.3.3 and find that it generates organizations that
effectively impart a desired metareasoning regime upon the MAS.
4.3.1 Background
Metareasoning is typically studied in the context of real-time systems and/or
agents with bounded rationality, which each naturally emphasize the premise that
agents must make Pareto tradeoffs between exerting effort on reasoning about actions
to execute, and exerting effort on actually executing those actions. This premise
is especially true with multiagent decision-theoretic frameworks (like the Dec-MDP
framework I have adopted), where high computational complexity inevitably limits
the scale of problems that can be solved. While metareasoning comes in many forms
(see Cox & Raja (2011) for a thorough discussion of work in this field), the type that
is most relevant for this dissertation addresses the followowing question: how does an
agent decide whether the improvements to decisions from additional reasoning are
expected to outweigh the costs of delaying enacting its decisions? When metareasoning
issues are considered, an agent’s objective shifts from computing pi∗ to instead striking
the optimal balance between its computational costs and the quality of the best
policy it can identify within those costs. Several approaches have been developed
towards solving the metareasoning problem, including anytime algorithms (Hansen &
Zilberstein, 2001b) and model shaping (Bratman et al., 2012).
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Unsurprisingly, metareasoning becomes even more complicated in MASs, since
the benefits of additional reasoning might depend on the reasoning and actions of
other agents (Raja & Lesser, 2007). For example, if one agent assumes responsibility
for (reasoning about) performing a task, then there might be no additional benefit
for other agents to also reason about that task. Thus, research into multiagent
metareasoning has typically been formulated as a metacoordination problem, where
agents individually make metareasoning decisions but coordinate those decisions to
strike a good collective balance between their expected joint performance and reasoning
costs (Raja & Lesser, 2007; Alexander et al., 2007).
In the remainder of this chapter, I investigate an alternative approach to solve
the multiagent metareasoning problem through organizational design, where a good
multiagent organization should both guide agents into coordinated local policies, and
also guide them into coordinated reasoning about their individual decision problems.
Of course, this approach simplifies the multiagent metareasoning problem that the
agents face by complicating the organizational design problem to find a design that
not only leads to coordinated action in the world, but also coordinated utilization of
the agents’ distributed reasoning resources.
The idea that an organization can impact agents’ reasoning and behaviors is
well-established. For example, social laws (Shoham & Tennenholtz, 1995) affect the
reasoning that agents perform as well as the actions they execute. In prior work,
however, the impact that an organization has on the agents’ reasoning has been an
incidental side effect rather than something an ODP explicitly leveraged to intentionally
impart a specific, desired metareasoning regime upon the agents, i.e., a specific POp
parameterization. Additionally, typical metareasoning approaches try to dynamically
assess the predicted benefit of additional reasoning, whereas the fundamental idea
of my approach is to have an ODP utilize its global view of the problem domain
to identify optimally-coordinated policy patterns, and then influence the agents to
avoid even thinking about acting counter to those patterns. For example, using its
global perspective, an ODP might identify that agents should typically fight fires near
their initial locations. It might then codify this pattern by restricting an agent from
reasoning about fighting fires in distant cells, which imposes a metareasoning regime
that trades computational speedup (due to never considering fighting fires in those
distant cells) for small expected reward loss (in the rare cases that it should fight
those fires).
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4.3.2 Extending the ODP
Extending the ODP to incorporate metareasoning issues means that it will have
to solve my organizational design problem (Definition 3.6): Θ∗ ≡ arg maxΘ POp(Θ).
Since direct enumeration of the organizational design space is infeasible (Section 3.2.1),
I focus on incremental search, and on techniques for computing the incremental impact
of an individual influence. In what follows, I formulate a simple greedy hill-climbing
search; however, other incremental search algorithms (e.g., Monte Carlo, A∗, etc.)
could be used instead (see Section 4.3.4 for further discussion).
Na¨ıvely, a greedy algorithm computes the (j + 1)-th step of the hill climb by
determining the influence, ∆i, with maximal organizational performance improvement
(I will return to the topic of determining Θ0 later in Section 4.3.2.3):
Θj+1 = Θj + arg max
∆i
POp(Θj + ∆i) (4.1)
Notice however, that Equation 4.1 requires recomputing the performance contribution
of Θj for each POp(Θj +∆i), which could waste substantial computational effort. If the
calculation of POp(Θj + ∆i) was instead decomposed into POp(Θj) and the conditional,
incremental impact of ∆i w.r.t. Θ
j, then the ODP could avoid this redundant
computation. I achieve this by estimating POp(Θj + ∆i) as a linear approximation.
Assuming ROp and COp are everywhere differentiable,1 and somewhat abusing
notation, I can write the equation in standard linear approximation form:
ROp(Θj + ∆i) ≈ ROp(Θj) + ∆i · dROp
dΘj
(Θj)
COp(Θj + ∆i) ≈ COp(Θj) + ∆i · dCOp
dΘj
(Θj)
Substituting these linear approximations into the definition of POp (Definition 3.5)
yields:
POp(Θj + ∆i) = f
(
ROp(Θj) + ∆·
dROp
dΘj
(Θj),COp(Θj) + ∆·
dCOp
dΘj
(Θj)
)
Now, taking the linear approximation for POp(Θj + ∆i) (assuming it is also everywhere
1 While the everywhere differentiable assumptions for ROp and COp are theoretically required, in
practice I have not found them necessary since my ODP does not explicitly compute the derivatives
(see Sections 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2).
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differentiable2):
POp(Θj + ∆i) ≈f
(
ROp(Θj),COp(Θj)
)
+ ∆i · dROp
dΘj
(Θj)
δf
δROp
(Θj)
+ ∆i · dCOp
dΘj
(Θj)
δf
δCOp
(Θj)
Substituting into Equation 4.1:
Θj+1 = Θj + arg max
∆i
[
f
(
ROp(Θj),COp(Θj)
)
+ ∆i · dROp
dΘj
(Θj)
δf
δROp
(Θj)
+∆i · dCOp
dΘj
(Θj)
δf
δCOp
(Θj)
]
Finally, the f(ROp(Θj),COp(Θj)) term can be dropped since it is independent of ∆i,
yielding the incremental organizational design problem my ODP solves:
Θj+1 = Θj + arg max
∆i
[
∆i · dROp
dΘj
(Θj)
δf
δROp
(Θj) + ∆i · dCOp
dΘj
(Θj)
δf
δCOp
(Θj)
]
(4.2)
Significantly, Equation 4.2 avoids redundantly computing how Θj impacts the opera-
tional performance, and instead only computes the conditional operational performance
impact of ∆i w.r.t. Θ
j.
In Sections 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2, I describe a general methodology for efficiently
computing ∆i · dCOpdΘj (Θj) and ∆i · dROpdΘj (Θj) respectively. Then, in Section 4.3.2.3, I
illustrate in detail how an ODP can implement this methodology for influences to the
agents’ action spaces.
4.3.2.1 Computing Incremental Reasoning Costs
In this section, I describe how an ODP can compute ∆i · dCOpdΘj (Θj), the conditional
impact to the agents’ computational costs from adding ∆i w.r.t. Θ
j. A Dec-MDP
agent’s computational costs are determined by two primary factors (Littman et al.,
1995), the number of states in its decision problem and the number of edges in its
state graph. Thus, computing incremental computational costs relies on determining
the expected marginal costs of adding a new state/edge, and then calculating the
expected change to the number of states and edges caused by adding ∆i into Θ
j.
2 The assumption of POp’s differentiability, unlike for ROp and COp is practically required since
my ODP directly computes derivatives of POp. As a result, my ODP can only consider metareasoning
Pareto fronts that are everywhere differentiable.
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My methodology for empirically estimating the marginal cost of a state and/or
edge is as follows. An agent first uses its local model, Mi, to compute pi∗i for an
episode in a set of randomly sampled episodes. Then, for each episode, I create a
modified version of Mi, labeled as M′i, that contains the minimal number of edges
between states such that the reachable state space from the initial states is unchanged,
and the optimal policy is unchanged. I include the latter condition so that the bias
of the estimate matches desired organizational influences that streamline the agents’
reasoning without precluding optimal policies. The agent then solves each problem
episode again, but plans using the respective M′i for that episode instead of Mi.
Taking the relative computational difference between these experiments provides an
empirical estimate of an edge’s marginal cost. To compute an estimate of a state’s
marginal cost, I looked across the episodes at the computational differences for the
M′i experiments (each episode typically has a different numbers of reachable states).
Since the state graph in theM′i for each episode is “minimally” connected, the agents’
computational costs are almost completely derived from the number of states (at least
insofar as possible). Consequently, this methodology “maximally” disentangles the
cost of a state and the edges to connect it to the state space, and provides a good
estimate of a state’s marginal cost.
To demonstrate the use of my methodology, Figure 4.6 shows its application in
the firefighting domain, using 300 randomly-generated episodes, along with best fit
lines. Taking the derivative of Figure 4.6a, M′i removes approximately 2.6 edges
for every state. Taking the derivative of Figure 4.6b shows that an edge’s marginal
computational cost is approximately 1.2ei+2000 (ns), where ei is the current number of
edges. Taking the derivative of theM′i line in Figure 4.6c shows that a state’s marginal
computational cost is approximately 5.28si+ 3000 (ns), where si is the current number
of states. The exact values I found here are clearly only applicable for my agents’
specific policy creation implementation within the firefighting domain; however, the
methodology generalizes to any problem domain expressed as a Dec-MDP, and to any
Dec-MDP solution techniques. More broadly, the approach of enumerating the factors
that contribute to an agents’ planning costs, then computing the expected marginal
cost for each factor, is extensible to any well-defined agent reasoning framework.
It is worth noting that measuring the marginal costs of states/edges using this
methodology does have a bias. Depending on the reward and transition topologies and
on the agent’s reasoning algorithm, the agent might not consume equal computational
costs on optimal versus non-optimal actions. Since I am only removing non-optimal
actions, I am biasing the measurements towards the costs of removing non-optimal
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(a) # of edges removed versus # of states.
(b) CPU savings vs. # of edges removed from the agent’s reasoning problem
(c) CPU time for agent vs. # of states in the agent’s reasoning problem
Figure 4.6: Marginal cost estimates for adding or removing a state/edge from an
agent’s local reasoning problem.
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actions (as opposed to any action). However, since the ODP seeks influences that
remove non-optimal actions rather than optimal ones, the measurement is biased in
the same way that we would want an ODP to exert influences.
4.3.2.2 Computing Incremental Reward
The incremental reward, ∆i · dROpdΘj (Θj), corresponds to the expected Q-value change
from adding ∆i into Θ
j. Examining Equation 2.2, a Q-value Qpi(st, a) only changes
if ∆i alters pi, the immediate reward R(s
t, a, st+1), or the transition probabilities
P (st+1|st, a). Since alterations to R(st, a, st+1) or P (st+1|st, a) also induce changes to
pi (and otherwise ∆i’s impact to Q-values is trivial to compute), I focus on how ∆i
alters the agents’ joint policy w.r.t. Θj. While the ODP could do this by calculating
pi|Θ
j
for each iteration of the incremental search, such an approach is computationally
daunting given the complexity of computing optimal policies and the number of
iterations the search might require.
Instead, the insight my ODP exploits is that it can use its global view to com-
pute/estimate the optimal joint policy, pi∗ (i.e., via the techniques from Section 4.2.2),
once, and then only consider candidate Θjs that preserve pi∗ while steering agents
away from taking, and even considering, actions outside of pi∗. So long as Θj does
not preclude pi∗, then the calculation of ∆i’s impact to the agents’ joint policy is
independent of Θj , and the ODP does not need to compute pi|Θ
j
. In the event that Θj
does preclude pi∗ (e.g., which could be optimal in a Pareto topology where computation
is extremely prohibitive), then statistics computed from pi∗ represent an optimistic
upper bound of the influences’ incremental ROp impacts (see Section 4.3.4). While
this methodology (unavoidably) requires the ODP to determine what good actions are
by calculating an optimal joint policy, the ODP only need do this costly calculation
once (rather than once for each of the O(|∆i|) search iterations), and then amortize
those costs over all of the search iterations, which results in substantial computational
savings.
4.3.2.3 Action Influences
In this section, I illustrate how an ODP can implement the general methodologies
from Sections 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2 for action influences. I revisit extensions to other influ-
ence mechanisms again in Section 6.2.2. I chose to implement action influences because
they are more straightforward (as explained below) while also being a particularly
commonplace organizational mechanism in previous research (Shoham & Tennenholtz,
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1995; Pacheco & Carmo, 2003; Horling & Lesser, 2008). Note however, that prior
work has not given explicit, quantitative consideration to how such influences affect
the agents’ metareasoning regime, which is the focus here.
As I will discuss further in Section 6.2.2, actions are also a computationally simpler
influence mechanism for which to compute the incremental impact ∆i · dCOpdΘj (Θj) and
∆i · dROpdΘj (Θj). That is, as I will show below, the ODP can compute the incremental
impact of an influence that prevents an agent i from considering ai in s
t
i by examining
pi∗ and Mi at sti, since the effects of the influence are so locally scoped with respect
to the agent’s reasoning process. In contrast, other influence types (i.e., states and
transitions) can have far-reaching effects, and affect the agent’s decisions process at
multiple states and at potentially different system times.
An action influence, ∆i, that removes action ai from consideration in state s
t
i,
removes one edge for each possible successor state upon taking ai in s
t
i, and removes
any now-unreachable states. By enumerating the successor states (via the transition
function), an ODP can calculate the expected change to the number of edges, |E∆ii |,
and states |S∆ii |, caused by adding ∆i to Θj. Combining those quantities with the
previous marginal cost estimates in Section 4.3.2.1 yields:
∆i · dCOp
dΘj
(Θj) =
(
5.28|SΘji |+ 3000
)
|S∆ii |+
(
1.2|EΘji |+ 2000
)
|E∆ii |
where |SΘji | and |EΘji | are the expected number of states and edges respectively for
agent i given that it conforms to Θj . |SΘji | and |EΘji | are given from the previous search
iteration, meaning this computation requires only O(|Ssuccessori |) time for enumerating
the successor state space.
The expected Q-value change associated with an action influence ∆i, that removes
action ai from consideration in state s
t
i, is equal to the expected difference between
the Q-value of ai and the next best action. Mathematically this yields,
∆i · dROp
dΘj
(Θj) = Est 7→sti
[((
max
a=〈·,ai,·〉
Qpi
∗
(st, a)
)
−
(
max
a′ 6=〈·,ai,·,〉
Qpi
∗
(st, a′)
))
x(st, a)
]
This computation requires O(|A||S|) time in the worst case, but the |S| term represents
the number of states that map into sti. In expectation, this term is
|S|
|Si| , and assuming
the agents have meaningful local observation capabilities, will typically be much less
than the total number of global states. For example, in the firefighting experiments
that follow in Section 4.3.3, 50 global states (from the typically hundreds of thousands)
map to a single local state.
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Algorithm 4.2 shows how an ODP can embed the above computations in a greedy
hill-climbing search to create an organizational design that modifies the agents’ local
action spaces so as to impart a target metareasoning regime. The algorithm begins by
initially preventing all actions from consideration in every state for every agent (lines
1–3). For the firefighting domain, I choose to begin with an organizational design
(Θ0) that prevents everything and then the ODP adds actions back in, as opposed to
beginning by allowing consideration of everything and subtracting actions out, due
to the topologies of ∆i · dCOpdΘj (Θj) and ∆i · dROpdΘj (Θj) and the tradeoff function, f(·)
between them. That is, in the firefighting domain, ∆i’s with low ∆i · dROpdΘj (Θj) tend to
also have low ∆i · dCOpdΘj (Θj). This is because actions with low expected Q-value (over
all sampled problems as calculated within ∆i · dROpdΘj (Θj)) tend to occur in states that
are infrequently reached, in large part since ∆i · dROpdΘj (Θj) is based on the occupancy
measures. For example, moving to a distant cell has low Q-value both because fighting
fires there is typically the responsibility of another agent, and because few feasible
trajectories bring the agent to that cell. As such, if the algorithm begins by allowing
consideration of all actions, it begins at a point where the magnitude of the gradient
is small and thus is prone to premature halting. However, by beginning by preventing
consideration of everything, the algorithm begins at a point with a large gradient, and
is likely to find a better solution. Intuitively speaking, this pattern seems like it would
be common in many domains, since computation of ∆i · dROpdΘj (Θj) is based on occupancy
measures, but if not, then the algorithm should ideally be initialized to a point of the
organizational design space with a high performance gradient. Other alternatives to
discourage the ODP from identifying poor local optima include standard hill-climbing
techniques like Monte Carlo, random restarts, simulated annealing, etc.
After initialization, the algorithm greedily selects local actions to add back in (lines
4–12). An important subtlety here is that I restrict the space of possible ∆is to those
actions possible in each agent’s currently reachable local state space. This is important
because efficiently utilizing the methodologies from Sections 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2 relies
on the assumption that only the current increment, ∆i, to Θ
j impacts the performance.
For example, when calculating ∆i · dCOpdΘj (Θj), the only information the ODP must
determine is |S∆ii | and |E∆ii |. If portions of the unreachable state space could already
be connected (i.e., due to adding back an action in some unreachable state in an
earlier iteration), then |S∆ii | and |E∆ii | could depend on the history introducing of
prior ∆is, which would greatly increase the complexity of the computation. Moreover,
influences to unreachable states by definition have zero expected impact, thus the
search algorithm can safely ignore such influences. Finally (lines 13–21), Algorithm 4.2
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uses the noAStatesi sets to ensure that each agent will have a well-defined local
problem by forcing every reachable state to have at least one available action.
Figure 4.7 illustrates how Algorithm 4.2 searches through the influence space for
agent 1’s movement actions. (Influences to the fight fire and NOOP actions as well
as all influences for agent 2 are omitted for ease of illustration.) As the hill climbing
progresses, the ODP adds additional actions for the agent to consider, where actions
with the highest Pareto improvement are added first.
The computational complexity of Algorithm 4.2 is O(|∆i|2 · POp cost), where
POp cost is the complexity of calculating POp(Θ −∆i). From the discussions earlier
in this section, POp cost for an action influence ∆i that prevents consideration of
ai in state s
t
i has complexity O(|Ssuccessori |+ |A||S|) corresponding to the total cost
to compute ∆i · dCOpdΘj (Θj) and ∆i · dROpdΘj (Θj). It is worth noting, however, that this
result hides the computational cost for calculating the optimal joint policy necessary
for computing ∆i · dROpdΘj (Θj), which could in fact be a substantial fraction of the
ODP’s computation in practice (e.g., in my empirical evaluation in Section 4.3.3,
computing joint policies for sampled problem episodes accounts for 99% of the ODP’s
computational costs). Thus, more precisely, the total complexity of Algorithm 4.2 is
O
(|∆i|2 (|Ssuccessori |+ |A||S|) + |Ai||Si|n). Of course, the |Ai||Si|n term is quite poor;
however, intuitively any computational ODP would require knowing a quantitative
description of organizational patterns (without which it could not decide which
interactions the MAS should pursue), and thus for a Dec-MDP based MAS, would
also include this term in its complexity analysis.
4.3.3 Evaluation
I begin my empirical evaluation by briefly describing some implementation pa-
rameters of the evaluation domain and ODP. These experiments use the firefighting
domain, where in each episode there are: two agents; two fires, each with initial
intensity independently and uniformly selected from {1, 2, 3}, and with a uniformly
random, but distinct location; delay in each cell independently and uniformly chosen
from [0, 1]; and a time horizon of 10. Agents incorporate their organizations into their
local models and solve their decision problems using the methodology developed in
Section 3.5.1.
In principle, an ODP could associate an action influence ∆i with a specific local state
(i.e., with a distinct influence for each agent-action-state combination). Section 4.1 as
well as previous research (Dignum et al., 2005), however, has shown that providing
abstract influences as opposed to detailed micromanagement can be beneficial when
105
Figure 4.7: Illustration of influence search (Algorithm 4.2) for agent 1’s movement
actions. The agent can move into a cell in a direction where it first passes a dotted
line, but not a solid line. The agent begins in the cell indicated with ∗. Dashed boxes
indicate the optimal influence to add into the organization for each search iteration.
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Algorithm 4.2 Action Influence Creation
Input: ODP’s domain model, and the Pareto optimality function f
Output: Set of organizational influences, Θ, that modify agents’ action spaces
1: Θ← ∀i, ∀t,∀sti, Ai,sti \\initially prohibit all actions in all states
2: ∀i, S˜i ← {s0i } \\S˜i is agent i’s reachable state space
3: ∀i, noAStatesi ← {s0i } \\noAStatesi : ∀sti ∈ S˜i s.t. Ai,sti = ∅
4: while ∃(∆i = ai,sti) ∈ Θ s.t. POp(Θ) < POp(Θ−∆i) do
5: ∆∗i ← arg max
∆i∈{∀i,∀sti∈S˜i,ai,st
i
∈θi}
−
[
∆i · dROpdΘ (Θ) δfδROp (Θ) + ∆i ·
dCOp
dΘ
(Θ) δf
δCOp
(Θ)
]
6: θi ← θi −∆∗i
7: if ∆∗i ’s s
t
i ∈ noAStatesi then noAStatesi ← noAStatesi − sti
8: for possible successor states, st+1i , from ∆
∗
i that /∈ S˜i do
9: S˜i ← S˜i ∪ st+1i
10: noAStatesi ← noAStatesi ∪ st+1i
11: end for
12: end while
13: while ∃i, noAStatesi 6= ∅ do
14: ∆∗i ← arg max
∆i∈{∀i,∀sti∈noAStatesi,ai,st
i
∈θi}
−
[
∆i · dROpdΘ (Θ) δfδROp (Θ) + ∆i ·
dCOp
dΘ
(Θ) δf
δCOp
(Θ)
]
15: Θ← Θ−∆∗i
16: noAStatesi ← noAStatesi − sti
17: for possible successor states, st+1i , from ∆
∗
i that /∈ S˜i do
18: S˜i ← S˜i ∪ st+1i
19: noAStatesi ← noAStatesi ∪ st+1i
20: end for
21: end while
22: return Θ
agents possess local expertise. For now (I revisit this issue in depth in Chapter 5), I
incorporate this principle in two ways:
1. By presenting the ODP with a model where it only knows the mean cell delay
as opposed to the specific delay of each cell for an episode. This also provides
the agents with local expertise relative to the ODP (e.g., as in Section 4.1).
2. By having the ODP consider action influences for each agent i that remove
an action, ai, from an abstract (rather than specific) local state, sˆ
t
i, where
the abstraction drops all state factors excluding agent i’s location. The ODP
computes the incremental operational reward and cost associated with an ab-
stracted influence ∆ˆi by taking the expectation over the set of influences, {∆i},
that map into ∆ˆi (i.e., whose states map into sˆ
t
i). This abstraction was chosen
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to prevent the ODP from micromanaging the agents, and forces an influence
to apply to a broader set of situations. Using an abstracted influence space
additionally reduces the ODP’s computational requirements, since the influence
space is smaller, and fewer samples are needed to compute stable estimates
for ∆ˆi · dROpdΘj (Θj). As we will see in Chapter 5, finer abstractions enable the
ODP to find more refined organizational designs at the expense of greater ODP
computation and/or overfitting (and vice versa for coarser abstractions).
The ODP sampled and solved training problems from its domain model until
it had stable estimates for ∆ˆi · dROpdΘj (Θj), which took 300 sample episodes in these
experiments. To test my claim that the algorithm correctly finds an organizational
design that imparts a desired metareasoning regime upon the agents, I explored a
space of environments with a range of metareasoning tradeoff demands, parameterized
by POp = ROp −COp/b for different values of the Pareto optimality parameter b ∈ Z+.
I present results across b values such that at extremely costly reasoning (low b) the
ODP designs an organization where the agents only consider executing a single action
(FF in this case), and at extremely low reasoning costs (high b) designs an organization
where every action the ODP expects an agent to ever want to execute is included. Note
that the latter, max-bOrg, will still exclude local actions that would never be sensible
(e.g., fighting fires in distant cells that are always another agent’s responsibility).
Unexpectedly, I found that the ODP was able to encode surprisingly nuanced
organizational designs despite being limited to a space of abstracted influences. For
example, the ODP frequently imposes unidirectional movements (see Figure 4.8),
where an agent is allowed to consider moving into a cell, but the action to move
back and in effect “undo” the previous action is removed from consideration. This
type of influence imparts a good metareasoning regime by forcing the agent to reason
about complete, irreversible action trajectories rather than needlessly reasoning about
reversing prior actions. These unidirectional movements also yield a coordinated joint
policy by discouraging an agent from rushing to the other side of the grid (where the
other agent is located) to fight a high-intensity fire since it would be unable to come
back and fight an initially-closer fire. Instead, the agent will prioritize fighting fires
close to its initial location before moving to the other side of the grid, by which time
another agent could have fought those fires.
To quantitatively determine the expected joint reward and agent computational
cost characteristics of each organizational design, I presented the MAS with a sequence
of 1500 test problem episodes, randomly sampled fromM∗, and had the agents utilize
each of the organizational designs (as well as a local baseline) in each of the episodes.
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Agent 1 Agent 2
∗ ∗
Figure 4.8: Movement action influences of the 1e6Org for each agent. An agent can
move into a cell in a direction where it first passes a dotted line, but not a solid line.
Agents begin in the cells indicated with ∗.
Figures 4.9a and 4.9b show the mean ROp and COp respectively over the 1500 test
episodes for each of the bOrgs and the local baseline. These graphs show that as the
ODP faces different target metareasoning tradeoffs (i.e., values of b), the organizations
it creates have monotonically increasing performance properties in both ROp and COp.
That is, as computation becomes cheaper (b increases), the ODP creates organizations
that induce the agents to consider more actions (and thus utilize more computation),
which yields increased expected joint reward. Also observe that these bOrgs, which are
limited to influences that only remove actions from consideration, do not lead to agents
finding better policies than they otherwise would have (ROps of the bOrgs do not
surpass the local baseline), but find these policies with significantly less computation
(lower COp). In Figure 4.9c, I use the expected ROp and COp data to calculate the
metareasoning regime imparted upon the agents by each of the organizations as a
function of tradeoff parameterizations. This graph shows that, for any target tradeoff
parameterization β, the best organizational design (i.e., maximizing the y-axis) is
approximately the bOrg the ODP generates with b = β, which confirms that the ODP
designs organizations that approximately optimize the Pareto front defined by the f
function within POp.
An additional dimension for evaluation is the ODP’s computational savings gained
by my incremental search techniques. Firstly, if the ODP enumerated the organizational
design space, it would evaluate O(2|∆i|) ≈ 4.2e180 candidate organizational designs in
the firefighting domain as opposed to the O(|∆i|2) = 360, 000 candidates it considers
with my incremental search, which highlights the importance of selectively searching
the design space. Secondly, despite being only a constant factor in the theoretical
complexity, the ODP’s computational costs in these experiments are overwhelmingly
dominated by the costs to solve for optimal joint policies to determine ∆ˆi · dROpdΘj (Θj).
While calculating optimal joint policies may seem daunting, the ODP would have
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(a) ROp(Θ) for the bOrgs and local baseline
(b) COp(Θ) for the bOrgs and local baseline
(c) Imparted metareasoning regime for the bOrgs and local baseline
as a function of Pareto optimality parameter
Figure 4.9: Performance characteristics of the bOrgs created by my ODP.
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to solve for optimal joint policies for each candidate design, Θj + ∆ˆi, if it directly
calculated the performance of each candidate instead of the (conditionally independent)
incremental impact of ∆ˆi. Thus, the approximation techniques empirically result
in numerous orders of magnitude of computational savings, and allow the ODP to
efficiently compute locally optimal organizational designs.
4.3.4 Limitations and Concerns
The greedy hill-climbing algorithm my ODP utilizes (Algorithm 4.2) is but one
choice for searching the organizational influence space. While the computational
advantages of an incremental search algorithm seem crucial for regulating the ODP’s
computational complexity (Section 4.3.2), other incremental search algorithms, such
as Monte Carlo, A∗, etc., could supplant the greedy hill climb that my ODP utilized.
A particular weakness of the greedy hill-climbing approach that I have identified
is that it can sometimes mis-apply influences that are along the front of the POp
Pareto topology. Namely, the ODP’s statistical estimates are constructed from
optimally coordinated policies, and as such, the ODP calculates an influence’s “optimal”
incremental impact, i.e., the calculations for the ∆i · dCOpdΘj (Θj) and ∆i · dROpdΘj (Θj)
terms anticipate additional, complementary influences also being added into Θ. In
the interior of the Pareto topology, this optimistic anticipation of complementary
influences subsequently being added comes to fruition; however, at the Pareto front,
the ODP may not add more influences (since they would decrease POp). Thus, at the
Pareto front, the ODP’s estimates of ∆i · dCOpdΘj (Θj) and ∆i · dROpdΘj (Θj) are overestimates.
Given such overestimates, the ODP can add ∆i into the organization when it actually
shouldn’t have. Obviously, a more intelligent search algorithm (e.g., that looks forward
to consider the trajectory of influences added into Θ) could fix this inconsistency at
the expense of additional computational costs for the ODP; however, it is important
to note that the significance of these inconsistencies is small by definition (since they
can only occur on the Pareto front). It is also worth noting that unlike other greedy
hill-climbing applications where myopic reasoning can lead to halting too soon, my
ODP implementation will only mis-apply influences by adding too many influences
into Θ. That is, since ∆i · dROpdΘj (Θj) can never be an underestimate, my ODP will
never undervalue an influence.
More broadly, other search algorithms could increase the expected POp of the Θ
found by the ODP via increasing the likelihood of better local maxima (e.g., Monte
Carlo search), or via a more comprehensive search of the organizational design space
(e.g., A∗ search). An open question is whether such improvements are worth pursuing
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(given their higher computational costs), or if the greedy search is already identifying
an Θ that is close to the global optimum, especially if the ODP were parameterized
with an optimal abstraction (see Chapter 5).
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have made two primary contributions. Firstly, in Section 4.1,
I contributed a heuristic principle for selecting effective organizational influences
(Principle 4.1) that states that a well-designed organization should influence only the
factors of agents’ models that are associated with agent interactions. By doing so,
an organization leaves the agents room to exercise their local expertise while still
influencing how that local expertise contributes to the collective interaction patterns.
I then identified that for the Dec-MDP framework I have adopted, these types of
influences should stem from the agents’ reward-/transition-dependencies. In my
evaluation of Principle 4.1, I found that it yields robust organizations that outperform
the local baseline MAS (especially in a subset of critical problem episodes) while
avoiding micromanagement that disregards agents’ local expertise.
My identification of Principle 4.1 contributes to the body of organizational reasoning
techniques by providing a theoretically-derived, empirically-validated heuristic for
delimiting a sub-class of effective organizational influences. Principle 4.1 contributes a
design heuristic not only to problem-driven approaches (Section 2.2.2) where it guides
a human to identify effective influences, but also to experience-driven approaches
(Section 2.2.3) where it informs a MAS (and/or adaptation algorithm) of a sub-class
of patterns that are organizationally significant. Moreover, Principle 4.1 contributes
a strategy for focusing the efforts of mixed approaches to organizational reasoning
(Section 2.2.4), including my agent-driven one, on pertinent influences for an ODP to
specify, and suggests techniques for automated organizational design (e.g., like those I
developed, see below).
The second contribution of this chapter is the development of computational
representations and algorithms for automated organizational design built uponPrin-
ciple 4.1’s premise. In Section 4.2.1, I formulated a general-purpose, agent-driven
methodology for constructing a computational ODP consisting of three stages, namely:
compute organizational patterns; select organizational influences; and influence agent
decision making. In the remainder of Section 4.2, I illustrated an implementation
of these stages for the Dec-MDP framework I have adopted in this dissertation. I
described how my ODP implementation can estimate the qualities of the agents’
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actions by: Monte Carlo sampling of the problem space; computing the optimal joint
policy for each sampled episode; and then aggregating the information computed
across the samples. My ODP implementation then selects organizational influences by
identifying patterns in the statistical estimates of the quality of the agents’ actions.
Agents assimilate these organizational influences to their local models and solve their
local reasoning processes as described in Chapter 3.1.2. My empirical evaluation of
this ODP implementation showed that it creates organizations that are intuitively
sensible and can exploit domain structure to yield MAS performance superior to that
of my best hand-crafted organizations.
In Section 4.3, I discussed how an organization can be used to impart a metarea-
soning regime upon the MAS. I extended my ODP implementation to incrementally
reason about the expected impact that candidate organizational influences would have
on the agents’ metareasoning, and developed techniques for efficiently estimating these
statistics (for influences that modify an agent’s action space). My evaluation demon-
strated my ODP implementation’s ability to identify intricate, nuanced organizations
(despite being limited to action influences) that exploit domain structure while also
following the Pareto topology between ROp and COp.
My overarching strategy for automated organizational design contributes a mathe-
matical, agent-driven approach for creating an explicit organization from first principles
to the organizational reasoning community, which previously either: relied on human-
expertise to provide an organization (e.g., Section 2.2.2); did not explicitly represent
the organization (e.g., Section 2.2.3); or focused on configuring/adapting an organiza-
tion rather than initially creating one (e.g., Section 2.2.4). Moreover, my overarching
approach to automated organizational design contributes an agent-driven framework
upon which the organizational reasoning community can further study specific aspects
of organizational reasoning (e.g., as I do in Chapter 5 with abstract organizational
influences). More narrowly, my specific ODP implementation contributes a proof of
concept that my overarching ODP strategy is well-formed, and provides a functioning
ODP implementation for the Dec-MDP community. Finally, extending my ODP to
explicitly reason about and optimize the agents’ metareasoning regime contributes
the first systematic study of multiagent metareasoning through organizational design,
which had previously been viewed as distinct issues and studied by distinct research
communities. As such, my techniques in this regard contribute to both the metarea-
soning and organizational reasoning communities, providing a new solution approach
for both metareasoning and organizational design as well as raising awareness of the
cross-cutting nature of organizational design.
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CHAPTER 5
Abstract Organizational Influences
As identified in Section 4.3.3 and prior organizational reason techniques (e.g., see
Section 2.2.2), abstractions can play a central role in the specification of organizational
influences. Broad, encompassing influences can be advantageous if an ODP wants
to instill overarching organizational guidance for the agents’ operational decisions.
Alternatively, sets of narrow, detailed influences can be advantageous if an ODP
wants to ensure specific coordination patterns specialized for particular environmental
conditions. Recent OMLs and ODPs have recognized the significance of abstraction
choice for creating effective organizational designs (Dignum et al., 2005; Horling &
Lesser, 2008; Hu¨bner et al., 2007; Sims et al., 2008; Sleight & Durfee, 2013, 2014),
and typically include mechanisms for an organizational designer to formulate abstract
influences. However, the field still lacks a formal understanding of how abstraction
choices impact organizational design processes and outcomes.
In this chapter, I systematically construct a formal, agent-driven theory of abstract
organizational influences. I begin in Section 5.1 by discussing the motivating factors
for abstract organizational influences. Then, I formally define abstract organizational
influences and present a mathematical framework for analyzing the dimensions of an
influence abstraction mechanism in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3, I describe how to
extend my ODP techniques developed in the previous chapters to incorporate abstract
influences. Using my framework, I empirically analyze the effects of abstract influences
on both the ODP and the performance of organizations designed with abstract
influences, and identify characteristics of effective abstractions (Sections 5.4, 5.6,
and 5.7). Given these results, in Section 5.5 I converge on task-delineated abstractions
as a general-purpose heuristic for selecting an influence abstraction mechanism, and
confirm this heuristic’s effectiveness empirically.
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Agent 1 Agent 2
∗ ∗
Figure 5.1: Movement action influences in the four-fire domain for each agent using a
position abstraction. An agent can move into a cell in a direction where it first passes
a dotted line, but not a solid line. Agents begin in the cells indicated with ∗.
5.1 Motivations for Abstract Influences
In Section 4.3.3, the ODP utilized an abstraction that relied on only an agent’s
position to identify patterns in that agent’s reasoning and behaviors. The resulting
organizations exploited specific problem properties—especially that a problem instance
often had exactly one fire for each agent to fight—and specified influences (e.g.,
Figure 4.8) that essentially captured that, once an agent starts moving toward a fire,
it shouldn’t think about reversing its movements, and that it is not useful to (think
about) moving to places more easily reached by the other agent. The ODP discovered
that, because each agent typically fought only one fire, an organization that disallows
reverse movements and movements deep in to the other agent’s region of responsibility
performs well.
More broadly, however, this class of patterns could be overly restrictive. For
example, consider even the seemingly innocent extension of the (two-agent) firefighting
domain to have four fires per episode instead of two. Since each agent might fight
multiple fires in the extended version of the domain, an encompassing abstraction
that at all times prohibits reverse movements could stop the agents from reaching
a second fire, and as a result have poor operational performance. Alternatively, the
ODP could allow the agents to consider more actions (e.g., Figure 5.1), but at the
expense of the agents incurring additional computational costs. Either option results
in a decreased net operational performance; however, a narrower abstraction (e.g.,
that partitions time) could provide the necessary organizational expressivity for the
ODP to differentiate these coordination patterns in a more nuanced specification.
For example, this could correspond to removing and/or redirecting the influences to
prohibit reverse movements after some time has elapsed.
Stepping back, I identify two primary motivations for abstract organizational
influences in an agent-driven approach:
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1. By generalizing where influences apply beyond just the seen instances, an appro-
priate abstraction can improve organizational performance. In the firefighting
domain, an example is where generalizing instances of purposeful movement
toward a fire to prohibit reverse movements everywhere can be fruitful.
2. By abstracting over a wider space of instances, an appropriate abstraction can
find influence patterns with greater confidence (i.e., it avoids overfitting). For
example, in the firefighting domain, this could correspond to seeing enough
instances to confidently constrain the agents to local partitions of the grid world.
Of course, these benefits can be lost if abstraction is taken too far. Overextend-
ing abstraction can misapply influences, and can conflate patterns or properties of
influences that can harm operational performance and/or confuse an ODP’s search
algorithm. Alternatively, too little abstraction can too sparsely distribute the ODP’s
limited information, yielding poor statistical estimates that make the ODP’s search
algorithm sensitive to sampling artifacts, and organizational performance reflective of
the agents’ arbitrary priors.
Beyond these fundamental motivations, abstract influences could have several
other benefits depending on the application. One intuitive example is that abstract
organizational influences can reduce organizational specification size. This can be
important when an agent queries its θi to find the influences associated with the
part of its Mi currently being considered (i.e., as described in Section 3.1.2). In my
computational agents, however, I employ hashing to provide O(1) query complexity
for organizational lookup, which makes specification size a non-issue. Nonetheless,
for other application domains, specification size could be an important attribute, for
example, with human agents or agents who must sequentially observe their local state
factors and are thus unable to easily hash their entire sti × ai × st+1i space into an
organizational specification.
The ODP’s computational costs are another possible motivating factor for abstrac-
tion, where broader influences imply a smaller organizational design space. From
Section 4.3.2.3, Algorithm 4.2’s complexity isO
(|∆i|2 (|Ssuccessori |+ |A||S|) + |Ai||Si|n),
which does depend on the size of the organizational design space (i.e., |∆i|). However,
it is important to note that the search’s computational costs are an insignificant
portion (i.e.,  0.1%) of the ODP’s total computational costs in my experimental
implementation; rather, the bulk of the computation is sampling problem instances
and computing optimal joint policies to estimate the influences’ incremental impacts,
which is not affected by abstraction choice. Nonetheless, if a different (e.g., optimal,
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exhaustive) search algorithm were used instead of a greedy hill climb, then the effects of
abstraction to reduce the size of the organizational design space could be an important
consequence.
Yet another possible motivation for organizational abstraction is to provide flexi-
bility for the agents to make local decisions within, while still providing organizational
guidance for that reasoning. However, counter to possible intuitions, abstract organi-
zational influences are orthogonal to the flexibility an agent retains in an organization.
For example, highly flexible organizations can be specified as an aggregation of many
fine-grained influences (e.g., in sti consider a
1
i , and in s
t
i also consider a
2
i , and in s
t
i
also consider a3i , etc.). Thus, flexibility stems from both number of influences and
their abstraction. Of course, abstraction choice could impact the ODP’s decision of
which/how-many influences to specify, but such flexibility differences arise from ODP
decisions rather than as necessary consequences of the abstraction choice.
5.2 Dimensions of Abstract Influences
To construct a framework for analyzing abstraction in organizational designs, in
this section I provide precise, formal definitions for abstract influences and identify
dimensions of abstraction pertinent to organizational design and outcomes.
Broadly speaking, an abstract organizational influence clusters together detailed
influences and forces the ODP and agents into a monolithic treatment of the clustered
influences. Figure 5.2 illustrates this concept. On the left are examples of optimal
actions for A1 to take in its initial position, but sampled for different system times
and fire configurations. On the right is the abstract influence that, based on the
patterns seen in the samples, indicates that at this position (at any system time or
fire configuration) A1 should just consider any of the West, East, or North movement
actions. (As mentioned in Figure 5.2, this example is for illustrative purposes only,
and not from empirical data.)
Using this intuition, I formally define an abstract influence as follows.
Definition 5.1. An influence abstraction is a function G : ∆ 7→ ∆ˆ, where ∆ˆi ∈ ∆ˆ is
an abstract organizational influence.
Building from the clustering perspective, there are three primary dimensions for
characterizing abstract influences.
Definition 5.2. The inclusivity of an abstract influence, ∆ˆi, corresponds to how
encompassing the influence is. Formally, the inclusivity of ∆ˆi is the expected fraction
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of agent i’s local model, sti × ai × st+1i ∈ Si × Ai × Si, that ∆ˆi modifies.1
Definition 5.3. The uniformity of an abstract influence, ∆ˆi, corresponds to how
well its composing influences agree on the local model’s modification. Formally, the
uniformity of ∆ˆi is the expected fraction of its composing influences that modify agent
i’s local model in the same way.
Definition 5.4. The variance of an abstract influence, ∆ˆi, is the expected variance of
its composing influences’ incremental (ROp,COp) impact. This differs from uniformity
in that ∆ˆi’s composing influences could all modify Mi in the same way (thus have
uniformity of 1), but have varied estimates for the incremental (ROp,COp) impact of
the modification (thus have high variance).
Figure 5.2 illustrates how the abstraction’s values along each of these dimensions
are calculated using an abstraction that drops all state factors except the agent’s
current position. I define the uniformity for an organizational design as the expected
uniformity over all of the organization’s influences (and mutatis mutandis for inclusivity
and variance).
5.3 Incorporating Abstract Influences
Incorporating abstract organizational influences into my previous ODP algorithm
(Algorithm 4.2) requires extending the calculation of an influence’s incremental impact
to an abstract influence’s incremental impact. I do this by taking the expectation over
∆ˆi’s constituent influences.
∆ˆi · dROp
dΘj
(Θj) = E∆i 7→∆ˆi [∆i ·
dROp
dΘj
(Θj)]
∆ˆi · dCOp
dΘj
(Θj) = E∆i 7→∆ˆi [∆i ·
dCOp
dΘj
(Θj)]
Using Figure 5.2 as an example, the ODP’s estimate for ∆ˆi’s incremental ROp and
COp impact is the expected impact of its constituent influences. The ODP search
algorithm uses these values exactly as it would with un-abstracted influences.
Agents incorporate abstract organizational influences into their local reasoning
in exactly the same way they incorporate un-abstracted influences (i.e., the process
1Beyond abstracting the domain of influences, one could also envision abstracting the range (i.e.,
the effect of the modification). However, such an approach often decreases uniformity, which is
typically undesirable (see Section 5.4). Still, abstracting the range could be an interesting direction
for future work (e.g., in the firefighting domain abstracting all movement actions to a single influence).
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A1 F2
a∗1 is East
incremental ROp = 1
incremental COp = 325
Time = 7
A1
F3
F2
F1
F1
a∗1 is West
incremental ROp = 5
incremental COp = 2100
Time = 0
A1
a∗1 is North
incremental ROp = 3
incremental COp = 2600
Time = 0
F2
F1
F3
F1
A1
a∗1 is West
incremental ROp = 0.2
incremental COp = 890
Time = 3
F1
F1
A1
a1 is {West, East, North}
incremental ROp = 2.3
incremental COp = 1479
Figure 5.2: Illustration of the Pos abstraction’s dimensions (see Table 5.1) for agent 1’s
initial position. The influence’s inclusivity is 1
50
, its uniformity is 1
3
, and its (ROp,COp)
variance is (4.63, 1.11× 106). Quantities shown are for the four example ∆1s (rather
than ∆ˆ1’s entire domain), and are for illustrative purposes only and not from empirical
data.
described in Section 3.1.2). As each agent i is solving its local decision problem, it
queries θi to find the ∆ˆi that applies to the s
t
i × ai × st+1i currently being considered
within itsMi, and then modifies itsMi in accordance with that ∆ˆi. For simplicity in
this work, I limit my consideration to abstractions where a ∆i maps to a single ∆ˆi. In
other words, G must be many-to-one, which implies the agents will only receive logically
consistent Θs that do not entail incompatible modifications for any sti × ai × st+1i .
Investigating many-to-many abstractions could be an interesting line for future work
(see Section 6.2.5), since it provides flexibility for hierarchical organizational influences
like those found in modern organizational modeling languages (Dignum et al., 2005;
Hu¨bner et al., 2007) and/or conflicting influences brought about by simultaneous
membership in multiple organizations.
For example, as agent 1 is solving for its organizationally optimal policy pi
∗|θ1
1 , in
any state whose location is its initial position, θ1 specifies the ∆ˆ1 shown in Figure 5.2.
Using ∆ˆ1, agent 1 will modify its model to only permit consideration of the West,
East, and North movement actions in its currently considered state.
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Figure 5.3: Position clusters for the PCluster based abstractions (dashed lines represent
cell boundaries for reference). ∗ indicates the agent’s initial location.
5.4 Influence Abstraction Effects
The research community has developed an extensive library of abstraction tech-
niques such as: state abstraction (Li et al., 2006) and finite controllers (Bernstein et al.,
2005; Poupart & Boutilier, 2003) for decision-theoretic problems; influence (Witwicki,
2010) and coordination locale (Varakantham et al., 2009) abstractions for efficient
coordination; hierarchical planning (Amato et al., 2014; Sutton et al., 1999) and task
networks (Sardina et al., 2006) for sequential reasoning; and the various abstract
modeling constructs for an organizational modeling language (Dignum et al., 2005;
Hu¨bner et al., 2007), among many others. Two overarching commonalities within these
techniques, however, are to approach abstraction as: 1) overlooking unimportant or
irrelevant information and/or 2) clustering similar information together. Using these
as a basis for designing abstractions over various points along abstraction dimensions, I
crafted several families of abstractions for the firefighting domain that are summarized
in Table 5.1. Broadly speaking, organizations created from these abstractions map
a set of state factors (for specific mappings see Table 5.1) to the ∆ˆi for that state,
where ∆ˆi informs agent i of which actions it should consider for that state. Together,
these ∆ˆis essentially construct regions of responsibility for each agent, which can vary
over time if system time contributes to the abstraction mechanism.
These experiments utilized the firefighting domain, where there are: 2 agents;
4 fires uniformly distributed throughout the grid (without replacement) and with
initial intensity i.i.d. uniformly sampled from {1, 2, 3}; cell delays i.i.d. uniformly
sampled from [0, 1]; and a time horizon of 12. Additionally, to provide finite maximum
durations before an agent could impact another, I introduce a cap on the maximum
number of consecutive failed movement attempts before success is ensured (two in
these experiments). I maintain the Markov property by adding a new state factor to
maintain the number of consecutive failed moves.
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Abstraction Expected Organizational
Name Inclusivity Variance (10−3ROp, 103COp) Description of Θs Constructed from Abstraction
None 1 (2.50, 1297) Every state maps to the same ∆ˆi.
Time 1
12
(35.2, 17.26) System time in a state maps to ∆ˆi.
Pos 1
50
(2.08, 0.99) Agent’s position in a state maps to ∆ˆi.
TCluster 1
4
(34.5, 204)
Like Time, but system time is clustered into intervals. For
example, states with times in [1, 3] map to the same ∆ˆi.
PCluster 1
12
(3.00, 15.8)
Like Pos, but positions are clustered into neighborhoods as
illustrated in Figure 5.3.
Time + Pos 1
600
(18.1, 0.02)
System time and agent’s position in a state, together, map
to ∆ˆi.
TCluster +
Pos
1
200
(22.0, 0.22)
Clustered system time and agent’s position in a state,
together, map to ∆ˆi.
Time +
PCluster
1
144
(28.1, 0.27)
System time and clustered agent positions, together, map to
∆ˆi.
TCluster +
PCluster
1
48
(37.3, 2.84)
Clustered system time and clustered agent positions,
together, map to ∆ˆi.
Table 5.1: Descriptions of the organizational abstractions I evaluate in Section 5.4. Uniformity for each abstraction relies on the
specific Pareto characterization, but typically decreases as agent computation becomes less costly.
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To observe the impact of abstract influences with respect to POp’s Pareto topology
(i.e., as agents have more or less available computational resources), I encoded the
same Pareto topology as in Section 4.3.3, POp(Θ) = ROp(Θ)− 1bCOp(Θ) for parameter
b ∈ Z+, and for each abstraction had the ODP create organizations for different values
of b. High b values represent when the agents have abundant computational resources
relative to the pace of the environment, and vice versa for low values.
Additionally, to observe the impact of abstract influences with respect the amount
of information the ODP possesses, I had the ODP create organizations from three
different available information profiles. I controlled the amount of information available
to the ODP by artificially manipulating the problem samples from which it constructed
estimates of the ∆ˆi · dROpdΘj (Θj) and ∆ˆi · dCOpdΘj (Θj) terms used in Algorithm 4.2. At one
extreme, the ODP exactly sampled the evaluation problem set, which encodes that
the ODP has perfect information. Then, as the ODP based its estimates off of fewer
sample problems (i.e., the training set is a diminishing subset of the test problems),
the ODP possessed increasingly imperfect domain information.
As in Section 4.3.3, I evaluated each organization on 300 problem instances
to empirically compute ROp and COp for each Θ, from which I calculated POp for
various Pareto optimality parameterizations. Recall the motivating example from
Section 5.1 where the influences to prohibit reverse movements were problematic in
the four-fire domain. Figure 5.4 illustrates influences that the ODP specified using
the TCluster+Pos abstraction. Notice how as time progresses, the actions that each
agent can consider changes. Early on, each agent is forced into one-way paths, which
streamlines their computation without typically precluding optimal actions. Then as
time progresses, each agent is allowed to consider most movements in the locations
near its initial location (in case it was able to quickly fight a fire and is now pursuing
its second fire), but still is forced into one-way paths further out (in case it is still
pursuing its first fire). Continuing to the next time cluster, the agent is afforded most
movement actions on its side of the grid (in case there are still fires in this region),
but is forced into one-way paths on the side of the grid opposite its initial location
(in case there are no more fires on its initial side of the grid and it helping the other
agent). Finally, at late times, the agents’ movements are heavily restricted because
they usually have fires extinguished by this time.
Figure 5.5 shows the POp curves for each organization. Figures 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8
show the separate ROp and COp curves for the organizations constructed from perfect
information, 2/3 information, and 1/3 information respectively. To allow the reader to
more easily visualize how the ROp and COp curves change in response to the amount
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Agent 1 Agent 2
∗
∗ ∗
∗ ∗
∗ ∗
∗Time ∈{0, 1, 2}
Time ∈
{3, 4, 5}
Time ∈
{6, 7, 8}
Time ∈
{9, 10, 11}
Figure 5.4: Movement action influences in the four-fire domain for each agent using
the TCluster+Pos abstraction. An agent can move into a cell in a direction where it
first passes a dotted line, but not a solid line. Agents begin in the cells indicated with
∗.
of information the ODP possessed, Figure 5.9 shows the ROp and COp curves for
select organizations that are particularly susceptible to information scope effects in
Figure 5.5. In the next sections, I systematically analyze these results to develop
a framework for characterizing how abstraction dimensions impact: the operational
performance of an organization (Section 5.4.1), the sensitivity of the ODP’s search
algorithm (Section 5.4.2), and the effects of information availability on the ODP
(Section 5.4.3).
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Figure 5.5: POp curves for each abstraction for different amounts of ODP information.
Solid, dashed, and dotted curves correspond to organizations constructed from perfect
information, 2/3 information, and 1/3 information respectively.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.6: ROp and COp curves for organizations constructed from perfect information.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.7: ROp and COp curves for organizations constructed from 2/3 information.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.8: ROp and COp curves for organizations constructed from 1/3 information.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.9: ROp and COp curves for select organizations to permit direct visualization of how information scope affects the ODP.
Solid, dashed, and dotted curves correspond to organizations constructed from perfect information, 2/3 information, and 1/3
information respectively.
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5.4.1 Operational Performance
The POp curves in Figure 5.5 reveal two differentiating characteristics for opera-
tional performance across abstractions: a curve’s smoothness (which will be discussed
in Section 5.4.2) and a curve’s raw quality (i.e., its vertical placement on the graph).
Analysis reveals that an organization’s uniformity is strongly correlated with per-
formance quality. One exemplary case of this is the None abstraction, where the
organizations at low b (i.e., when computation is expensive) restrict all but a single
action from consideration (i.e., the same action must be taken in every state). These Θs
by definition have maximal uniformity and also obtain relatively high POp as compared
to other abstractions with similar inclusivity (e.g., Time). Then, as b increases, the
None organizations permit consideration of additional actions, eventually decreasing
uniformity to its minimal value, and these minimal-uniformity Θs obtain the worst
POp.
Considering this observation more deeply, decreased uniformity arises when al-
ternative actions could be optimal for specific instances entailed in ∆ˆi’s domain, for
example like in Figure 5.2. Rather than restrict the agent from considering some subset
of Pareto-valuable actions that the ODP knows the agent might need in a specific
problem instance, the ODP instead permits consideration of all actions that could be
Pareto-valuable, and relies on the agent’s local intelligence to appropriately select from
among this set. As a result, the ODP under-constrains the agents’ reasoning, which
increases COp and thus decreases POp. However, for high-uniformity influences, the
ODP can aggressively restrict the agents’ actions to a limited set of Pareto-valuable
actions.
POp’s reliance on inclusivity is interesting in that excess inclusivity can yield poor
POp (e.g., the None and Time abstractions), and too little inclusivity can also result
in poor POp (e.g., the Time+Pos abstraction). However, abstractions with moderate
inclusivity are associated with the maximal POp curves. It is straightforward to show
that excess inclusivity increases susceptibility to the effects of decreased uniformity;
that is, additional states map into the same ∆ˆi but may not have the same optimal
actions. Too little inclusivity is detrimental for the opposite reason; that is, since a
low-inclusivity ∆ˆi applies to such a narrow space, there is insufficient diversity in the
ODP’s statistical estimates to generalize to unseen problem instances. Consequently,
the agents can encounter states that do not map to any of the specified influences, in
which case the agents default to their local, baseline reasoning and behaviors.
Examining the ROp and COp curves in Figures 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8 illustrates that,
broadly speaking, as the agents’ computation becomes relatively cheaper (b increases),
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the ODP induces the agents to consider more actions, which in turn provides opera-
tional flexibility for the agents to achieve higher ROp. The Time and Time+Pos curves
deviate from this pattern due to low uniformity across all of the Pareto conditions;
that is, the specific action an agent should take is poorly correlated with system time,
meaning that time-based abstractions cluster together different actions. This biases
the ODP into permitting the agents to consider additional actions even when Pareto
conditions discourage excessive agent reasoning.
5.4.2 ODP’s Search Sensitivity
A striking feature of Figure 5.5 is the large dip in POp for some of the abstractions
as computation becomes less costly (e.g., in the None abstraction), when we would
normally expect smooth, monotonically increasing POp curves. In each of these cases,
the pre-dip organization would actually be a preferable Θ to the one created by
the ODP for these Pareto conditions, which implies that the ODP’s greedy search
algorithm performed poorly in these instances.
Notice that these dipping cases occur most significantly in the abstractions with
high variance. Recalling Definition 5.4, high variance corresponds to ∆ˆis composed of
∆is with significantly different expected values for ∆i · dROpdΘj (Θj) and ∆i · dCOpdΘj (Θj), which
in turn makes the incremental impact of ∆ˆi have high statistical variance. Utilizing
such imprecise estimates for a ∆ˆi’s incremental impact naturally makes the greedy
search algorithm sensitive to initial conditions and small data errors introduced from
the ODP’s sampling process, which results in the unexpected POp performance dips.
In other words, the ODP believes from its data that certain influences will improve
POp, when in reality, the ODP is overestimating the reward and/or underestimating
the computational costs of adding the influences to the design, and experimentation in
the evaluation domain ultimately reveals that these influences are actually detrimental
to POp.
5.4.3 ODP’s Information Scope
Examining Figure 5.5, we unexpectedly observe that organizations created from
less information tend to achieve higher POp, whereas intuition would dictate that
additional information should tend to improve the quality of an organizational design.
Further analysis reveals that an abstraction’s inclusivity is a primary determining
factor for analyzing an ODP with respect to its available information. As the ODP
receives additional information, it is being exposed to increasingly-unusual problem
130
instances, analogously to how the cumulative probability of drawing a value three
standard deviations from the mean of a Gaussian increases as you draw more samples.
For abstractions with high inclusivity, the optimal actions from these unusual problem
instances inevitably get clustered together with the more common optimal actions,
essentially creating multimodal distributions for the ∆ˆis’ statistical estimates. Since
my ODP computes a ∆ˆi’s incremental impact as the mean of its constituent ∆is’
incremental impacts, multimodal distributions fundamentally violate the assumptions
of the ODP’s statistical representation, and result in decreased POp from the resulting
organizations. This argues that an ODP should employ more sophisticated statistical
models for representing estimates of high inclusivity influences. An interesting direction
to consider for future work would be an automated approach for correcting the ODP’s
statistical representation in response to influence inclusivity (see Section 6.2.4 for some
initial thoughts in this direction).
Figure 5.5 also demonstrates that some abstractions are more robust to the effects of
information availability than others. For example, the None abstraction is completely
immune to these effects and the TCluster abstraction is also exceptionally resilient
in this regard. While these abstractions have high inclusivity and thus should be
susceptible to information availability effects, they also have extremely low uniformity.
Thus, incorporating specialized ∆is into a ∆ˆi cannot induce the ODP to permit
additional actions, because those actions are already permitted due to the common
cases.
5.5 Task-Delineated Abstractions
To summarize the key findings from my analysis in the previous section, the best
abstractions are ones that:
 Have moderate inclusivity. This provides enough leeway for an ODP to
specify nuanced influences where appropriate but is broad enough to permit
influences to generalize to the larger problem space.
 Have high uniformity. This allows the ODP to more aggressively restrict
the agents’ local models to a smaller set of actions for consideration, which
streamlines computational effort thereby improving performance.
 Have low variance. Low variance reduces sensitivity in the ODP’s search
algorithm, resulting in smoother performance curves that better match the
Pareto topology.
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These observations lead to a high-level strategy of adopting abstractions that
segment each problem instance into maximally-sized components that agree on the
same action with (nearly) the same expected incremental computational and reward
impacts. Although such a strategy is not computationally practical as it would involve
searching through the space of clusterings, it does suggest a heuristic proxy, which is
to group together states/actions that are collectively pursuing the same outcome. I
refer to this heuristic clustering strategy as a task-delineated abstraction.
For example, in the fire-fighting domain, a task-delineated abstraction would
imply segmenting a problem episode into tasks associated with putting out a specific
fire. See Table 5.2 for the task-delineated abstractions I provided to the ODP for
the firefighting domain, where the number of active fires serves as an indicator
variable for which task an agent should currently be pursuing. It is important to
note that while the FCount+Pos and FCountLocal+Pos abstractions have identical
inclusivity and very similar variance, the FCount+Pos abstraction has much higher
uniformity, and thus my framework predicts is the more desirable abstraction. The
FCountLocal+Pos abstraction’s uniformity is lower because the ODP’s information is
unevenly distributed across the abstraction space. For example, there are relatively few
states where there are four fires on one half of the grid, causing the ODP’s information
to be concentrated in the portion of the abstraction space corresponding to 0-2 active
fires in the agent’s half of the grid, and subsequently decreasing uniformity. In contrast,
the FCount+Pos abstraction more evenly distributes the ODP’s information, resulting
in higher uniformity.
Broadly, the task-delineated heuristic has theoretical foundations suggesting that
it leads to abstract influences with moderate inclusivity, high uniformity, and low
variance. Inclusivity is moderate because the abstraction allows the ODP to restrict the
task-level behaviors of the agents while still allowing information to generalize within
the scope of a single task (i.e., provides leeway for agents to use their local expertise
to most effectively complete their organizationally designated tasks, Section 4.1).
Uniformity is high and variance is low if appropriate tasks are identified that cluster
similar actions with similar incremental impacts.
Figure 5.10 shows the POp curves of these abstractions using the same evaluation
methodology as in Section 5.4, along with the local baseline and the best abstraction
from Section 5.4 (TCluster+Pos). ROp and COp curves for these abstractions are given
in Figure 5.11. Observe that the heuristically-recommended task-delineated abstrac-
tion (FCount+Pos) achieves essentially the same POp quality as the TCluster+Pos
abstraction, which is unsurprising given that the clustered system times essentially
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Figure 5.10: POp curves for task-delineated abstractions alongside bounding abstrac-
tions (TCluster+Pos and local baseline). Solid, dashed, and dotted curves correspond
to organizations constructed from perfect information, 2/3 information, and 1/3
information respectively.
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Abstraction Expected Organizational
Name Inclusivity Variance (10−3ROp, 103COp) Description of Θs Constructed from Abstraction
FCount 1
4
(3.48, 120) Number of active fires in a state maps to ∆ˆi.
FCountLocal 1
4
(2.26, 274)
Number of active fires on agent’s half of grid in a state maps
to ∆ˆi.
FCount +
Pos
1
200
(3.46, 0.11)
Number of active fires and agent’s position in a state,
together, map to ∆ˆi.
FCountLocal
+ Pos
1
200
(2.76, 0.18)
Number of active fires on agent’s half of grid and agent’s
position in a state, together, map to ∆ˆi.
Table 5.2: Descriptions of task-delineated abstractions. Uniformity for each abstraction relies on the specific Pareto charac-
terization, but typically decreases as agent computation becomes less costly. For completeness, I included the FCount and
FCountLocal abstractions despite my framework predicting that they have poor performance characteristics. I did not construct
PCluster variants because PCluster and Pos were qualitatively identical in the experiments in Section 5.4.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.11: ROp and COp curves for task-delineated abstractions alongside bounding abstractions (TCluster+Pos and local
baseline). Solid, dashed, and dotted curves correspond to organizations constructed from perfect information, 2/3 information,
and 1/3 information respectively.
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Figure 5.12: An example initial state with four fires and agents located initially
adjacent to each other. Darker cell shading indicates higher cell delays. Ai indicates
agent i’s location, and Fx indicates a fire with intensity x.
proxy for task-delineation. Notice, however, that because FCount+Pos has lower
variance, it is less sensitive to information availability effects (i.e., its three POp curves
for information quantities are nearly identical), and also exhibits fewer ODP search
sensitivities (i.e., the POp curves are smoother and monotonically increase over the
Pareto topology). As my framework predicts, the other abstractions’ high variance,
low uniformity, and/or high inclusivity make them suboptimal, which provides addi-
tional evidence for the framework’s effectiveness for analyzing influence abstraction
mechanisms.
Finally, it is worth recognizing that, in retrospect, my previous position-based
abstraction (Section 4.3.3) is essentially task-delineated for the version of the firefighting
domain with only two fires, and as my framework predicts, performed well. That is,
since each agent was expected to fight a single fire, there is a single task for each
agent.
5.6 Evaluation With Initially Adjacent Agents
To provide additional empirical evidence of the effectiveness of my abstract influence
techniques, in this section, I present results from a set of experiments where the agents
begin adjacent to each other in the center of the grid (those in Figure 5.12). As
described in Section 3.4 and demonstrated in Section 3.5.3, the initial configuration
of state can have significant impact on the effectiveness of the local baseline, since a
problem episode may have more or less opportunities for an organization to beneficially
influence the MAS. As such, the experiments in this section present a qualitatively-
distinct environment from the previous experiments in this chapter.
The experiments in this section follow the same parameterization and methodology
as in Section 5.4, except for the agents’ initial locations. Additionally, I did not
construct PCluster variants because PCluster and Pos were qualitatively identical in
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the experiments in Section 5.4. Figure 5.13 shows the POp curves for the organizations
in these experiments. Figures 5.14, 5.15, and 5.16 show the separate ROp and COp
curves for the organizations constructed from perfect information, 2/3 information,
and 1/3 information respectively.
Firstly, notice that, because there are greater opportunities for an organization to
improve the agents’ coordination (i.e., by differentiating agents’ task-level behaviors),
many of the organizations are able to achieve higher ROp than the baseline MAS in
these experiments (only when computation is inexpensive enough), while still having
lower COp. This result reiterates the observations about baseline performance from
Sections 3.4 and 3.5.3, and highlights the importance of evaluating an ODP technique
in both domains where the baseline is effective (e.g., there are few opportunities
for additional organization to improve coordination) and also where the baseline is
ineffective (e.g., additional organization is required to differentiate agents’ task-level
behaviors).
Secondly, my framework for analyzing the effectiveness of an influence abstrac-
tion mechanism (Section 5.4) correctly predicts organizational performance. High-
uniformity, moderate-inclusivity, low-variance abstraction mechanisms result in high-
performing organizations that smoothly and robustly follow the Pareto topology for
all of the ODP-information profiles.
Finally, observe that my task-delineated abstraction (FCount+Pos) remains a
sound choice, and achieves the best POp for the majority of the Pareto space (and is
nearly as good as the best otherwise), while smoothly and robustly following the Pareto
topology. A notable exception to FCount+Pos’s dominance of the other abstractions is
that the FCountLocal+Pos is a superior choice when the agents’ computational costs
are inexpensive (because it has higher uniformity for these Pareto conditions). For
the FCount+Pos abstraction, there are a more actions that are only Pareto-valuable
when computation is exceptionally inexpensive (e.g., as indicated by the distinct
inflection point for the FCount+Pos curve in Figure 5.14b), which inevitably get
distributed across the abstraction space, resulting in decreased uniformity. However,
the FCountLocal+Pos abstraction does not exhibit this property (e.g., has a smoother
derivative in Figure 5.14b), meaning that the set of Pareto-valuable actions is smaller,
and already included in the organization (resulting in higher uniformity). This
occurs because the state space is unevenly distributed across the FCountLocal+Pos
abstraction (i.e., there are few states with four fires on one side of the grid). While
this unevenness was detrimental in Section 5.5 when the agents began spread out
throughout the grid (since the fires agent i should fight could be in any direction from
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Figure 5.13: POp curves for each abstraction for different amounts of ODP information.
Solid, dashed, and dotted curves correspond to organizations constructed from perfect
information, 2/3 information, and 1/3 information respectively.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.14: ROp and COp curves for organizations constructed from perfect information.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.15: ROp and COp curves for organizations constructed from 2/3 information.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.16: ROp and COp curves for organizations constructed from 1/3 information.
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the agent), when agents begin in the center of the grid, the fires agent i should fight
are typically in a single direction.
5.7 Evaluation with Additional Agents
My experiments in this section utilize a version of the firefighting domain with:
a 10× 6 grid; 4 agents who begin at the locations in Figure 5.17; 8 fires, uniformly
distributed throughout the grid (without replacement), and initial intensity i.i.d.
uniformly randomly selected from {1, 2, 3}; no cell delays (i.e., movement actions are
deterministic); and a time horizon of 8.
To compute optimal joint policies for sampled problem episodes as part of com-
puting a quantitative description of organizational patterns (Section 4.2.2), my ODP
performed an additional layer of task abstraction using the options framework. Specif-
ically, to permit the ODP to compute optimal joint policies, it constructed options
that each correspond to a pair of agents (agents 1 and 2 were grouped together, as
were agents 3 and 4). The ODP constructed three options in a state for each pair of
agents, where each option is associated with a pair of fires to fight, and I embedded a
heuristic to inform the ODP of which pairs of fires should be translated into options.
The heuristic selects three fires corresponding to the: (a) closest fire to the first agent
i, (b) closest fire to the second agent j, and (c) fire with closest mean distance to the
pair of agents. The three options the ODP constructs for a pair of agents i and j are
then simply 〈Ai→(a), Aj →(b)〉, 〈Ai→(c), Aj →(b)〉, and 〈Ai→(a), Aj →(c)〉. To
break ties between equally-distant fires, the ODP selected the fire with the largest,
min-distance to another agent, which has the effect of prioritizing fires that are far
from the other agents. While this heuristic is not theoretically ensured to retain the
optimal joint policy, I hand-validated that it does in fact allow the ODP to compute
the optimal joint policy for ten problem episodes (out of the ten that I checked),
suggesting that the heuristic is at least sensible despite lacking theoretical guarantees.
For these experiments, I used the same methodology as in Section 5.4, and con-
structed a space of organizations over the same space of Pareto optimality parameters
(POp(Θ) = ROp(Θ)− 1bCOp(Θ)), for each abstraction (excluding the PCluster abstrac-
tions which were qualitatively identical to the Pos abstractions in prior experiments)
for the three available information profiles (300, 200, and 100 episode samples respec-
tively). Importantly, however, note that the space of possible agent interactions has
increased exponentially compared to Section 5.4, since there are additional agents
and additional fires to be fought. Thus, despite the ODP sampling the same number
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Figure 5.17: Example initial state in the four agent version of firefighting domain. Ai
is the position of agent i, and I = x indicates that there is a fire in that cell with
intensity x.
of episodes as in those experiments, its knowledge of the MAS’s interaction space
is significantly diminished (from 1.6 × 10−3% to 1.8 × 10−9% of the initial fire
configurations), to the point that its statistical estimates are no longer stable.
Figure 5.18 shows the POp curves for the organizations in these experiments.
Figures 5.19, 5.20, and 5.21 show the separate ROp and COp curves for the organi-
zations constructed from perfect information, 2/3 information, and 1/3 information
respectively.
Firstly, notice that in contrast to the experiments in Sections 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6
where additional information from more sample problems tended to degrade POp, in
the experiments here additional information almost universally results in organizations
with increased POp. This reflects the notion that despite sampling the same number
of episodes, the ODP effectively has much less information in these experiments,
and as it obtains additional information from more samples, the performance of the
organizations can increase substantially. Interestingly, the task-delineated abstractions
are exceptionally sensitive to this information deficit, which is caused by the information
from the sampled episodes being unevenly distributed across the abstraction space.
For example, there are relatively few states in the optimal joint policy trajectory where
there are 6-7 active fires (since agents fight fires in parallel), yet those states are ones
where influencing the agents into appropriate coordination is critical (so that redundant
efforts of agents pursuing the same fire can be preempted). Consequently, the ODP
has poor statistical estimates for how the MAS should act in these critical states,
and mis-applies organizational influences, resulting in poor performance compared to
Sections 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 (though the FCount+Pos abstraction is still the third best
abstraction).
The Time+Pos abstraction also exhibits interesting performance properties in
these experiments. In Sections 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6, the Time+Pos abstraction performed
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Figure 5.18: POp curves for each abstraction for different amounts of ODP information.
Solid, dashed, and dotted curves correspond to organizations constructed from perfect
information, 2/3 information, and 1/3 information respectively.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.19: ROp and COp curves for organizations constructed from perfect information.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.20: ROp and COp curves for organizations constructed from 2/3 information.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.21: ROp and COp curves for organizations constructed from 1/3 information.
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relatively poorly compared to the other abstraction choices (as a consequence of poor
uniformity); however, the Time+Pos abstraction is arguably the best abstraction
choice here (as a consequence of near perfect uniformity). Since the abstraction has
such low inclusivity, the ODP is essentially overfitting the organization to the episodes
that it sampled (which are identical to the test samples). In the previous experiments,
overfitting yielded poor results because of uncertainty about which action was optimal
for a specific location-time tuple (e.g., due to stochastic movement actions, and
overpopulation of the abstraction space). Here, however, overfitting evenly distributes
the information from the episode samples across the abstraction space, and comes
close to simply dictating optimal policies to the agents (which is possible because of
deterministic movements).
Finally, note that because of sub-par organizational performance, the local baseline
performs relatively well compared to the organizations my ODP creates (e.g., in
Figure 5.18). Moreover, there are many cases (when the agents’ computational costs
are not prohibitively expensive) where the MAS would be better off not using the
organization and instead fell back to its baseline model. Unfortunately, my ODP is not
designed to “realize what it doesn’t know,” so that it could (weakly-) dominate the
baseline system by not specifying detrimental influences constructed from error-prone
statistical estimates. I describe some initial thoughts for overcoming this issue more
in Section 6.2.1.
5.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, I contributed a formal, agent-driven theory of abstract organiza-
tional influences. I precisely defined abstract organizational influences, and formally
analyzed their dimensions in Section 5.2, before extending my existing automated
ODP techniques to incorporate abstract influences (that modify agents’ action spaces)
in Section 5.3. I empirically evaluated the impact that such abstract influences have on
both the ODP and resulting organizational performance in Sections 5.4, 5.6, and 5.7,
and found that abstractions with high uniformity, moderate inclusivity, and low
variance tend to reliably yield organizations that can smoothly follow the ROp, COp
Pareto topology. Finally, I identified that constructing a provably optimal abstrac-
tion is computationally infeasible, but formulated a heuristic abstraction mechanism
that decomposes the influence space into task-delineated segments, and validated the
heuristic’s effectiveness empirically (Sections 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7).
My formal definitions and framework for analyzing abstract influences contribute
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the first precise, systematic investigation of abstract organizational influences to the or-
ganizational reasoning community, whereas the field previously lacked a mathematical
understanding of how abstraction choice could impact the ODP and resulting outcomes.
Additionally, these contributions provide the Dec-MDP research community with a
theory of organizational abstractions that informs adoption of organizational tech-
niques in Dec-MDP frameworks. My task-delineated abstraction heuristic contributes
a theoretically-derived, empirically-validated (for influences that modify agents’ action
spaces) heuristic for identifying an effective influence abstraction, which provides the
organizational reasoning and Dec-MDP communities with an overarching strategy for
selecting an influence abstraction mechanism.
149
CHAPTER 6
Conclusion
The focus of this dissertation has been on the development of an agent-driven
approach to organization, where decisions about how to design and represent an
organization for a MAS stem from how the organization is expected to impact the
agents’ reasoning and behaviors. I begin in this chapter in Section 6.1 by summarizing
the contributions of my research, and then in Section 6.2 describe some open questions
that my research raises.
6.1 Summary of Contributions
In this section, I revisit my claimed contributions from Section 1.4, and provide
specific instances of where each is realized in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
6.1.1 Organizational Specification Language
In Chapter 3, I developed an agent-driven strategy for defining the organizational
design space.
 In Section 3.1, I defined an organizational influence as a modification to an
agent’s local decision problem, and an organization as a set of organizational
influences. After committing to a particular Dec-MDP based reasoning frame-
work for the agents’ decision processes, I then enumerated the ways in which
the agents’ models can be organizationally influenced to define the agent-driven
organizational specification language for this Dec-MDP based reasoning frame-
work. As is, my specification language contributes to Dec-MDP based reasoning
techniques since it provides a mathematically-sound approach for incorporat-
ing organizational reasoning techniques into the agents’ operational reasoning
processes.
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 In Section 3.1, I showed how the agents can natively understand and directly in-
corporate their organizational influences into their local decision problems, rather
than requiring additional middleware to translate an organizational specification
into unambiguous information that agents can act upon. In doing so I also
defined the semantics of organizational influences associated with modifications
to each construct of the agents’ modeling representation, which systematically
defines the organizational design space for the Dec-MDP based framework I
adopted. This agent-driven definition of the organizational design space con-
tributes to the body of organizational reasoning techniques, and provides a
well-defined, systematic method for understanding how an organization can
relate to a MAS given the agents’ reasoning frameworks, whereas prior research
(Section 2.2) only informally understood this relationship.
 In Section 3.2, I leveraged the mathematical foundations of the agents’ decision
frameworks to formally analyze the theoretical properties of my organizational
specification language. I proved that the number of expressible organizational
designs in my specification language (with distinct impact on the MAS’s joint pol-
icy) is O(|pi|!), where |pi| is the cardinality of the joint policy space. Additionally,
I proved that my specification language is both necessary and complete for the
Dec-MDP based reasoning framework I have adopted. This analysis contributes
a mathematical characterization of the organizational design space, and pro-
vides the Dec-MDP research community with theoretically-sound, agent-driven
organizational specification language. Moreover, my analytical methodology
contributes a general, agent-driven strategy for analyzing the theoretical prop-
erties of organizational specification languages to the organizational reasoning
community.
 In Section 3.5, I empirically demonstrated the effectiveness of specifying influ-
ences in each of the constructs of my organizational specification language. In
that evaluation, I was able to hand-specify organizations that impart effective
coordination patterns on a MAS, which illustrates the practical applicability
(beyond the theoretical capability) of deploying of my agent-driven approach for
specifying an organization. These experiments (along with my other empirical
experiments throughout this dissertation) contribute evidence of my agent-driven
approach’s practical effectiveness to the organizational reasoning community,
and also contribute an illustration of the potential benefits of organizational
techniques to the Dec-MDP research community.
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6.1.2 Organizational Performance Metrics
In Chapter 3, I used my agent-driven approach to construct principled metrics
of organizational performance based on how the MAS is expected to perform when
conforming to the organization, and used these metrics to formulate a well-defined
organizational design problem.
 In Section 3.3, I leveraged the agents’ reasoning framework to define the perfor-
mance of an organization in terms of the MAS’s joint reward and the agents’
computational costs when conforming to the organization, and framed a well-
defined organizational design problem from these metrics. My agent-driven
definition of the organizational design problem contributes to the body of organi-
zational reasoning techniques, and provides a formal, mathematical foundation
for selecting between alternative organizations. Moreover, my problem for-
mulation establishes the basis for computational ODP techniques that create
an organization from first-principles (e.g., like I develop in later chapters), in
contrast to prior research that relies on an expert human to identify appro-
priate organizational constructs (e.g., Section 2.2.2) that may subsequently be
configured/adapted (e.g., Section 2.2.4).
 In Section 3.4, I systematically formulated of a baseline MAS against which to
compare organizational performance by constructing an aligned-but-uninformed
MAS. This methodology for constructing a baseline organization contributes
a performance benchmark to the organizational research community that can
be used to evaluate the effectiveness of an ODP technique to identify beneficial
organizational influences.
6.1.3 Automated Organizational Design
In Chapter 4, I developed an agent-driven strategy for automated organizational
design, and implemented that strategy to create a computational ODP for the Dec-
MDP I have adopted throughout this dissertation. Also in Chapter 4, I discussed how
to extend my ODP implementation to explicitly consider the agents’ metareasoning
regime. Then, in Chapter 5, I constructed a formal, agent-driven theory of abstract
organizational influences, and showed how to extend my ODP techniques to abstract
influences.
 In Section 4.2.1, I contributed a general-purpose, agent-driven methodology for
constructing a computational ODP consisting of three stages, namely: com-
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pute a quantitative description of organizational patterns; select organizational
influences; and influence agent decision making. First, the ODP computes a
quantitative description of organizational patterns, which serves to inform the
ODP of which joint interactions are worthwhile for the MAS to pursue. Second,
the ODP selects organizational influences by identifying patterns in its quantita-
tive description of organizational patterns. Third, the agent’s incorporate their
organizational influences and solve for their local policies as previously described
(Chapter 3).
 In Section 4.3, I showed how to extend my ODP representations and algorithms
to explicitly reason about and balance the Pareto tradeoff between the agents’
computational costs (COp) and the quality of their joint policy (ROp). Also in
that section, I developed techniques for efficiently estimating the incremental
impact (both to the agents’ computational costs and quality of their joint
policy) of an organizational influence, and embedded those computations in
a parameterized, incremental search algorithm to create an organization that
imparts the approximately optimal metareasoning regime upon the MAS. My
problem formulation and resulting algorithm contribute the first ODP techniques
that intentionally, explicitly optimize the metareasoning regime imparted on a
MAS by an organization.
 In Chapter 5, I formulated a framework for analyzing the effects of alternative
abstract organizational influences, and showed how to extend my agent-driven
techniques to incorporate an abstraction mechanism. This framework contributes
the first in-depth study of the effects of alternative abstraction choices both
on the organizational design process and on the MAS’s performance using
the designed organizations. Moreover, my results in this section contribute a
systematic understanding of how to design and/or choose from among influence
abstraction mechanisms, namely to employ an abstraction with high uniformity,
moderate inclusivity, and low variance.
 In Sections 4.2.5, 4.3.3, 5, and 5.7, I performed empirical evaluations of my ODP
techniques, and found that my ODP implementation is able to construct effective
organizations for the MAS that: (approximately-) optimize the metareasoning
regime imparted by the organization; utilize abstract organizational influences;
and scale to complex MASs even when the ODP’s domain information is dimin-
ished. Individually, these experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of my ODP
techniques to cope with the associated challenges of the respective sections (e.g.,
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metareasoning, abstractions, and scaling). Moreover, together these experiments
contribute compelling evidence for the efficacy of my automated ODP techniques
as well as my agent-driven approach to organizations in MASs more broadly.
6.1.4 Influence Selection Heuristics
In Chapters 4 and 5, I identified heuristics for guiding a human in designing an
effective organization for a MAS and also for guiding usage of my automated ODP.
 In Section 4.1, I analyzed the organizational design space to identify that a
well-designed organization should influence only the factors of agents models
that are associated with agent interactions, which for the Dec-MDP-based agents
I employ corresponds to factors stemming from reward-/transition-dependencies.
My empirical evaluation of this heuristic confirms its effectiveness, especially in
MASs where the agents possess local expertise that is imprecisely modeled by the
ODP. As such, this heuristic contributes an overarching strategy for focusing an
ODP’s efforts on the aspects of organizational design where it can best contribute
to the MAS’s performance, namely on influencing the agents into coordinated
patterns of joint interactions rather than attempting to micromanage the details
of how the agents’ achieve their respective portions of those joint interactions.
 In Section 5.5, I used my influence abstraction framework to identify task-
delineated abstractions as a heuristic for selecting an effective influence abstrac-
tion for the ODP, since it tends to result in abstractions with high uniformity,
moderate inclusivity, and low variance. I empirically evaluated this heuristic,
and found that it led the ODP to robustly construct effective organizations
that smoothly follow the Pareto topology. This heuristic contributes not only a
tool for guiding selection of a significant parameter of my ODP techniques (i.e.,
choice of abstraction mechanism), but also a broader strategy for an ODP to
efficiently reason about abstracting organizational influences.
6.2 Open Questions
My work in this dissertation has focused on developing core representations and
algorithms for an agent-driven approach to organizational reasoning. Unsurprisingly,
however, there are several other challenging aspects of the organizational design
problem (both identified from prior organizational reasoning research as well as
uncovered by my work here) that could be interesting directions for further study.
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6.2.1 Organizationally Adept Agents
Recalling from Section 2.2.4, the premise of organizationally adept agents (OAAs)
is that the agents explicitly make adaptations to their organization because they are
aware of the broader context of how their organization is expected to relate to the MAS.
This is accomplished via including annotations in the organizational specification,
where an annotation provides second-order information about the context of the
organizational influences. The agents can monitor the environment as they experience
it, and compare their actual experiences to the expected context for which their
organizational influences were designed. If there is a mismatch, then the agents can
use the annotations as a springboard from which to adapt their organization, for
example dropping influences whose expectations are not being met in the environment,
altering influences whose expectations are close but not perfect, and/or adding new
influences to better match actual environmental conditions.
Stepping back, OAAs provide an elegant solution for dealing with uncertainty
and/or information deficiencies in my agent-driven organizational reasoning techniques.
For example, in the experiments in Section 5.7 where organizations were constructed
from insufficient information, the MAS would have been better off by not using some
of the organizational influences and instead had fallen back to the local baseline. If
the agents in the MAS were organizationally adept, they could recognize that the
expectations on which their organizational influences were based were not being met,
and adapt their organization as appropriate (e.g., ignore unjustified influences).
Another perspective on these ideas is to provide the OAAs with several alternative
organizations (e.g., sub-organizations each tailored for a specific subset of problem
episodes the MAS could encounter), and empower the OAAs to multiplex among
these alternatives. This perspective could be used, for example, as a concession to
uncertainty about the distribution of problem episodes the MAS will experience.
In the remainder of this section, I perform some initial experiments to illustrate
that my agent-driven approach is amenable to OAA techniques. To perform these
experiments, I use the 10-agent firefighting domain described in Section 3.5.3 and
consider two different models of how fires arise: having an increasingly higher proba-
bility of arising toward the east end of the grid; and having an increasingly higher
probability of arising toward the west end. Note that the optimal organizational
influences are significantly different between the two environments; in the eastEnvi-
ronment the organization should designate more agents to the eastern region (and
vice versa for the westEnvironment). I hand-designed a specialized organization for
each case, which are analogous to fullOrg from Section 3.5.3 except that the primary
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Figure 6.1: Illustration of the westOrg.
areas of responsibility (PARs) are non-uniformly sized to compensate for the biased
fire distributions. For example, in the westOrg (Figure 6.1), 3 agents are responsible
for the western 4 columns (4×3, 4×4, and 4×3 PARs). Working eastward, the PARs
get progressively larger, starting with two 4×5 PARs (stacked vertically), then two
5×5 PARs, then two 6×5 PARs. Finally, a lone agent is responsible for the eastern
edge with a 5×10 PAR. The eastOrg is a symmetric copy of the westOrg. Associated
with each organization is a set of annotations informing each agent that the ODP
(which was me in this case) expected one fire, on average, to be in its PAR (for that
organization).
I provided the agents with both of these annotated organizations, in addition to an
annotated fullOrg, which has uniformly sized and evenly distributed PARs. As such,
the fullOrg is not intended to perform well for either environmental parameterization,
but should be mediocre in both environments. The agents all initially adopt (based on
the ODP’s directives) fullOrg, to reflect the ODP’s uncertainty about the environment.
As episodes are experienced, the agents monitor the number of fires that are located
in their respective PARs. They then jointly aggregate this observational evidence, e,
and perform Bayesian inference to calculate the likelihoods that each of the possible
expected environments (as captured within the annotations) is the actual environment
being observed, which are used to estimate the expected reward of following each
available organization. The agents then collectively and greedily adopt the organization
with the highest anticipated expected reward. Formally, they adopt Θ˜ as follows:
Θ˜ = arg max
Θ
E[POp |Θ, e]− c(Θc,Θ)
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E[POp |Θ, e] =
∑
j
Pr(Mj|e)E[POp |Θ,Mj]
where c(Θc,Θ) is the cost of switching from the current organization Θc to Θ, and
serves to temper the agents’ adaptations. I assume there is no cost for remaining in
the same organization, ∀i c(Θi,Θi) = 0. Pr(Mj|e) is the likelihood of environmental
model Mj being the actual model given e, which the agents calculate via Bayesian
inference. E[POp|Θ,Mj] is the expected performance of following organization Θ in
Mj , which I assume is provided by the ODP in the annotations. For these experiments,
I estimated E[POp |Θ,Mj] by a priori simulating Θ on a training set of episodes
created from Mj, and POp = ROp (i.e., metareasoning concerns are ignored).
My experiments present the agents with episode batches where the true environment
model, M∗, is selected uniformly randomly from the two environments every 20
episodes (all organizations face the same episodes in the same order). The agents are
allowed to collectively adopt whichever organization they deem best at the beginning
of each episode before they observe the initial state. Since M∗ is dynamic, I allow
the ODP to set a decay rate in the annotations, which the agents use to decay the
importance of their past observations of how many fires were in their PARs. I evaluated
several organizations on this problem set: statically using the east/west/fullOrg for
every episode; and several parameter settings of the OAA process described above.
OAAX refers to the OAA process above where the organizational switching cost is X.
My results are summarized in Figure 6.2, which confirms several intuitions. Firstly,
statically following either specialized organization is generally undesirable since they
perform poorly when used in the environment they were not intended for (i.e., using
the westOrg in the eastEnvironment); however, statically following fullOrg makes a
significant improvement since it is weakly suited to both environments. Secondly,
by allowing the agents to react to the shifting environment, the OAA capability (in
general) can yield a large performance gain. Finally, if the organizational switching
cost is low, the agents should maintain sufficient observational evidence history in
order to prevent the agents from switching organizations due to a transient episode,
such as when an episode from the eastEnvironment happens to “look” like an episode
from the westEnvironment due to unlikely fire locations.
These results provide an initial demonstration that my agent-driven approach is
extensible to OAAs, but leave many questions unanswered. Most significantly, how
does an ODP create annotations to accompany its organizational influences (which
was done by hand in my experiments above)? In principle, my ODP has an extensive
number of expectations about the domain and/or agents, for example, as captured
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Figure 6.2: Expected reward vs. the observational evidence decay rate.
in its quantitative description of organizational patterns (Section 4.2.2); however,
providing this full set of expectations as annotations seems at best excessive or at worst
counterproductive (e.g., could lead agents to fixate on less significant expectations with
little practical importance). An open challenge is thus identifying a subset of (possibly
abstract) organizational annotations that summarize the significant expectations upon
which the organization is vitally dependent.
Another significant challenge is how to maintain organizational consistency across
the OAAs as they adapt their organization (I forced agents to make collective adap-
tations in my experiments above). Organizations are constructed to be utilized as a
whole (i.e., the influences to the various agents are codependent), and unilateral OAA
adaptations may result in mismatched influences with poor aggregate operational
performance. Further, it is not known under which conditions locally-motivated orga-
nizational adaptations will converge (assuming a stationary distribution of episodes),
or the speed of such a convergence (should it exist). As such a possible direction
for future research would be to develop strategies for decentralized organizational
adaptations that ensure the currently adopted organization is internally consistent.
6.2.2 Other Influence Mechanisms
My organizational specification language (Section 3.1) identifies that each of the
constructs in the agents’ decision making framework could be used as a lever for
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influencing the agents. Throughout this dissertation, I have performed empirical
experiments with:
 Hand-identified influences to the agents’ state factors, action spaces, transition
function factors, and reward function factors in Sections 3.5 and 4.1.
 Influences identified by my automated ODP (without regard to metareasoning
and/or abstraction concerns) to the agents’ state factors, action spaces, and
transition function factors in Section 4.2.
 Influences identified by my automated ODP (accounting for metareasoning
and/or abstraction concerns) to the agents’ action spaces in Section 4.3 and
Chapter 5.
As mentioned in the respective sections, I did not evaluate influences to the
agents’ initial state distribution factors and/or time horizon because they are generally
inappropriate for the firefighting domain. An open question, in this regard, is if there
are domains where influences to these factors have practical significance.
I did not evaluate influences that modify agents’ reward function factors with my
automated ODP techniques, because as I identified in Section 3.5, reward influences
do not have the capacity to affect the agents’ computational costs (COp). Thus,
when considering the ODP in the context of metareasoning issues, reward influences
are a less interesting mechanism to study. As mentioned in Section 4.2.3, however,
reward influences could be a useful fallback mechanism if the ODP cannot formulate
hard-constraint influences (i.e., states, actions, and transitions).
A more significant open challenge is extending my automated ODP techniques to
create influences to factors other than the agents’ action spaces, while still accounting
for metareasoning and abstraction concerns. As mentioned in Section 4.3, I elected to
focus on influences to the agents action spaces because these types of influences are
well studied in prior research and have efficiently-computable impact on the agents’
local decision problems. However, as illustrated with my hand-designed influences
(Sections 3.5 and 4.1) and when the ODP neglected metareasoning/abstraction concerns
(Section 4.2), influences to the other components of the agents’ decision problems can
also be effective, and moreover provide additional expressive power for organizationally
influencing the MAS (as shown in Appendix A). The primary difficulty in creating
influences to the transition and state (accounting for metareasoning/abstraction) is
that the impact of these influences to the agents’ decision problem can be far reaching,
rather than with limited scope as in action influences. For example, an influence to
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remove ai from consideration in s
t
i is created because ai is not a Pareto-valuable action
for agent i to consider, and the ODP can compute the influence’s impact by directly
examining agent i’s policy at sti. In contrast, an influence to alter Pi(f
t+1
k |sti, ai) is
created because the ODP wants to change agent i’s local policy, potentially at various
states, at various decision points (e.g., at st−1i , s
0
i , etc.), and thus the ODP cannot
directly compute the influence’s impact by directly examining the i’s policy at a single
state but rather must examine the policy more broadly. As a result, computing the
∆i · dCOpdΘj (Θj) and ∆i · dROpdΘj (Θj) terms of Equation 4.2 is complex.
Another aspect of my specification language that I have not explored is the
ability to create new state factors within the agents’ local representations; rather, my
experiments dealt only with constraining the agents’ existing state factors. Intuitively,
however, the capability to add new state factors to an agent’s model is incredibly
powerful as an organizational influence mechanism. For example, consider an influence
that adds a new state factor to agent i’s model that represents which task (from
among a set of organizationally provided tasks) i is currently pursuing. Such a state
factor is related to my task-delineated abstraction heuristic, but because it would be
explicitly represented in i’s state representation, the agent could use it while solving
its decision problem and coordinating with other agents (as opposed to being simply
a reasoning mechanism for the ODP). As another example, consider an influence
that adds a new state factor to multiple agents’ representations to serve as a sentinel
flag for coordinating operational decisions. This type of state factor could allow the
ODP to directly inform the MAS of which non-local information is critical to joint
performance. Unsurprisingly, creating new state factors is an exceptionally challenging
problem both since the space of possible factors is intractably large (i.e., infinite) and
the expected impact of adding a new state factor is challenging to compute. As such,
developing bounds on new state factors that are worth the ODP’s consideration and/or
heuristics for selecting from among viable candidate factors would be important topics
for pursing this direction in future work.
6.2.3 Biasing the ODP’s Statistics to Encourage Patterns
A somewhat subtle artifact of my ODP methodology is that not only does my
ODP’s effectiveness depend on the existence of interaction patterns within the problem
episodes it samples (which intuitively is necessary for any ODP), but those patterns
must be consistently expressed the same way in order for the ODP to have good
statistical information. For example, in the firefighting domain, the agents’ movements
throughout the grid to a fire could arbitrarily follow any Manhattan path (assuming
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equally restrictive cell delays). If the ODP’s policy solver arbitrarily decided among
these alternatives for each episode sample, then the ODP’s statistical estimates would
be inconsistent, and essentially devalue the ODP’s view of how important it is for the
agent to fight that fire. Another example of this is if two agents are exact replicas
(e.g., in the firefighting domain, if they begin in the same initial location with the
same local model like in the clustered variant of experiments in Section 3.5.3), where
the ODP could arbitrarily allocate a fire to either of those agents. More generally,
this effect occurs if the ODP’s policy solver arbitrarily breaks ties between equally
good policies.
I have identified four fundamental ways for overcoming this issue, which I describe
now.
 Break ties in a consistent fashion. That is, rather than break ties arbitrarily, the
ODP’s policy solving process (i.e., as part of computing a quantitative description
of organizational patterns in Section 4.2.2) can consistently break ties in the
same way. For some policy solving algorithms (e.g., value-iteration), this solution
is straightforward, but for others (e.g., the linear program representation I use,
Equation 2.4) would require comprehensive knowledge of the solution technique.
Of course, this solution also implies that the interaction patterns that the ODP
eventually identifies will be biased by whatever tie-breaking procedure is selected.
 Prevent ties by making policies distinctly valued. If ties between equally good
policies are impossible (or exceedingly unlikely), then this issue is insignificant.
Throughout this dissertation, my experiments have tended to adopt this solution
when possible to avoid confounding results. For example, stochastic cell delays
decrease the likelihood of equally viable Manhattan paths, and having the agents
begin adjacent to each other (but not stacked) differentiates the optimal joint
policy. However, naturally this solution is not generally applicable to all domains.
 Use abstractions such that the statistical information from all alternative policies
maps to the same part of the abstraction space. For example, in Chapter 5, the
issue of alternative Manhattan paths to a fire is less significant if the agent’s
location does not contribute to the abstraction mechanism (although could still
matter to an extent because of system time, for example). This solution is
broadly applicable to all domains and policy solving algorithms, but could result
in an abstraction mechanism with other undesirable characteristics (e.g., poor
uniformity).
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 Iteratively construct an organizational design, where the organizational patterns
identified from earlier sampled episodes bias the policy solver for subsequent
samples. For example, if the agent’s policy in an earlier episode took a Manhattan
path that goes north then east, the policy solver could be biased to take
Manhattan paths that go north before east in subsequent samples. This solution
is also general purpose, and moreover has theoretical basis in experience-driven
organizational techniques (Section 2.2.3). An open challenge, however, is how to
temper the reinforcement process so that the ODP can avoid getting trapped in
local optima based on its early samples.
6.2.4 Advanced Statistical Representations and Abstraction Choice
Throughout this dissertation, I computed the impact of an organizational influ-
ence by taking the expectation, which carries an implicit assumption of a uni-modal
distribution. However, as mentioned in Section 5.4.3, with abstract influences it is
possible for an ODP to be reasoning about multimodal distributions, which funda-
mentally violates the assumptions of my primitive statistical representation, and as
a consequence, results in the ODP mis-applying influences. An open challenge is to
develop a strategy for identifying an appropriate statistical representation in response
to the information the ODP needs to model, as well as to extend the ODP’s search
algorithm to reason appropriately with the more advanced statistics.
Stepping back, the statistical representation problem above is but one manifestation
of a more fundamental question of how to best represent and compose the ODP’s
limited information. That is, the information the ODP possesses should be used to
guide both the choice of influence abstraction mechanism as well as the underlying
statistical representation. For example, in Section 5.7, I identified that my task-
delineated abstraction mechanism did not evenly distribute the ODP’s information
across the abstraction space for the four agent domain, and as a result the ODP mis-
identified influences at critical points of the agents’ decision problems. A comprehensive
solution to these issues, however, could dynamically adapt the ODP’s abstraction
mechanism in response to the information it obtains from each sampled episode, so as
to avoid over-/under-populating any portion of the abstraction space. A challenge,
however, is efficiently determining the best abstraction from among the intractably
many alternatives.
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6.2.5 Relaxing the Restrictions to Organizational Influence Mappings
Throughout this dissertation, I limited my discussions to organizational influences
with many-to-one mappings, and the ODP specified influences using a single abstraction
mechanism for the entire organization. That is, an (abstract) organizational influence
could modify agent i’s local model at several sti × ai × st+1i tuples, but any specific
sti × ai × st+1i tuple could only be modified by a single organizational influence.
More generally, an organization could consist of influences with different abstrac-
tions, for example corresponding to the amount of information the ODP has about
that section of the influence space as just described in Section 6.2.4. Even more
generally, an organization could consist of hierarchical influences, where for example
the influences at the top level of the hierarchy map to every state and broadly modify
the agents’ reasoning to align with organizational objectives, and influences at the
bottom level of the hierarchy map to singular states and rigidly modify the agents’
reasoning to ensure effective coordination at critical junctures. This type of hierarchi-
cal influence specification is closely related to how organizational modeling languages
specify organizations (Section 2.2.2).
Extending the agents’ reasoning mechanisms to permit hierarchical specifications
of organizational influences seems rather straightforward (indeed abstract influences do
not provide additional expressive power in the organizational specification language),
although some edge cases merit further consideration. For example, should all the
layers in a hierarchical influence specification have their modifications applied to
the agents’ models (assuming they are compatible with each other), or just the
bottom-most layer, or perhaps just some of the layers? Additionally, how should the
agents respond if the layers contain conflicting influences (supposing such conflicts are
permitted)? Arguably, such decisions could be made by the ODP and included as part
of organizational specification (at the expense of further complicating the ODP). The
larger challenges to relaxing the restrictions of influence mappings lie on the ODP
side, where the flexibility to consider influences within the context of multiple and/or
arbitrary abstraction mechanisms could greatly increase the computational complexity
of the ODP.
6.2.6 Scaling the ODP
I have identified five dimensions, corresponding to Properties 1.1– 1.5 respectively,
that intuitively could stress the ODP techniques I have developed in this dissertation:
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Number of Agents. Increasing the number of agents in the MAS increases the
number of possible coordination patterns that an ODP must consider. Additionally,
those patterns could contain more agents, which could make the patterns more complex.
This dimension’s impact on my ODP can be seen empirically in Section 5.7.
As previously shown in Section 4.3.2.3, the complexity of Algorithm 4.2 is
O
(|∆i|2 (|Ssuccessori |+ |A||S|) + |Ai||Si|n)
which depends on the number of agents (n) both directly and indirectly (since the size
of the influence space is linear in the number of agents). The |Ai||Si|n term reflects
the computational complexity for the ODP to compute the optimal joint policy for
a sampled problem instance (as described in Section 4.2.2), and presents a serious
challenge in scaling my ODP implementation. For example, state of the art Dec-
(PO)MDP research (see Section 2.1.4) often evaluates algorithms in domains with only
two or three agents and short time horizons (i.e., < 10) due to the general intractability
of the reasoning framework. As such, scaling this portion of my ODP algorithm up
beyond a few agents is theoretically intractable for Dec-MDP based agents, unless
additional assumptions about problem structure are made (e.g., coordination locales
or specific forms of inter-agent dependencies). In the experiments in Section 5.7, I
scale the firefighting domain to four agents, which is the largest system for which I
could solve a problem episode for the optimal joint policy.
Stepping back, however, computing joint policies for sampled problem episodes is
a particular implementation of my more general ODP methodology for computing a
quantitative description of organizational patterns. As mentioned in Section 4.2.1, if
a quantitative description of organizational patterns can be obtained from some other
source (e.g., an external expert or the agents themselves), then the other stages of
my ODP can use those provided statistics instead of the ODP computing them itself.
Examining the theoretical scaling capabilities of my ODP for the other stages, we
see that the ODP’s organizational search costs scale quadratically in the number of
agents, at least for the greedy hill-climbing search (Algorithm 4.2).
Beyond the ODP’s computational costs, it is also important that the ODP continue
to produce organizations that perform well, even for larger MASs. Unsurprisingly, the
quality of an organization is determined by a myriad of factors besides the number of
agents, and cannot be formally disentangled without making further (unreasonable)
assumptions about the domain (e.g., the degree and form of inter-agent dependencies).
To provide a high-level intuition, however, larger MASs present the possibility of larger
164
and/or more complex coordination patterns, which could stress an ODP’s ability to
identify appropriate organizational influences. Along these same lines, the larger space
of joint interactions also stresses the ODP’s limited information (e.g., for computing
a quantitative description of organizational patterns), since information is dispersed
across a larger space of influences, and moreover, a fixed episode sample size represents
a smaller subset of the possible coordination patterns the MAS could exhibit.
MAS Iterdependencies. Tighter coupling among agents increases the importance
of correctly identifying interaction patterns and/or makes those patterns more complex.
This dimension’s impact on my ODP can be seen, for example, in the experiments from
Section 5.6, where the agents beginning adjacent to each other increases the effective
interdependency between them. Thus, as shown in those experiments, my ODP seems
robust in this scaling dimension, and if anything creates organizations with larger
benefit to the MAS as the MAS becomes more interdependent. Recognize, however,
that these improvements could be the result of simply having more opportunities for
organizing the MAS, and my ODP is actually scaling poorly in this dimension (i.e.,
a decreasing percentage relative to the optimal organization) despite an increase in
absolute effectiveness. Thus, further investigation is necessary to definitively determine
how my ODP scales in terms of the MAS’s interdependencies.
Information Deficiencies. With less information, the ODP cannot correctly influ-
ence the MAS as aggressively, and must instead rely on the agents to appropriately
exercise their local expertise. This dimension’s impact on my ODP can be seen, for
example, in the experiments from Section 4.1 where the ODP’s model was smoothed,
and/or experiments from Section 4.3 where the ODP had fewer sample episodes from
which to compute a quantitative description of organizational patterns. As shown in
those experiments, by following my organizational design principle of only influencing
the agents’ interaction patterns, and using a task-delineated abstraction mechanism,
my ODP is relatively robust to information deficiencies. Although, as shown in
Section 5.7, the ODP becomes susceptible to mis-applying influences when it has
severely insufficient information. It is challenging to formally disentangle exactly how
information deficiencies affect the quality of the organizations the ODP creates; how-
ever, at a high level, information deficiencies degrade the ODP’s statistical estimates
of how the agents should act. At certain thresholds (that depend on the domain),
these data errors lead the ODP to mis-identify which influences are appropriate for
the MAS, and can result in an under-performing, even detrimental, organization.
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Coordination Overhead. As the agents are increasingly unable to coordinate their
local policies operationally, an ODP must compensate by providing an organization to
influence the agents into effective coordination patterns. Recalling my experimental
methodology described in Section 3.5.1, throughout my experiments, I have forced
all coordination to stem from the organization rather than permit the agents to
coordinate their local polices with operational reasoning. As such, my empirical results
throughout this dissertation already reflect the worst case of this scaling dimension.
Temporal Scope of the Organization. To create an equally performing organi-
zation but over a more diverse set of problem episodes, the ODP must identify either
broader organizational influences or a larger set of narrow influences. This dimen-
sion’s impact on my ODP can be seen across the empirical results throughout this
dissertation; for example, as the chapters progressed, I intentionally added addition
parameters and complexity to the firefighting domain (e.g., stochastic cell delays,
additional fires, and more agents). As the results in the respective sections show, my
ODP is able to adapt to a more diverse space of problem episodes.
6.2.7 Open Systems
As discussed in Section 2.2.2, organizations (especially from a problem-driven
approach) are often viewed as part of an open system, where agents can join and
leave the organization at their will, but the organization remains comparatively static.
Since my agent-driven approach leverages the agents’ decision models as a basis for
organizational reasoning, open systems are a somewhat unnatural premise in my
approach, unless another agent with the same capabilities can be recruited to directly
substitute for an agent that leaves the organization. While that assumption could be
reasonable in some domains (e.g., with homogenous agents), in other domains (e.g.,
with heterogeneous agents and finely tuned local expertise) such direct substitutions
may not be feasible. Of course, the ODP could redesign an organization for the
new MAS every time agents come and go, but doing so could be computationally
demanding and/or excessive, especially if the net change to the organization from
different agents is small. The challenge, thus, is to develop efficient techniques for
designing an organization for a MAS, given an existing organization for a similar MAS,
and resembles the transfer learning problem (Pan & Yang, 2010). Alternatively, the
ODP could assume agents are OAAs, and so will adapt their organizational roles to
fit their local expertise, in which case the challenge is for the ODP to identify and
account for such adaptations.
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Formal Proofs of Specification Language Necessity
In this appendix, I provide formal proofs for the necessity of each construct in my
organizational specification language (Section 3.1) as well as briefly discuss how each
construct has been used in previous work to influence agents in a MAS.
Rewards. As discussed in Section 2.2.5, the idea of influencing reward functions is
well studied in prior operational reasoning research. By influencing an agent’s reward
function, the organization provides extra incentive for the agent to execute actions
that are expected to positively contribute to collective MAS performance (and vice
versa for disincentives). In the firefighting domain, for example, an agent could have
a reward associated with being located within a certain region of responsibility. As
another example, reward influences can be used to lead an agent to establish conditions
that have low uninfluenced local reward, but that enable other agents to then take
actions that lead to high joint reward.
Theorem A.1. Organizational influences to reward factors are a necessary specifica-
tion language construct for the Dec-MDP framework I have adopted.
Proof. By Exhaustion. Assume that agent i’s local reward function is constant for
all conditions, that is, ∀sti, st+1i ∈ Si,∀ai ∈ Ai, Ri(sti, ai, st+1i ) = c for some constant c.
This implies agent i’s Q-values are invariant with respect to the topology of agent i’s
transition function, and more precisely that ∀sti,∈ Si,∀ai ∈ Ai, Qpii (sti, ai) = c · (Ti− t).
Now suppose that an ODP wants to reprioritize agent i’s local policy space (to an
organizationally desired total-ordering) but without adding or removing any policies
from agent i’s consideration. This could occur, for example, if the ODP knows that,
given the influence abstraction mechanism it is using, agent i needs to be able to
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consider both action ai and a
′
i in the set of states that ∆ˆi will map to. This type
of influence cannot be expressed by modifications to agent i’s state factors, actions,
initial state distribution factors, or time horizon, because those types of modifications
will alter the space of policies agent i considers. Additionally, modifying agent i’s
transition factors will not affect its policy because its Q-values are invariant to its
transition function. The only remaining construct for expressing this influence is
modifying agent i’s reward factors, and indeed modifying agent i’s rewards will impact
its Q-values and subsequently re-prioritize its local policy space without adding or
removing any policies from consideration.
Transitions. Researchers have also identified how influences to an agent’s local
transition function can be a powerful tool for guiding agent policies (Section 2.1.4.1).
By informing an agent of the expected non-local effects on its local model, the agent
can create a local policy that accounts for the actions of the other agents. For example
in the firefighting domain, an agent could be informed that fires will (probabilistically)
be extinguished at certain times without the agent fighting them. This is due to other
agents’ efforts; however, the means of extinguishing, or even existence of other agents,
need not be specified.
Theorem A.2. Organizational influences to transition factors are a necessary specifi-
cation language construct for the Dec-MDP framework I have adopted.
Proof. By Exhaustion. Assume that, given the organization an ODP has identified,
agent j stochastically exerts a non-local effect on agent i’s local state space. As a
consequence of this non-local effect, suppose agent i should prefer local policy pii over
local policy pi′i, for example, because pii establishes necessary preconditions for agent
i to capitalize on the non-local effect if it should occur. Further, assume that given
the influence abstraction mechanism the ODP is using, the ODP does not want to
use ∆ˆi to directly prevent any of the actions of agent i, because those actions are
Pareto-valuable over the space of states that ∆ˆi maps to. In addition to actions, this
type of influence cannot be expressed by modifications to agent i’s state factors, initial
state distribution factors, or time horizon, because those types of modifications cannot
provide agent i with information about the non-local effect’s transition dynamics. A
∆ˆi that modifies agent i’s reward factors could potentially induce agent i to prefer
pii over pi
′
i; however, if we additionally assume the ODP has imprecise knowledge of
the agent’s local rewards (Property 1.3), the ODP cannot use influences to reward
factors to ensure agent i prefers pii without overwriting i’s local expertise, which
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I have demonstrated as undesirable (Section 4.1). The only remaining construct
for expressing this influence is modifying agent i’s transition factors, and indeed,
modifying the transition function factors can inform agent i of these non-local effects,
and lead agent i to prefer pii over pi
′
i.
Actions. Like reward and transition influences, influences to an agent’s action space
are also a familiar approach in the literature (e.g., see Sections 2.2.2, 2.2.4, and 2.2.5).
The idea of action influences is to restrict the actions an agent can consider, for
example, an organizational designer might associate different roles with different
agents and thus induce agents to specialize in the possible actions they will exercise.
Chosen well, such restrictions not only help agents pursue complementary policies,
but simplify planning for each (Section 4.3). For example, in the firefighting domain,
an agent might be assigned a region of responsibility, and thus not need to consider
actions that would take it out of that region since other agents are responsible for
other regions. Alternatively, an action influence could ensure that an agent considers
an action that it might not have otherwise (e.g., a communicative action).
Theorem A.3. Organizational influences to actions spaces are a necessary specifica-
tion language construct for the Dec-MDP framework I have adopted.
Proof. By Exhaustion. Assume the ODP wishes to constrain agent i’s local policy
space such that a certain action, ai, can never be performed, or even considered, in
state sti, but otherwise leave i’s local policy space unchanged. Influences to the agent’s
state factors, initial state distribution factors, transition function factors, and/or time
horizon can only prevent ai from consideration in s
t
i by preventing consideration of
sti entirely, which modifies agent i’s policy space beyond what is permitted in the
example and thus inappropriate. Influences to agent i’s reward function factors could
discourage the agent from performing ai, but do not prevent i from considering ai and
thus are inappropriate in this example. The only remaining construct for expressing
this influence is to modify agent i’s action space, and indeed, modifying the action
space can prevent agent i from performing and considering ai in s
t
i.
States. While influences to an agent’s state representation as a means to induce
coordination has not appeared in prior work, state abstraction more generally has
received a great deal of attention (Andre & Russell, 2002; Roy et al., 2005; Li et al.,
2006). One underlying concept to organizationally influencing an agent’s state factors
is that, given the organization, there could be state factors that an agent can sense that
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are unnecessary to represent. For example, in the firefighting domain, an agent may
not need to represent the intensity of distant fires because they are the responsibility
of other agents. In addition to restricting an agent’s local state space, an organization
might purposely augment an agent’s local state representation with new features,
where the ODP has decided that those features are crucial to distinguishing between
states that otherwise would look locally identical. Such augmentations can provide
additional information that improves operational performance, but it also falls on the
ODP to delineate the communication protocols and policies that would ensure an
agent possesses up-to-date values for those features despite not being able to directly
observe them. For instance, in the firefighting domain, to improve coordination, an
ODP might insist that each firefighter tell the others which fire it is now working
towards extinguishing.
Theorem A.4. Organizational influences to state factors are a necessary specification
language construct for the Dec-MDP framework I have adopted.
Proof. By Exhaustion. Assume there are two distinct global states that appear
locally identical to agent i, ∃st, s′t ∈ S, sti, s′ti ∈ Si, s.t. st 6= s′t, but sti = s′ti , where the
ODP has determined it is critical for agent i to perform distinct actions in those two
states. Influences to agent i’s local action space, reward function factors, transition
function factors, time horizon, and/or initial state distribution factors will not allow
agent i to distinguish between st and s′t. The only remaining construct for expressing
this influence is to modify agent i’s state factors, and indeed, modifying i’s state
representation (and the necessary accompanying transition and initial state influences)
could add another factor to agent i’s state representation that allows it to distinguish
between st and s′t.
Finite Time Horizon. Influences to an agent’s finite time horizon have not been
studied in prior research to the best of my knowledge. The central idea here is that an
ODP might determine that the improved parallelism from better coordination means
that agents can safely reason over shorter time horizons. Alternatively, the ODP
might improve coordination by increasing the time horizon for the agents, effectively
asking them to be less myopic.
Theorem A.5. Organizational influences to state factors are a necessary specification
language construct for the Dec-MDP framework I have adopted.
Proof. By Exhaustion. Assume the ODP wishes to influence the number of decision
points that agent i plans for. Influences to agent i’s rewards function factors, action
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spaces, and/or initial state distribution factors clearly can not impact the number of
decision points that i plans for. Influences to agent i’s states and transitions, however,
could meaningfully impact the number of decision points, for example, by adding a
state factor to keep track of the number of prior decision points, and then influencing
the transitions to deterministically (independently of the action taken) go to a terminal
state when the number of decision points exceeds some threshold. This threshold,
however, is precisely what the time horizon represents, and other than using this
threshold, state and/or transition influences cannot impact the number of decision
points. The only remaining construct for expressing this influence is to modify agent
i’s time horizon, and indeed, modifying the time horizon prompts agent i to plan for
more/fewer decision points.
As just illustrated, the time horizon is unnecessary to some extent in that an
identical effect can be realized within the state and transition influences (and simply
not explicitly labeled as the time horizon). In this case, however, I would also argue
that there should not be a finite time horizon explicitly represented in the agents’ local
models either, but rather implicitly encoded within their local states and transition
functions. Since I have presented the agent’s local models as explicitly representing
the finite time horizon, I advocate that any influences to the number of decision points
that relies on a threshold should also be labeled as influences to the finite time horizon,
which leads to the time horizon being a necessary construct given my agents’ decision
models as I have presented them.
Initial State Distribution. Like time horizon influences, I am unaware of any
prior work that influences an agent’s initial state distribution. If the ODP is permitted
to impose initial states on the MAS (e.g., initially spread the agents throughout
the grid in the firefighting domain), then influencing the MAS into more desirable,
coordinated initial configurations could be a powerful organizational mechanism (e.g.,
as my experiments in Section 3.5 demonstrate). Other uses for influences to the
agents initial state distribution factors include providing the necessary initialization
information for new state factors that agent i cannot directly observe.
Theorem A.6. Organizational influences to initial state distribution factors are a
necessary specification language construct for the Dec-MDP framework I have adopted.
Proof. By Direct Proof. As proved in Theorem A.4, adding a new state factor
to agent i’s initial state distribution is a necessary construct in my specification
language. Since every state factor must be covered by an initial state distribution
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factor (Definition 2.3), influences to an agent i’s initial state distribution factors are
also a necessary construct.
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